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Abstract 
This thesis studies the role of derivative claims in the English legal system in the 
context of protecting the company as a separate legal personality, through both the 
shareholders and employees acting as the derivative claim applicants.  
In spite of the aim of the English Law Commission to change the derivative claim to 
a more affordable and more accessible mechanism in the UK, still the current overly 
restricted approach to this mechanism prevents it to play an effective role in protecting 
the company. The academic literature brings several factors including the availability of 
other mechanisms of protection for shareholders, the cost of the derivative claim and the 
ambiguities in the procedural requirements as the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the 
derivative claim.  
This research argues that the derivative claim is the only direct mechanism of 
protection for the company as a separate legal personality, and that protection of the 
company extends beyond the protection of its shareholders. Therefore, the hurdles in the 
way of efficiency of the derivative claim should be removed and it should become a 
more effective mechanism of protection for the company as a whole. 
 Although the combination of other mechanisms of accountability for directors1  
could discipline directors and provide an environment, in which the derivative claim is 
less needed, however, they have been designed to protect the personal interests of 
                                                
1 These mechanisms include the market for corporate control, disclosure requirements, non-executive 
directors also in private companies, unfair prejudice conduct and shareholders agreements. 
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shareholders in the first instance and might not provide a potent protection for the 
company in all circumstances. This thesis argues that the derivative claim could work as 
a complementary mechanism and provide protection for the company in situations that 
the other mechanisms fail to do so. 
In order to enhance the protection of the company through the derivative claim, the 
thesis proposes that the scope of derivative claims’ applicants should be extended to 
employees. Employees have strong incentive to protect the company because they often 
invest in a company with their human capital, and are deeply dependent on the company 
well-being for their livelihoods and their pension benefits. In order to make the 
derivative claim a more affordable and accessible mechanism, the thesis proposes some 
reforms to derivative claim procedural requirements, including the shareholders 
ratification and the derivative claim costs. This thesis is a comparative study. The 
proposals for the derivative claim procedural requirements have been inspired by the 
derivative claim structures in the United States and New Zealand. The financial 
structure of the derivative claim in both countries has reduced the risk of the derivative 
claim for shareholders. Moreover, studying the role of the derivative claim in these 
jurisdictions confirms the thesis argument that although the availability of the other 
mechanisms of accountability could affect the need for the derivative claim, still the 
derivative claim has a role to play as a complementary mechanism. 
 
 
 
  1 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This thesis develops the arguments for the amendment of the statutory 
derivative claim in the UK with the view to the interests of the company rather 
than any stakeholder group. Therefore, before discussing the problems of the 
derivative claim in the UK, this thesis explores the origin and functions of the 
derivative claim as the only mechanism of protection for the company as a separate 
legal personality. It also explores the theories of the company to ascertain what the 
objective of the company is and for whose benefit the company should be 
protected through the derivative claim.  
1.1 The derivative claim: definition and origin 
The proper plaintiff principle is a fundamental principle of English corporate 
law. It states that if a wrong has been done to the company it is the company that 
has a cause of action and a primary right to sue in respect of any injury or damage. 
The principle was established in Foss v Harbottle,2 a case in which Mr. Foss 
and another company shareholder initiated a claim against the directors of the 
company, alleging loss of the company’s property as a result of the company’s 
directors engaging in illegal activities. The court rejected their claim, ruling that 
with regards to the harm to the company, the company itself is the proper plaintiff 
in an action. The decision in Foss v Harbottle established two main rules, the 
                                                
2 Foss v Harbottle [1843] 2 Hare 461 
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proper plaintiff principle and the internal management principle. According to the 
proper plaintiff principal, because the corporation itself is a legal entity, it has the 
initial right to make for itself. Any legal remedy would go to the company, thus 
individual shareholders only indirectly benefit if the litigation is successful.  
Under the internal management rule, it is generally accepted that the courts will 
not interfere with business decisions because it is believed that it is better if 
controlling shareholders decide on the internal issues within the company.3 
However, the Foss rules raised fundamental questions such as: what would 
happen if the controllers of the company are involved in the harm that happened to 
the company themselves and decide not to exercise the company’s right to sue the 
wrongdoers? What if the cause of action is against a person who is the controlling 
shareholder? How, if at all, would someone outside the wrongdoer team be able to 
pursue a claim to redress a wrong done to the company? The answer to these 
questions was established in the common law exceptions to Foss v Harbottle.4 In 
fact it was during the nineteenth century that courts started to consider that the 
Foss rules could produce injustice in some situations. As the result the courts  
eventually provided that shareholders could bring proceedings on behalf of the 
company in exceptional situations, in the form of a legal action which is known as 
the derivative action. 
  
                                                
3 ibid 490 
4 In the next chapter I will explain the common law exceptions to the Foss rule in more detail. 
Briefly, the so-called exceptions are (1) personal rights, (2) illegal or ultra vires acts, (3) majority 
control and (4) fraud on the minority. However, among these exceptions only majority control and 
fraud on minority are typically known as exceptions to the Foss v Harbottle rules. 
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1.2 Problems with the traditional definition of the derivative claim 
 
The derivative claim (also known as the derivative suit and the derivative 
action) generally has two main functions: the compensation role to recover 
damages for the harm wrongdoers have done to the company, and the deterrence 
function to prevent further harm to the company.  
A derivative claim can be considered by shareholders and, in the context of this 
thesis, employees where the directors or other wrongdoers or both have abused 
their position in the company. This could be in the form of directors’ opportunistic 
behaviour, for example when directors divert company assets or opportunities to 
themselves to obtain personal interest. Alternatively, directors may be negligent in 
managing the company and their negligence harms the company or takes the 
company to the verge of insolvency. Hence, the derivative claim is litigation on 
behalf of the company, which could force the wrongdoers to compensate the harm 
they have done to the company. Also, its deterrence function could work as a 
threat to potential wrongdoers and prevent further harm to the company. The 
deterrence function could work in situations where the claimants become aware of 
directors’ abuse of power through an ongoing transaction or notice any 
mismanagement, which would harm the company or take the company to the verge 
of insolvency. In such situations, they could initiate a derivative claim and curtail 
the ongoing harm through a court order. Even just the threat of the derivative claim 
might be enough to prevent wrongdoers from continuing their wrong conduct or 
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make them comply with their duties. However, despite its potential advantage, the 
traditional concept of the derivative claim limits its functions.  
Traditionally, the derivative claim is assumed to reduce agency costs 5  between 
shareholders and directors.6 Based on this assumption, the derivative claim function is 
to preserve the company from the wrongdoers’ harm for the benefit of shareholders 
because of the agency costs arising between the shareholders and directors. Hence, only 
shareholders should have the right to initiate the derivative claim. This definition is 
based on the shareholder primacy theory and has a limited scope. In the view of this 
thesis, the derivative claim is the only direct litigation mechanism for protecting the 
company as a separate legal personality from its shareholders. The protection of the 
company is important not only because of the interests of shareholders, but also for the 
sake of other stakeholders whose interests are tied to the long-term function and 
financial stability of the company. Hence, any harm to the company could put their 
interests in jeopardy. Therefore, limiting the availability of the derivative claim to 
shareholders, limits the function of the derivative claim in protecting the company as a 
whole. Shareholders may not always care about the long-term protection of the 
company as long as other mechanisms are available to protect their personal interests, 
and as long as they secure a high financial return on their investments in the short term. 
                                                
5 Agency cost is a type of internal cost in a company, traditionally based on the shareholder 
primacy theory. The agency cost arises from conflicts of interest between shareholders and directors. 
For example, shareholders want management to run the company in a way that increases shareholder 
value but directors may wish to grow the company in ways that maximise their personal power. 
Another type of agency cost is the one that arises from the conflict of interest between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders, known as the horizontal agency cost; see also Daniel R. 
Fischel and Michael Bradley, ‘The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’ (1986) 71 Cornell Law Review 261 
6 Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Application  
(Oxford University Press 2007) 
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Therefore, focusing on shareholder interests to define the function of the derivative 
claim would jeopardise companies’ long-term sustainability. 
To justify why as a mechanism of protection for the company the traditional concept 
of the derivative claim should change, the thesis explores the concept of the company as 
a separate legal personality and reviews the different corporate law theories on the 
objective of the company. The aim is to ascertain for whose benefit the company should 
be protected and who has the right to make a claim on behalf of the company.  
1.3 Corporate separate legal personality  
Under the doctrine of corporate separate personality, a company, even if it is a one-
man company with one shareholder controlling all its activities, is a separate legal 
entity, distinct from its shareholders, directors, etc. Shareholders do not own the 
company property. The company has its own rights and obligations. It could enter into 
contracts and be a party to legal proceeding and it could sue wrongdoers.7  
Ireland argues that the doctrine of corporate separate legal personality as a modern 
doctrine was established following the Companies Act 1862 and developed during the 
following years. 8  By the development of the share market from 1870 and the 
establishment of the share as an autonomous, liquid form of property, the concept of the 
                                                
7 Derek French, Stephan Mayson and Christopher Ryan, Company Law (Oxford University Press 
2017-2018) 125 
8 Paddy Ireland, ‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62(1) The Modern 
Law Review 42; Before the ratification of the Companies Act 1862, the concept of the “registered 
company” was introduced to the UK legal system by the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844. Also in later 
years the Limited Liability Act 1855 was passed to introduce the concept of limited liability, which 
provided  protection for the personal asserts of a company’s members. 
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company as a separate, depersonified entity was gradually formed.9 By the development 
of the market, professional directors started to take control of the company from 
shareholders. The change in control of the company was complemented by a decline in 
the right of shareholders to intervene in daily management of the companies, and the 
shift of power from the shareholders general meeting to the board.10 As a result of these 
changes, the role of shareholders changed from active participants in small companies 
who had the ownership right, to passive investors who have a diversified basket of 
securities and stand outside the company with a set of certain rights and expectations.11 
Therefore, the company eventually became ‘’the sole legal and equitable owner of the 
firm’s industrial capital’’ and the separated nature of the company emerged.12  
The concept of corporate legal personality, which was initially set out under the 
Companies Act 1862 was formally affirmed as a legal doctrine in the decision in 
Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd.13 The Salomon ruling established the principle that a 
company validly incorporated possesses a separate legal personality regardless of the 
number of its members. Nevertheless, even before the Salomon case the courts through 
several cases confirmed the separation of company from its shareholders.  
In Bligh v Brent, 14  for instance, the court considered the share as a personal 
entitlement to profit but not a claim on the company’s assets. The court held that 
                                                
9  Ireland ibid 
10 ibid 43 
11 ibid; also A.A. Berle and G.C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932; 
revised edn, New York: Harcourt Brace 1967) 244 
12 Ireland [n 8] 
13 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL) 
14 Bligh v Brent [1837] 2 Y&C Ex 268  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shareholders had no direct interest, legal or equitable, in the company’s property, only a 
right to dividends and a right to assign their shares for value. 
In the context of this thesis’ argument, more important than the decision in Bligh v 
Brent, is the court ruling in Foss v Harbottle15 where the court considered the company 
as a separate legal entity and established the proper plaintiff principle by holding that 
only the corporation can sue for wrongs done to it, not the shareholders.  
In Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co Ltd v Hawkins16 the court confirmed that a 
company can sue directly for any offensive statement made against it as a separate legal 
personality. That case also affirmed that a company could even sue its own members for 
libel. The courts have also stated that a company’s property belongs to it as a separate 
legal personality and not to its members.  
In Farrar v Farrars Ltd17 the court held that because a company is separate from its 
members, it could enter into transaction with its shareholders. In Percival v Wright18 the 
court held that the directors owed the duty to act in the best interest of the company as 
whole, not just of shareholders. In Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries 
Ltd19 the court confirmed the corporate separate personality by ruling that: “The rule 
(in Foss v. Harbottle) is the consequence of the fact that a corporation is a separate legal 
entity. Other consequences are limited liability and limited rights. The company is liable 
for its contracts and torts; the shareholder has no such liability. The company acquires 
causes of action for breaches of contract and for torts, which damage the company. No 
                                                
15 Foss v Harbottle [1843] 2 Hare 461 
16 Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co Ltd v Hawkins [1859] Hurl & N 87 
17 Farrar v Farrars Ltd [1888] 40 ChD 395 
18 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 ch App Cas 409   
19 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 204 
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cause of action vests in the shareholder. When the shareholder acquires a share he 
accepts the fact that the value of his investment follows the fortunes of the company and 
that he can only exercise his influence over the fortunes of the company by the exercise 
of his voting rights in general meeting".20 The Prudential Assurance judgment reveals 
both sides of the corporate separate personality. On one hand, the company assets are 
separated from the shareholders, and the company as a distinct personality from its 
shareholders has its own obligations. Therefore, shareholders liability for the company’s 
unpaid debts is limited to the amount of shares they have in the company,21 and the 
shareholder assets are not available to meet the company’s debts.22 The company is the 
legal and beneficial owner of its own property. The shareholders are not the beneficiary 
owners of the company property.23 Even the death of its members would not end the 
legal existence of the company, even if they were the sole shareholders of the 
company.24 On the other hand, the company has its own separate rights too. Hence, 
shareholders are not allowed to have a direct remedy in situations that the company is 
harmed by the wrongdoers’ conduct. In such situations, shareholders loss is only 
reflective of harm to the company for which only company could sue and get a remedy. 
Even in a situation that shareholders are allowed to initiate a claim on behalf of the 
company, they could only benefit from the recovery through an increase in their share 
                                                
20 ibid 210-211  
21 Salomon v Salomon & Company Ltd [6]; CA 2006, s 3(2); also Brenda Hannington, Company Law 
(Oxford University Press 2015) 45 
22  Hannington ibid 46; Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law (2nd edn, 2009) 6-10; 
Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 387  
23 The Maritime Trader [1981] 2 Lloyds Rep 153; see also Ayton Ltd v Popely [2005] EWHC810 (ch), 
LTL 19/92005  
24 French, Mayson and Ryan [n7] 133; also Australian case Re Noel Tedman Holding Pty Ltd [1967] 
QdR 561 
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values. The principle knows as the “reflective loss” principle25. The rule prevents a 
person other than the company getting any direct remedy for the harm to the company, 
even if that person has a separate personal cause of action against the wrongdoer that is 
different from that of the company.26  
Despite the affirmation of the corporate separate personality from its shareholders 
under the status and the case law,27 the nature of corporate personality and the company 
objective has always been the subject of some theoretical debates. Contractarians, for 
instance, believe that company does not exist. It is the product of a contractual 
agreement between its owners to endorse the power conferred by shareholders on 
directors.28 The concession theory, on the other hand, argues that the corporate separate 
personality does exist; however, such legal consideration for corporations could only be 
created by the act of state and, therefore, the exact content of corporate personality 
depends on policy considerations.29 The nature entity theory considers that the company 
and shareholders are fundamentally separate to legitimate limited liability.30 The theory 
                                                
25 Hannington [n 21] p 46; The reflective loss principle is a common law rule, which was established 
under Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1982]. The rule indicates that shareholders 
should not get a double recovery for the same harm to the company and to their personal interests.  
26 Day v Cook [2001] EWCA Civ 781, [2004] EWCA Civ 592, [2002] I BCLC 1, 791 
27 The only known exception to the corporate separate personality is piercing the corporate veil. In the 
case of piercing the corporate veil, the rights and liabilities of the company could be attributed to other 
natural or legal persons. Such circumstances could happen through a contract, or statutory provisions or if 
the company is agent of its members or in the case of beneficial ownership of trust property. However, in 
Prest v Pedrodel Resources Ltd [2013] and Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corporation v Recoletos Ltd 
[2014], the courts have brought the concept of the piercing the corporate veil into questions because of the 
difficulty of finding any underlying principle for the rule and by holding that it does not necessarily 
happen that much in practice. 
28 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) Colombia Law Review 
1416, 1426   
29 CD Stone, ‘Should Trees have standing? Toward legal Rights for natural objects?’ (1972) 45 S 
California Law Review  450; French, Mayson and Ryan [n 7] 157 
30  Mary Stokes, ‘Company Law and Legal Theory’ in William Twining (ed), Legal Theory and 
Common Law (Oxford: Blackwells 1986)  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puts the board of directors at the centre of control of the company.31 In addition to the 
mentioned theories, other corporation theories such as economic market, organization 
and legal model have set explicit or implicit assumptions on what the company is or for 
whose interest directors should run the company. The detailed discussions of different 
notions of the company, although interesting, are outside the subject of this thesis.  To 
the extent, which is relevant, this thesis adopts the doctrine of corporate separate 
personality and argues that based on this doctrine, shareholders are not the owners of the 
company so they should not be the only group of stakeholders in the UK who have the 
right to make a derivative claim. The other stakeholders whose interests are tied to the 
company, in the context of this thesis the employees, should also be able to protect the 
company from the wrongdoers’ harm. The argument is that the Company Act 2006 has 
recognized the company separate personality by indicating that a director of a company 
owes his general duties to the company.32 This means that directors’ fiduciary duties are 
to the company as a whole and not to individual shareholders. Nonetheless, the 
shareholder value principle which has been encapsulated in 172 CA 2006 indicates that 
‘A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most 
likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole’. 
This means that in practice, directors own their duty to the capital rather than the 
company.33 Therefore, only shareholders could be involved in the management of the 
company, and only shareholders could initiate a claim on behalf of the company when 
                                                
31 Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 97 
North-Western Law Review 547, 550  
32 s 170(1) and 170(3) CA 2006  
33 Lorraine Talbot, Critical Company Law ( Routledge 2015) 128-131 
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directors are in breach of their fiduciary duties. This approach still roots in the UK 
corporate law traditional shareholder value attitude and in the view of this thesis is 
problematic. In the following, I discuss the main theories on company law and also the 
UK approach to the company’s objective to justify my argument that the company 
should be protected through the derivative claim for the interest of the company itself.  
1.4 Shareholder primacy principle   
Shareholder primacy theory, which traditionally underpins corporate law in the UK, 
generally requires directors to act in the interest of shareholders exclusively.  
Under the theory, the company should be operated in a way that gives the highest 
priority to the interests of shareholders. It treats shareholders as the subjects of 
directors’ accountability,34 and the only stakeholder group which has the enforcement 
power on behalf of the company and could impact in the management of the company.35 
One suggestion is that the idea of ‘shareholder primacy’ could go back to descriptions 
of early share ownership in corporations where shareholders were legitimately 
considered as equitable owners of the whole activity.36  However, the theory in its 
traditional form was eventually created after Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published 
their famous ideology of separation of ownership and control and managerial model of 
                                                
34 For instance, the UK “enlighten shareholder value principle” encapsulated in section 172 of the 
Companies Act 2006, explicitly provides that directors’ duties are to promote the long-term success of the 
company for the benefit of the members as a whole.    
35 Elaine Lynch, ‘Section 172: A Ground-Breaking Reform of Director’s Duties, or the Emperor’s 
New Clothes?’ (2012) 33(7) Company Lawyer 196; Iris Chiu, ‘Operationalizing a stakeholder conception 
in company law ‘ (2016) 10(4) Law and Financial Markets Review 174 
36 Samuel Williston, ‘History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800 Part II (concluded)’ 
(1888) 2(4) Harvard Law Review  
 
 
12 
the company.37 They acknowledged a very strong management and weak shareholders 
with small influence.38  To prevent the directors from self- interested conduct, they 
proposed that directors should have fiduciary duties to the company for the benefit of 
the shareholders. Although in their paper they did not explicitly promote the idea that 
the interests of shareholders should be privileged over the interests of other corporate 
stakeholders, they considered shareholders as important corporate stakeholders in the 
company.39 
During the 1970s, with the rise of the ‘law and economics’ movement,40 ‘shareholder 
primacy theory’ was eventually established. The law and economic theorists generally 
consider shareholder primacy as a principle for running a business, which gives the 
interests of shareholders the highest priority over the other stakeholders in the company. 
Milton Friedman in his paper argues that the only proper aim of a company is the 
pursuit of profit for the company’s owners, which are the shareholders.41 He traces the 
origin of shareholder primacy theory back to Henry Maine, who was one of the leaders 
of the ‘law and economics’ movement.42 
                                                
37  Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and private property (Transaction 
publishers 1991)  
38 ibid 277  
39  Lynn Stout, The shareholder value myth: How putting shareholders first harms investors, 
corporations, and the public (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2012)  
40  Lynn Stout, ‘The toxic side effects of shareholder primacy’ (2013) 161(7) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 2003-2023  
41 Milton Friedman, ‘The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits’ (2007) Corporate 
ethics and corporate governance (2007) 32   
42 ibid 81; Henry Manne, ‘Mergers and the market for corporate control’ (1965) 73(2)  
Journal of Political economy 110-120; Lynn Stout [n 39]  
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In 1976, Michael Jensen and William Meckling in their seminal paper43 enhanced 
‘shareholder primacy’ to a greater extent. Jensen and Meckling argued that the main 
problem in companies is pushing wayward managers (agents) to truthfully consider the 
interests of the owners (shareholders/principals). The model of ‘shareholder primacy’, 
which Jensen and Meckling promoted, was the ‘nexus of contracts’ model. In their 
paper, they brought the notion of the company into question. They argued that the 
company is not an entity in its own right; it is in fact a legal fiction, which comprises of 
a nexus of contracting individuals. It is a nexus of a set of contracting relationships, 
which serves as a focus for a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of 
individuals are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations.44 
Just like Friedman, Jensen and Meckling assumed that the shareholders are the company 
owners and the only residual claimants. 45  Many ‘law and economy’ scholars later 
adopted the phrase and the people who adopt the nexus of contracts view are known as 
‘Contractarians’. The Contractarians believe that the company itself does not really 
exist; it is merely the nexus, connection, or link amongst various corresponding 
relationships, thus it cannot have any social responsibility.46 They believe that the rights 
for which shareholders are eligible come not from their ownership of property but from 
the terms, they have negotiated. Hence, the whole notion of ownership as entitlement is 
                                                
43 Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs 
and ownership structure’ (1976) 3(4) Journal of financial Economics 305-360  
44 ibid 
45 Lynn Stout [n 39]  
46 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ [1989] Chicago Law Review 1416, 
1426 
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sidestepped. 47  For instance, Easterbrook and Fischel regard a company as a set of 
contracts among managers, workers and the contributors of the capital.48 In this regards, 
company law supplies “terms most venture would have negotiated, where the costs of 
negotiating at arm’s length for every contingency sufficiently low”. 49  Bainbridge 
regards the company as a nexus of contracts that is a combination of different peoples’ 
efforts coordinating together to provide goods or services.50 However, among all people 
involved in the company, the proponents of the ‘nexus of contracts’ privilege the 
protection of shareholders because in their opinion shareholders are the central players 
and the only risk-takers in the company. The reason is that shareholders bring the capital 
into a firm and because of the insecurity of future return, they bear the most risk. The 
exception to this is if the company goes into insolvency, when creditors also become the 
residual claimants. Hence, the shareholders’ situation in the company should be 
different from other stakeholders and protecting their interests should be privileged 
above protecting the interests of the other groups.51 Easterbrook and Fischel argued that 
the company should be run for the benefit of shareholders as the only residual claimant 
of the company, because only shareholders have incentives to maximise profits in the 
company and monitor the other stakeholders, so they are likely to foster economic 
                                                
47 Lorrain Talbot, ‘Why shareholders shouldn’t vote: A Marxist-progressive critique of shareholder 
empowerment’ (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 791  
48 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, ‘Limited liability and the corporation’ (1985) 52(1) The 
University of Chicago Law Review 89-117  
49 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel R, Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press 1996) 15 
50 Stephan Bainbridge, The new corporate governance in theory and practice (Oxford University 
Press 2008) 28-30  
51 Merrick Dodd, ‘For whom are corporate managers trustees?’ (1932) 45(7) Harvard Law Review 
1145-1163 
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efficiency. 52  Shareholders are the only groups of stakeholders who are completely 
dependent on the business’ success to ensure any return from their contribution to the 
company’s capital. All the other stakeholders such as employees, creditors and suppliers 
have fixed rights, which have been defined by their contracts with the company. For 
instance, employment contracts set out employees’ wages and salaries. Shareholders, 
however, have no guarantee of returns to their investment, which come in the form of 
dividends or increases in the company’s share value. Moreover, in the case of the 
company’s insolvency, shareholders will stand last in line to receive any surplus left 
over after the contractual claims of the other stakeholders have been met.53  On the 
other hand, the argument is that as residual claimants, shareholders have the best 
incentives to monitor other stakeholders, maximise the total value of the firm, and thus 
maximise social welfare. Therefore, residual risk-bearing should be complemented with 
residual control and the power to change the arrangement of the use of production 
factors.54 Based on this argument, the proponents of shareholder primacy believe that 
directors are contractually obliged to pursue shareholder value. They would be in breach 
of their duty if they pursued the interests of other stakeholders, with whom they have no 
contractual relationship.55 Under the nexus of contracts theory, the contract between the 
shareholders as the owners of the company’s capital and directors who make business 
decisions and run the company on behalf of shareholders knowns as an agency 
                                                
52 ibid  
53 John Buchanan, Dominic Heesang Chai and Simon Deakin, Hedge fund activism in Japan: The 
limits of shareholder primacy (Cambridge University Press 2012) 43  
54 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ‘Production, information costs, and economic organization’ 
(1972) 62(5) American Economic Review 777-795 
55 Lorrain Talbot [n 47] 15  
 
 
16 
relationship.56 Nonetheless, the interests of the shareholders are not always in line with 
the decisions taken by directors as the agent. Since directors may find themselves in 
situations where their contractual duty to shareholders comes into conflict with their 
own self-interest, ‘agency costs’ arise between shareholders and directors. In such 
situations, the incompleteness of the contract between directors and shareholders 
requires completing by the state of incorporation, which it does by upholding fiduciary 
duties.57 Nonetheless, according to the nexus of contracts theory, companies step in 
where market contractual arrangement dealings fail. The shareholders, as principals, 
require additional mechanisms to reduce these co-called agency costs, either through 
establishment of the proper incentives such as performance-related pay or through 
disciplining mechanisms such as those provided by the market for corporate control.58 
Contractarians argue for the governing force of takeovers by emphasising on the ability 
of the market to hold all available public information in time and reflect this in stock 
prices.59 Managerial ineffectiveness will presumably lower the value of shares in the 
marketplace, and subsequently create an opportunity for potential bidders to acquire the 
business. Hence, the market for corporate control assumes to work as a corrective 
mechanism against directors’ failure to maximise shareholders’ wealth.60 However, this 
argument might not always be correct. Corporate takeovers are extremely expensive, 
therefore the scale of a manager's wrong must be enormously high in order to affect the 
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company’s share price or attract a bid for control. The agency cost- related issues might 
not be large enough to trigger a takeover bid even if they result in a notable reduction in 
a company’s share value. The other argument is that the markets for corporate control 
may replace wrongdoing directors through the hostile takeover but it would not 
necessarily punish them for the damages they have done to the company. Because of 
this reason, the market for corporate control could not substitute the role of the 
derivative claim for protecting the company as whole.  
1.5 The shareholder primacy theory limitations 
One dominant view under corporate law is that the ‘shareholder primacy’ is an 
economically efficient corporate objective.61 However, the theory has many limitations. 
As was discussed above, based on the corporate separate personality doctrine the 
company does not belong to shareholders and shareholders are not the owners of the 
company, so the company protection should not be important for preserving the interests 
of shareholders only.  
The problem with the shareholder primacy theory is that it makes the board of 
directors dependent on the will of the majority shareholders, which might cause profit-
seeking in the shareholders’ interest, but not necessarily in the company’s interest as a 
whole.62 Proponents of ‘shareholder primacy’ argue that the purpose of corporate law 
should be reducing agency cost between shareholders and directors. In the view of this 
research, this argument is not correct because even in terms of protecting shareholders’ 
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interests, shareholder primacy theory might not always protect the interests of minority 
shareholders. Directors are usually under the influence of institutional shareholders and 
in some cases, majority shareholders have strong conflicts of interest with the minority 
shareholders.63 Moreover, the agency costs do not always arise from the conflict of 
interests between shareholders and directors, they could arise from directors’ 
opportunistic behaviour, which damages the interests of other stakeholders such as 
employees in the company. In such situations, they should have the equal right to 
initiate a claim on behalf of the company and protect their own interests. Furthermore, 
the shareholder primacy principle with its focuses on short-term earnings performance 
of the company fails to maximise social wealth.64 Corporate short-termism can produce 
unpleasant consequences for society.65 For instance, directors’ opportunistic behaviour 
or negligence could result in the company’s insolvency and as a result employees lose 
their job in the company. In such a situation, not only employees receive personal harm 
(including the significant time and cost they should spend to find a new job) but also it 
could have harmful social effect. The fact is that institutional shareholders may sacrifice 
other stakeholders’ interests while extracting benefits from the company. They may not 
sue directors for their exploitative behaviour, which harm the company as long as they 
can extract short-term benefit, produced by those wrongdoers. This opportunistic 
behaviour could happen in the form of excessive levels of pay to the company’s 
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executives or in the form of dividends or redemption to controlling shareholders. Such 
wealth transfers might exceed the company’s profits or diminish the company’s long-
term investment capital and consequently take the company into insolvency.66 BHS 
could be a good example in this regard. All the wrong conduct that Sir Philip Green and 
others have done in BHS are grounds for the derivative claim including the negligence, 
mismanagement, and misappropriation of the company’s assets through dividends and a 
variety of intragroup transactions. Nevertheless, in BHS – which was a very large 
private company – there was no shareholder from outside the wrongdoers’ team to act 
as a watchdog and control and stop the wrongdoers’ misconduct. Even if BHS was not a 
private family-run business and there were some outside shareholders with some ability 
to control the directors’ conduct, for the reasons brought in above they might not care 
about the company employees’ pension scheme. Hence, the question is why should only 
shareholders be able to initiate a claim on behalf of the company? Why not other 
stakeholders such as employees as well who have more long-term interest in the 
company and are more willing to protect it. The truth is that the shareholder primacy 
theory narrows down the company protection by focusing on shareholders’ short-term 
wealth maximisation, and putting the enforcement mechanisms against the wrongdoers 
in the hands of shareholders who could be indifferent toward the harm to the company. 
Majority shareholders could encourage the board of director to take excessive risk to 
maximise their profit in a short time. These short-termism goals could be worsened by 
                                                
66 Chiu ibid 174; Anres Ramirez and Nezih Altay, ‘Risk and the Multinational Corporation Revisited: 
The Case of Natural Disasters and Corporate Cash Holdings (2011) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1772969; 
Ron Blackwell and Thomas Kochan,’ Restoring Public Purpose to the Private Corporation” (2013) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214621 
 
 
20 
performance-related remuneration for company management, which is designed to align 
directors’ interests with those of shareholders. Consequently, it would shift the decision-
making, which could help the suitability of the company in the long run to the kinds of 
decisions that would only produce short-term profits desired by shareholders.67 
Based on these arguments, the shareholder primacy theory fails to provide a balance 
between the directors’ power on the one hand and a long time protection for the 
company on the other. Therefore, the right to make a claim on behalf of the company 
should not be limited to shareholders.  
1.6 Stakeholder theory  
Another important corporate law theory on the objectives of the company is the 
stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory provides that the objective of the company is to 
benefit all stakeholders. Therefore, the company should not be run for the interest of 
shareholders, but the interests of other stakeholders who can affect or be affected by the 
actions of a company.68 This theory’s argument is that in addition to shareholders, other 
stakeholders should have claims on a company’s assets because they contribute to a 
company’s capital.69 Like the shareholder theory, there are several concepts involved 
with the stakeholder theory, which have created different arguments and conclusions 
mainly on the issue of who the stakeholders are.70 For instance, Freeman described 
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stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievements of the firm’s objectives”.71 Still this definition should be narrowed down 
between different stakeholders since their interests and influence can vary in the 
company.72 I will discuss this later in this chapter.  
Overall, the stakeholder theory emphasises organisational success in achieving the 
corporate objective of profitability through stakeholder management.73 The emphasis on 
relationships with customers, employees, suppliers and investors means that the 
proponents of the stakeholder theory argue that corporate governance is more about 
satisfying all stakeholders’ interests than only satisfying those of the shareholder.74 
Clarkson defines a company as a system of stakeholders operating within the larger 
system of the host society that provides the necessary legal and market infrastructure for 
the firm’s activities.75 The purpose of the company is to create wealth or value for its 
stakeholders who play different roles in the company by converting their stakes into 
goods and services.76 Also, the argument is that directors should be required by law to 
act in the interest of the whole company, so that shareholder maximisation is based on 
the stakeholder theory that only when all of the other stakeholders’ relationships of the 
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corporation are fully recognised and developed can long-term shareholder value be 
realised.77 The rationale behind stakeholder theory is that corporate governance should 
promote the success of the company as a whole, because the stakeholders’ benefit is 
vital to the company’s overall achievement. This would protect the interests of the 
company’s employees, keep positive business relationships with suppliers and 
customers, ensure a positive social reputation, and reduce the negative impact on society 
as a whole.78 Therefore, stakeholder theory requires decision makers to identify the 
legitimate stakeholders and their interests first, then weigh and balance the latter against 
each other and finally make their choice on that basis.79  
1.7 Critiques of stakeholder theory  
One critique of the opponents of stakeholder theory is that under this theory directors 
need to consider the interests of all stakeholders. This would cause poor decision-
making in the company because directors would be responsible to no one.80 The answer 
could be that directors owe their duties to the company and should be responsible to the 
company, and that the company is comprised of several groups of stakeholders. 
Therefore, directors should make decisions which are in the interests of the company. 
Another argument of the opponents is that stakeholders other than the shareholders are 
able to protect themselves through the terms of the contracts that they make with the 
company, while shareholders do not have this kind of protection. Hence, shareholders 
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are vulnerable81 and they might be at the mercy of the directors. The answer is that no 
contract is comprehensive to cover all issues and it is virtually impossible to predict all 
the possible future harms in a contract. Furthermore, in terms of vulnerability, 
stakeholders such as employees could be far more valuable than shareholders in a 
company because they normally have only one job and it can be put in jeopardy by the 
opportunistic behaviour of directors or their negligence. Shareholders, especially in 
public companies, are arguably able to diversify risk more easily through their profile or 
they still have the option to sell their shares and get out of the company in case of any 
harm. In addition to that, other stakeholders might be able to protect their personal 
interests through the contracts they have with the company to some extent. For instance, 
in case of a company’s insolvency, employees might get some compensation through 
their contracts or from the various regulations outside the corporate law such as the 
Redundancy Act. Nevertheless, such protections would not protect the company from 
directors’ opportunistic behaviour harm and consequently would not protect employees’ 
interests, including their job in the company. Hence, while for shareholders removing 
themselves from the risk of corporate loss in case of harm to the company might be 
comparatively easier involving selling their shares, the same cannot be said for other 
stakeholders such as employees. Mitchell argues that employees risk redundancy and 
will have committed themselves to a geographical location and perhaps spent years 
accumulating firm-specific skills, which may not be easily transferable.82Therefore, 
broadening the scope of the derivative claim to other stakeholders would enhance the 
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directors’ accountability in the company and would protect the other stakeholders’ 
reflective interest in the company.  
Based on these arguments, this thesis, in line with the stakeholder theory, argues that 
the protection of the company is important for the interest of all the stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, the thesis accepts that there are some flaws in this theory. For example, 
there is no clear guidance to define who the important stakeholders in the company are. 
In the context of this thesis, this issue is important in terms of defining the stakeholders 
who should be empowered with the right to make a claim on behalf of the company. It 
is not possible to assign such a right to an infinite group of stakeholders as it might open 
the ground for abuse. The derivative claim right should be given to the stakeholders who 
have strong incentives to save the company, such as employees.  
Since this thesis argument concerns with the protection of the company as a separate 
legal personality rather than personal interest of constituencies groups, it could not 
completely rely on the stakeholder theory to justify its arguments for the derivative 
claim. Therefore, the concept of the company, which this thesis is trying to put forward, 
is more in line with the Andrew Keay entity maximisation and sustainability model of 
company. Professor Keay views the company as an entity, which should be able to 
maximise profit but whose assets should be protected and sustained. This theory focuses 
on the company as a separate legal entity and argues that the objective of the company 
is to maximise the wealth of the entity as an entity and, at the same time, to ensure that 
the company is sustained financially for the benefit of all the stakeholders.83 Hence, the 
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theory argues for the fostering of the company’s wealth, which will require directors 
attempting to increase the overall long-run market value of the company as a whole, 
taking into account the investment made by various people and groups.84 Under the 
maximisation and sustainability model, the maximisation of the company profits may 
inter alia improve dividends for shareholder, or reduce risk for creditors or improve 
working conditions, greater job security and bonuses for employees. However, the focus 
would be on the company itself and its long-term sustainability and what will enhance 
its position, rather than the focus being on the stakeholders and their personal interests.85 
In line with this perspective, the thesis argument is that the long-term financial stability 
of the company should be enhanced. Therefore, in order to increase the company 
protection, the derivative claim should be more accessible and should be expanded to 
the other stakeholders. However, as was discussed above, some stakeholders should be 
prioritized over the others in having the derivative claim because stakeholders do not 
have the same level of interest in the company. Before discussing which stakeholders 
have strong incentive to protect the company, since the focus of this research is on the 
derivative claim in the UK, I explore the English law approach to the issue of the 
company objective. The aim is to ascertain which stakeholders’ interest has been 
prioritized under the UK corporate law and why this approach should change.  
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1.8 The UK corporate governance and paths to enlightened shareholder value  
The most challenging issue for any corporate governance system in the view of this 
thesis is to keep the balance between the ability of the directors to run the company 
efficiently, and the protection of the company for the interest of all the stakeholders. 
Depending on the history, traditions, culture, politics and several other factors, every 
jurisdiction could have a specific system to achieve the above goal. 
 In the UK, corporate governance in public companies is based on shareholder value 
primacy. Therefore, private ownership rights and shareholders’ profit-maximisation is 
considered as the foundation of UK company law.86 Consequently, only shareholders 
can hold directors accountable to their fiduciary duties through different mechanisms 
including the derivative claim. In fact several historical, political and economic 
components have contributed to each other in forming the framework of shareholder 
primacy in the English legal system. One reason for the rise of shareholder primacy in 
the UK was the increase in hostile takeovers in the UK in the 1950s, which was partially 
a consequence of a Labour Government amendment to the Companies Act. 87  The 
Companies Act 1948 made the investigation of potential takeover targets easier, 
requiring companies to disclose information on their current earnings which made them 
                                                
86 John Armour et al., ‘Shareholder primacy and the trajectory of UK corporate governance’ 
(2003) 41(3) British Journal of Industrial Relations 531-555; David Collison et al., ‘Shareholder 
primacy in UK corporate law: an exploration of the rationale and evidence’ (2011), available at < 
http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-technical/business-law/rr-125-001.pdf 
(accessed at 16/5/2017); Shuangge Wen, Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Governance: Legal 
Aspects, Practices and Future Directions (Routledge 2013) 
87 Christopher Bruner, Corporate governance in the common-law world:  
The political foundations of shareholder power (Cambridge University Press 2013)  
147; Andrew Johnston, ‘Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on 
 the City Code’ (2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 422, 427 
 
 
27 
more detectable by outsiders.88 Together with that, the 1948 Companies Act reforms 
gave shareholders power to remove directors without cause by ordinary resolution of a 
simple majority. Such a right permitted would-be acquirers to achieve substantial 
governance power through open-market share purchases. 89  Likewise, the growing 
assertion of shareholder primacy was related with the rise of increasingly powerful 
institutional shareholders in the UK. The focus of financial activities in the City of 
London, the limited role of courts in regulating corporate activity, and the enthusiasm 
for referring to self-regulation by the major financial trade associations and professional 
organizations, gave the UK institutional shareholders more possibility to control the 
company. 90  Moreover, the institutional shareholders’ informal, ‘behind-the-scenes’ 
impact on the conduct and policy of listed companies resulted in the growth of a series 
of self-regulatory codes in the areas of takeover, specifically the City Code on 
Takeovers and Merger, which gave more weight to the shareholder primacy theory.91 
The regulatory takeover regime has been formally oriented toward shareholders’ interest 
since 1968.92 UK Takeover Code is comprised of a series of principles, which gives 
shareholders strong power in relation to takeover offers. It is one of the main differences 
between the UK takeover regulation and the US takeover mechanism. In the United 
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States, as it will be discussed in chapter four, courts in Delaware let the board  to take 
into account the interests of other corporate stakeholders at the time of takeover. 
Moreover the rise of institutional shareholder power in the UK could be linked to the 
post-war policy which was “depriorition of private shareholders wealth maximization 
and encouraging the growth of public shareholders in the form of financial institutions 
such as pension funds”.93 The other reason that gave rise to the UK shareholder-centric 
corporate governance was the economic industrial crisis in the 1970s. Recession and 
public debt caused substantial gaps in balance of power between the multilateral powers 
of unions, management and state. Years of industrial conflict had split traditional 
political positions and in 1979 the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher was 
voted into government with a new, radical, neo-liberal agenda. 94  The neo-liberal 
approach favours the Coase95 version of shareholder primacy, which endorses the idea 
that the market needs to be free from any controls, which do not facilitate bargaining. In 
the UK, the government’s policy was formed with the aim of steady development, not 
high profits. The policy also included the privatization of industry. “Nationalised 
industries were created to provide secure employment for millions and fix prices” and 
“British industry was crammed with potential value for shareholders”.96 Overall, from 
early 1980 the United Kingdom shifted toward the service industry and that has 
increased the shareholder value corporate governance goals. The UK corporate 
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governance has fundamentally been constructed on the shareholder primacy principle. 
The Cadbury Report explicitly highlighted the predominance of the principal-agent 
relationship between shareholders and directors in corporate operations.97 Later, the 
1998 Hampel Report clarified that the single prevailing objective shared by all listed 
companies, whatever their size or type of business, is the protection and the greatest 
practicable enhancement over time of their shareholders’ investment.98  
1.9 The Enlightened Shareholder Value principle and partial consideration of 
other stakeholders interests 
Despite the UK’s long-term shareholder primacy approach, until the enactment of the 
Companies Act 2006, UK corporate law had taken an uncertain approach towards the 
issue of for whose benefit the company should be run and protected. During the post-
war period, there were even some attempts to directly incorporate employees’ interests 
into the UK’s corporate legal framework.99 
 However in response to growing pressures from globalisation and the impact of the 
European Commission company law harmonisation programme, in March 1998 the 
Department of Trade and Industry initiated a substantial review of company law in the 
UK with the aim of establishing a framework which was up to date, competitive and 
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designed for the next century.100 The comprehensive review that was initiated was to be 
supervised by a Steering Group that became known as the Company Law Review 
Steering Group (CLRSG). One of the important considerations in the company law 
reform process was to add more stakeholder consideration to corporate law. The 
argument was that the corporate law framework at the time failed to sufficiently 
recognise that businesses normally best generate wealth where participants operate 
harmoniously as teams, and that managers should recognise the wider interests of the 
community in their activities. 101  Acknowledging the significance of stakeholder 
interests, the Company Law Review Steering Group’s aim was to define whose interests 
company law should serve, and the legal means by which to do so.  
In order to achieve its aim, the CLRSG proposed two possible approaches: the 
stakeholder theory (pluralism) approach and the enlightened shareholder value 
approach. Both proposals were based on the instrumental significance of stable and 
trusting stakeholding relationships for the overall welfare of the corporation, rather than 
the normative value presented by Contractarians. 102 However, although the CLRSG 
recognised the importance of stakeholder interest, it identified a number of problems 
with regards to the application of the stakeholder principle in the UK corporate law.103 
The steering group argued that stakeholder protection should generally be pursued 
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outside corporate law and in other areas of law and public policy, rather than through 
changes in the framework of company law, as such reform would require an essential 
change to the current framework and could lead to unpredictable and damaging 
effects.104 The CLRSG was also concerned that giving directors discretion to consider 
stakeholders’ interests (other than shareholders’ interests) would dangerously distract 
directors at the expense of economic growth and international competitiveness.105 The 
CLRSG considered that the aim of modernising company law was to provide greater 
clarity on what is expected of directors and make corporate law more accessible.106 
Therefore, considering the aforementioned problems with stakeholder primacy, the 
CLRSG rejected stakeholder primacy as the objective of corporate law and instead 
adopted a new approach named as the enlightened shareholder value approach. The 
CLRSG noted that the practical benefits of adopting the enlightened shareholder value 
is that it would not involve a fundamental change in the orientation of company law, 
which is concerned to maximise shareholder wealth. However, it would involve a little 
modification. The CLRSG continued that the law at the time was ‘focused on the short 
term and narrow interest of members at the expense of what is in the broader and longer 
term sense of the enterprise, 107  and suggested that this could be addressed by 
reformulating directors’ duties to give effect to the enlightened shareholder value 
approach. Also, it suggested that the approach would require directors to adopt a 
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broader and longer view of their role. 108  Under the enlightened shareholder value 
approach, the CLRSG argued that ‘the ultimate objective of companies as currently 
enshrined in law is to generate maximum value for shareholders which is in principle 
the best means also of securing overall prosperity and welfare.109 The CLRSG stated 
that a considerable majority of reactions to its earlier consultation paper clearly 
favoured continuation of the shareholder value approach, but with consideration of a 
balanced way to promote relationships with stakeholders, such as employees and 
suppliers.110 Finally, the CLRSG recommendation resulted in the establishment of the 
enlightened shareholder value under section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 as the 
latest UK company law framework.  
1.10 Enlightened Shareholder Value and lack of enforcement power for 
stakeholders 
As mentioned, the UK enlightened shareholder value is now encapsulated in section 
172 of the Companies Act 2006. Section 172 is entitled: “duty to promote the success of 
the company”. However, the new “enlightened shareholder value” considers stakeholder 
interests only as instrumental to long-term shareholder wealth maximisation.111 In fact, 
the enlightened shareholder value was expected to drive long-term company 
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 (London: DTI 2000) para 2.11; also Andrew Keay, The enlightened shareholder value  
principle and corporate governance (Routledge 2012) 76   
111 For a detailed account of the arguments put forward in the debate, see Sarah Kiarie, ‘Crossroads: 
Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the 
United Kingdom Take?’ (2006) 17 International Company and Commercial Law Review  329, 338-340, 
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performance and maximise overall competitiveness, wealth, and welfare for all. 112 
However, despite such expectation the enlightened shareholder value approach does not 
put any actual obligation on directors to consider the interest of any other stakeholder 
group than the shareholders. 113  The biggest problem with section 172 is that 
stakeholders do not have the right to make a claim on behalf of the company to protect 
their reflective interests. In fact, the provision grants unrestrained discretion to the 
directors to act in a way that they consider would most likely promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of the members.114 While the Company Law Review Steering 
Group rejected the stakeholders theory based on the argument that it would give 
directors a wide range of discretion which would be difficult to police115, the current 
enlightened shareholder value principle’s approach has inherited the same problem. The 
section gives wide discretion to directors without a clear wording in the Act or 
providing a guideline for directors regarding how and when they should consider the 
interests of other stakeholders, including employees. The flaws and ambiguities in 
section 172 Companies Act 2006 which have been identified and discussed by many 
scholars, have now been identified by the UK Government as well. As a result, the 
Government recently under the new corporate governance reforms has attempted to 
clarify these ambiguities. However, the Government has no plan to change the wording 
                                                
112 Department of Trade and Industry, Company Law Reform Presented to Parliament by the Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry by Command of Her Majesty 20-21 (March 2005) 
113 Geoffrey Morse et al., Palmer’s Company Law: Annotated Guide to the Companies Act 2006 
(Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 168 
114 Keay [n 110] 107; see also Daniel Attenborough, ‘The Company Law Reform Bill: An Analysis of 
Directors ‘Duties and the Objective of the Company’ (2006) 27 Company Law 162, 167 
115 Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Strategic  
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of section 172. Instead, it has declared that the GC 100 group of the largest listed 
companies will be required to prepare guidance on the practical interpretation of the 
directors’ duty under section 172 of Companies Act 2006.116 The practical effect of the 
proposed guidance would not be clear until the details of this proposal is revealed. In the 
view of this thesis, the most important criticism of this Act is still the lack of an 
enforcement mechanism for other stakeholders to enable them to protect the company. 
The new corporate governance proposal has also failed to consider such a right for other 
stakeholders. The only group with actual enforcement possibilities remain shareholders 
under the statutory derivative claim. Ultimately, the law only serves shareholders’ 
interests. However, as has been discussed above, shareholders in many situations have 
only short-term profit maximisation interest and might only care about their own 
investing returns in the near future. Hence, they might be reluctant to be involved in 
corporate governance matters and costly monitoring of directors’ conduct. Thus, they 
may not care if the directors earn profits by breaking the law or hurting the company in 
the long run.117 Therefore, they might not be eager to make a time consuming claim on 
behalf of the company to discipline directors for the benefit of other stakeholders.  
                                                
116 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance Reform, 
 The Government response to the green paper consultation, Action 8, para 2.45 
117 Lorraine Talbot, ‘Why shareholders shouldn’t vote: a Marxist-progressive critique of shareholder 
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1.11 Without a derivative claim right for other stakeholders, the new corporate 
governance reform would not enhance the company’s protection 
In order to support companies to take better decisions for their own long-term benefit 
and that of the economy overall, the UK Government published a Green Paper on 
November 2016 to set out a new and better corporate governance framework. The 
purpose for publishing the Green Paper was to ‘stimulate a debate on a range of options 
for strengthening the UK’s corporate governance, including options for increasing 
shareholder influence over executive pay and strengthening the employee, customer and 
supplier voice at boardroom level’.118 In response to its Green Paper, in August 2017 the 
Government published a package of corporate governance reforms.119 The proposed 
reforms cover three main areas of executive pay, greater employee and other 
stakeholder engagement at board level and corporate governance in large privately 
companies. I will explore the proposed reforms in detail in chapter seven where I will 
argue for the employees’ derivative claim right. However, as a brief explanation here, 
my argument is that although the UK Government package of reforms is a positive 
move in enhancing company protection, still it would not increase the overall protection 
of the company especially in the long run. The key problem is that under these reforms 
the Government still assumes that shareholders are the only important group of 
stakeholders in the company. It fails to address deep-rooted problems of short-termism, 
                                                
118Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance Reform Green 
Paper (29 November 2016), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/corporate-
governance-reform (visited 24/11/2017) 
119 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, The Government response to Green paper 
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unjustifiable pay differences, and the lack of consideration of the other stakeholders’ 
interests in the running of their company in a proper way. Still only shareholders will 
receive a report on executive pay, and only shareholders have the right to make a claim 
on behalf of the company. Even in terms of strengthening the employees’ voice, 
shareholders would still have more rights than the employees themselves. Directors 
should still report to shareholders on how they comply with their duty to consider the 
employees interest in the company. Also, it is very plausible that shareholders play a 
greater role in forming the proposed advisory council and choosing the employees’ 
director than the employees in the company. For the reasons that I have discussed 
before, it is a problematic approach. Shareholders may not have a long-term interest 
especially in public companies. They may not have concern about giving extraordinary 
rewards to executives as long as they receive quick and big returns for their financial 
investments. They may not care when directors harm the company assets with their 
opportunistic behaviour and put the other stakeholders’ interests, such as the employees’ 
jobs, in jeopardy as long as they are benefiting from their short-term investment in the 
company. In terms of private companies, due to the lack of external mechanisms such as 
market regulators scrutiny, the wrongdoers’ abuses remain unchecked and it is very 
unlikely that the proposed corporate governance code would affect the internal 
management of these types of companies. In private companies like BHS, there is no 
shareholder outside the wrongdoers’ team to monitor their compliance with their 
fiduciary duties or with the proposed corporate governance code. Hence, to increase the 
accountability of directors and controlling shareholders toward the company, as a 
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complementary to the proposed reforms the right for initiating the derivative claim 
should be broadened to other stakeholders. The need for broadening the derivative claim 
right to other stakeholders in the company was mentioned by some of the respondents to 
the Government Green Paper as well.120 This thesis argues that the derivative claim 
could be an effective mechanism for sanctioning directors where they fail to comply 
with their duties and in situations that the other mechanism of corporate governance 
fails to hold them accountable. Therefore, the problem with the derivative claim 
procedural requirements, including the problem of derivative claim costs, should be 
solved; also, the scope of the derivative claim applicants should be broadened to the 
other stakeholders.  
1.12 Who should have the derivative claim right to protect the company? 
Although the protection of the company is important for the benefit of all the 
stakeholders whose interests are tied to the company’s stability, granting the derivative 
claim right to wide undefined groups of stakeholders could increase the risk of abuse of 
litigation. The reason is that stakeholders have different types of interests in the 
company and not all of them have strong incentives and engagement with the company 
to initiate a time consuming and expensive claim on its behalf against the wrongdoers. 
Therefore, key stakeholders in the company should be identified. As was mentioned 
before, different stakeholder theorists suggest different approaches to identifying the 
key stakeholders. 121  Freeman, for instance, considers “owners, managers, local 
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community, employees, suppliers and customers” as key stakeholders.122 Donaldson and 
Preston’s approach of identifying is whether stakeholders are important for normative, 
instrumental or descriptive reasons, 123  and Gao and Sirgy classify stakeholders as 
“internal”, “external” and “distal” stakeholders which have different levels of 
engagement to the company. 124  However, in defining who should, in addition to 
shareholders, have the right to initiate the derivative claim, this thesis relies on 
Company Act 2006 itself. Under the factors listed in paragraphs (a) – (f) of section 
172(1) CA 2006, directors are required to consider the interests of employees. In fact, 
the only groups of corporate stakeholders whose interest in the company has been 
clearly recognized are employees and creditors.125 For the other groups, section 172 
requires directors “to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others”. 126  In addition to that, under the new corporate governance 
proposals, the Government has proposed three voluntary mechanisms for engaging 
employees with the board, these being a designated non-executive director, a formal 
employee advisory or a director from the workforce. This thesis criteria for choosing 
which stakeholders should have the derivative claim right is not that whose stakeholder 
interest is more important but that which stakeholder is in a better position to protect the 
                                                
122 Ronald Freeman, ‘A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation’, in MBE Clarkson (ed), The 
Corporation and Its Stakeholders (University of Toronto Press, 1998) 125 
123  Thomas Donaldson and Lee Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation’ (1995) 20 
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company. Although protecting the company from wrongdoers’ harm could be very 
important for the creditors as well, due to the limited scope of the thesis I prefer the 
employees’ derivative claim right for the following reasons. First, employees are 
arguably in a better position than other stakeholders, even shareholders, to be aware of 
the directors’ misconduct and possibly prevent it through the threat of a derivative claim 
or an actual initiation of the claim. They are working in the company and could have 
better access to the company’s documents or even by word of mouth be aware of 
directors’ wrong conduct that harms the company. More important than that, the 
employees ‘economic fortune is tied to the company’s fate and they could be affected 
by the directors’ bad decision or opportunistic behaviour that harms the company.127 
They have strong interests and incentives, even more than shareholders, to protect the 
company from the wrongdoers’ harm because they typically have only one job. If the 
company goes insolvent and they lose their job, it puts a very significant impact on their 
ability to earn a livelihood. In addition to that, broadening the derivative claim right to 
employees would be a threat to potential wrongdoers in the company who in turn might 
be more cautious about the consequences of their misconduct. They would be warned 
that even if there is no shareholder outside their team to monitor their conduct, still the 
company employees could challenge their opportunistic behaviour, which harms the 
company. Therefore, the employees derivative claim right could enhance the company 
protection for the benefit of all the other stakeholders by holding directors more 
accountable toward the company. I will discuss this issue further in chapter seven, and 
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also explain why the Government proposed options for engaging the employees with the 
board are not sufficient.  
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1.13 How could the derivative claim enhance the protection of the company? 
Now that the reasons for broadening the derivative claim scope to employees in the 
UK have been discussed, it needs to be explained how and when the derivative claim 
could save the company. 
To the great extent, the rationale behind the derivative claim depends on the role that 
the derivative claim is expected to play. Those who focus merely on the financial 
compensatory role of the derivative claim would find few justifications for this 
mechanism. Obviously, the compensatory function has limitations. The potential 
compensation may be too small to make spending money and taking up the directors’ 
time in a legal action worthwhile for the corporation.128 
In terms of minority shareholders acting as the applicant in a derivative claim, they 
might have owned shares when the defendant’s wrongdoing occurred, but they may 
have sold their shares by the time of the court order for recovery. Therefore, while the 
applicant would not benefit from the compensation, the incoming shareholders would 
receive a windfall gain.129 It would be the same for employees as the applicant that, 
while they could have strong reasons to sue directors and bring financial compensation 
to the company to keep the company financially stable, still they would also be more 
willing to have the power to stop the harm to the company in the first instance. 
Therefore, the mere monetary compensation function cannot completely justify the role 
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of the derivative claims in protecting the company and the rationale says that the 
deterrence role should be as important. The deterrence role of the derivative claim is 
traditionally overtaken by the financial compensatory role. However, in the view of this 
thesis, in addition to the compensation role the deterrent aspect of derivative litigation 
can play a significant role in preventing harm to the company and holding directors 
accountable for breach of their fiduciary duties. In the context of misconduct, which has 
harmed the company, the derivative claim may validly generate intangible (non-
monetary, yet valuable) relief for companies in the form of a court order that would stop 
wrongdoers from continuing their misconduct. It may also bring changes to the 
company’s board structure through a settlement, which would prevent further harm to 
the company. These changes could happen in different forms. From the nullification of 
an election of negligent or opportunistic directors, to an injunction to stop the director 
from carrying out or continuing with a termination of a detrimental transaction, which 
would take the company to the verge of insolvency. Especially in relation to private 
companies, the deterrence role of the derivative claim and consequently the non-
monetary benefit could be very important. Since private companies usually have fewer 
shareholders and the ownership and control is more concentrated, it would be difficult 
for the minority shareholders or employees to dismiss a wrongdoing majority from the 
company. If we only consider the possibility of financial relief, it must be remembered 
that monies recovered still go back under the wrongdoers’ control in the company and 
they would also indirectly benefit from the compensation based on the shares they 
owned. However, non-monetary benefits of the derivative claim, such as terminating a 
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self-dealing transaction which is harmful for the company, through a court order or 
settlement can be helpful in stopping the wrongdoers’ misconduct and preventing 
further harm to the company. Hence, the deterrence role of a derivative claim could 
even be more important than the compensation role for both minority shareholders and 
employees as the applicants. Arguably, even just the threat of the derivative claim 
(rather than an actual derivative litigation) might be enough to prevent wrongdoers from 
continuing their incorrect conduct or make them comply with their duties. Therefore, 
the deterrence function could potentially improve the corporate governance of the 
company in situations that minority shareholders and employees do not have enough 
power to make those corporate governance changes and prevent harm to the company 
through the other mechanisms. In addition to preventing the current misconduct, a 
successful derivative litigation is assumed to deter misconduct by potential wrongdoers, 
who are in similar situations at other companies too.130 
Reisberg notes that the deterrence role of the derivative claim works both ex 
ante 131  and ex post. 132  The ex ante aspect involves the likelihood and the 
magnitude of the threat of liability for those who decide to engage in wrongdoing, 
and ex post is actual liability for the whole harm they cause.133 Reisberg argues 
that the deterrent value of derivative litigation is tied to the social value of such 
litigation. In fact, the deterrence function is linked to the social opprobrium that 
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wrongdoers receive as the consequence of being sued in a derivative claim.134 
Reisberg correctly reasons that since the days when Wigram V-C described the 
corporation as a ‘private partnership’ in Foss v Harbottle, corporate activities, 
specifically directors’ business decision-making, have become more of a ‘public’ 
concern. Consequently, in most derivative litigation the norm invoked has a 
substantial, public source.135 The higher the society regards the derivative claim 
role, the more efficient will be the deterrent role of the claim. Therefore, directors’ 
misconduct in a company will fail to deliver social condemnation if the derivative 
claim merely appears to be a financial remedy for a private group.136  Hence, 
Reisberg concludes that the derivative claim does not accomplish its complete 
efficiency in controlling directors’ behaviour in the UK because the English 
system still considers derivative claims to be a remedy for private disputes and so 
the deterrence role, and consequently the social effect of derivative claims, is 
ignored.137 Reviewing the case law in the UK confirms Reisberg’s allegation by 
revealing that courts consistently consider the probable financial return to the 
company as the only basis for procedural rulings in derivative litigation.  
In line with Reisberg’s opinion, this thesis takes the view that such an approach 
should change. In this regards the broadening of the derivative claims right to 
employees, which is one of the research proposals, could enhance the deterrent 
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role of the derivative claim and would add to the social impact of it. The more 
voices raise the issue of wrongdoer malpractice in the company the more society 
would be aware of the issue, and consequently the more cautious would be the 
potential wrongdoers about the consequences of their misconduct. Also, to 
enhance the deterrence function of the derivative claim this thesis proposes that in 
issuing the indemnity costs order for the derivative claim applicants, the court 
should consider the non-monetary but substantial changes that a derivative claim 
could bring to the company. The consideration of the non-monetary aspect could 
add to the derivative claim requirement under the statutory derivative claim 
provisions. Such consideration is important in terms of giving the minority 
shareholders and employees the power to be involved in the management of the 
company. This is the power that in an ordinary situation they would not have. I 
will discuss this issue further in chapter six. 
 
1.14 The derivative claim: an exceptional but effective remedy 
 
The important point which needs to be clarified by this thesis is that the 
derivative claim is not a mechanism which should be frequently in use. As stated 
earlier in this chapter, the derivative claim was established as the exception to the 
general proper claimant principle. The proper claimant principle, which is a 
leading English precedent rule in corporate law, indicates that in ordinary 
situations if any wrong has been done to a company, the proper claimant is the 
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company itself. Only in very exceptional circumstances where the board of 
directors refuses to prosecute the wrongdoers (because for example wrongdoers 
are in control of the board), the derivatives claim becomes applicable. Therefore, 
by nature, the derivative claim is an exceptional remedy and something of last 
resort, which is not supposed to be frequently used by shareholders or other 
stakeholders, which in the context of this research are limited to the company’s 
employees.  
The reason is clear, like any other mechanism of protection, the derivative claim 
has both benefits and limitations and over-referring to it may not always benefit 
the company. 138  Therefore, the role of procedural requirements and the court 
scrutiny are important for protecting the company from vexatious claims.  
However, the mentioned risk of abuse does not bring the potential benefits of the 
derivative claim into question. While on the one hand derivative claims should be 
under control to not allow troublesome claimants to impede the carrying on of the 
proper business of the company, on the other hand they could still serve as a 
supplement to other mechanisms that operate to hold directors accountable toward 
their fiduciary duties.139  
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As Reisberg argues, none of the so-called mechanisms of accountability are 
optimal under all circumstances.140 I add to the Reisberg argument that the other 
corporate governance mechanisms of accountability might not always be optimal 
for protection of the company because they have been established to protect the 
interest of shareholders in the first instance. Hence, they protect the company to 
the extent that the shareholders (particularly institutional shareholders) care about 
the protection of the company as a whole. Therefore, derivative claims can play an 
efficient role in situations where those other mechanisms fail to detect or curb 
wrongdoers’ misconduct in the company. The thesis argument is the efficacy of the 
derivative claim demonstrates by not the quantity of the claim but by the quality of 
the rules governing the derivative claim procedure. Based on this argument, 
regardless of how much in practice the derivative claim might be needed, under the 
law the derivative claim should be an accessible and affordable mechanism to the 
extent that in exceptional circumstances, it becomes worthwhile pursuing a claim. 
 
1.15 The current situation of the derivative claim in the UK  
 
The UK statutory derivative claim scheme, which has been based on the 
recommendations of the English Law Commission, has been arguably one of the 
most debated reforms introduced by the Companies Act 2006. The new statutory 
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criteria have been set out under sections 261-263 of this Act.141 In comparison to 
common law derivative action, under the statutory regime, theoretical grounds for 
bringing the derivative claim have been extended to negligence from which 
directors do not benefit, as well as for other breaches of duty by directors. 
Moreover, pre-existing concepts of ‘fraud on the minority’ while ‘wrongdoers are 
in control’ have been removed. 
Also, since the introduction of the statutory derivative claim, in sections of the 
Act relating to proceedings in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the term 
‘derivative action’ has changed to the term ‘derivative claim’. The Scottish action 
is still called a derivative ‘action’. 142  However, since the enactment of the 
Companies Act 2006, the statutory derivative claim has been the centre of ongoing 
academic debate on its efficacy in holding directors responsible for carrying out 
their fiduciary duties.143 
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The main argument among scholars is that in comparison to the previous 
position under the common law, the new statutory scheme has brought no change 
in terms of accessibility to derivative claims for shareholders and the remedy is 
still rarely used in England. Several reasons have been given for the paucity of 
derivative litigation in the UK, such as flaws and ambiguities in the statutory 
derivative claim provisions,144 the costs of derivative litigation for shareholders,145 
the availability of other mechanisms of accountability for directors 146  and the 
English legal system’s traditional approach to shareholder litigation.147 Overall, the 
common agreement among the UK corporate law scholars is that the statutory 
derivative claim under the Companies Act 2006, as it stands, has not achieved the 
English Law Commission’s ambition of making the derivative process a more 
accessible and affordable mechanism. 
This research attempts to move away from the given arguments and extend the 
discussion on the role of derivative claims beyond its current scope. In this regards, 
the research analyses the function of the statutory derivative claim in the UK in the 
context of a mechanism for protecting the company as a separate personality from 
its shareholders, and the view of both minority shareholders and employees as the 
applicants. The research argues that the biggest problem with the derivative claim 
in the UK is that the current structure has been based on shareholder value 
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The Representative Problem’ (2006) 3(1) European Company and Financial Law Review  
69-108 
 
 
50 
principle. In order for the derivative claim to be an efficient mechanism for 
protection of the company as a whole, the current structure should be changed.  
1.16 The research objective  
 The objective of this research is to propose reforms that would help the 
statutory derivative claim work better in protecting the company as a whole, and in 
holding directors of UK companies accountable for their fiduciary duties toward 
the company as a separate legal entity.  
 
1.16.1 The main critiques: 
In the view of this thesis, there are two main critiques to the current role of the 
derivative claim in the UK. The first is that in spite of the reforms to the common 
law derivative actions, the approach to the derivative claim is overly restricted. It 
means that the statutory derivative claim fails to set smooth, clear procedural 
requirements. The problem arises from the ambiguities with the procedure 
requirements including the difficulties with the prima facie case, the role of the 
shareholders ratification and disinterested member’s view towards the claim and 
the derivative litigation costs. The second critique is that the scope of the 
derivative claim applicants is limited to shareholders.  
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1.16.2 The thesis arguments: 
 
The thesis arguments are as follows: 
(1) The company is a separate legal personality, which should be protected for the 
interest of all the stakeholders in the long run. Therefore, the role of derivative 
claim as the only mechanism of the protection for the company itself should be 
reconsidered. 
(2) The efficiency of the derivative claim stands from not the quantity number of 
the derivative claim cases but the quality of the law that rules the derivative 
claim procedure. Therefore, under UK corporate law the derivative claim 
should be an affordable and accessible mechanism for the circumstances that it 
is needed. The derivative claim could still have a deterrent effect even if it is 
litigated a few time. 
(3) The availability of the other mechanisms of accountability for directors in 
private and public companies could provide an environment in which the 
derivative claim is less needed. However, these mechanisms have been 
established to protect the interests of shareholders in the first instance. They 
protect the company to the extent that shareholders care. So the protection of 
the company through these mechanisms might not be optimal in all 
circumstances.  
(4) Shareholders might not care about the protection of the company as a whole as 
long as the other mechanisms of protection preserve their personal rights or 
 
 
52 
they can receive profits for their investment in the short term. Therefore, to 
enhance the protection of the company, the scope of derivative claim 
applicants should be broadened to the other stakeholders.  
(5) In addition to shareholders, employees should have the right to make the 
derivative claim. They invest in the company with their skill and their 
economic fortune is tied to the company’s well-being. Therefore, they have 
strong incentive to protect the company from the wrongdoers’ harm. 
1.16.3 What should be reformed in the current statutory derivative framework? 
The originality of the thesis comes from the proposals for changing the 
shareholder-based structure of the statutory derivative claim. These proposals 
include broadening the scope of the derivative claim applicants to the employees, 
as well as reforms to the derivative claim procedure requirements. The thesis 
argues that the ambiguities with the prima facie case should be solved. One 
suggestion is to making the two-stages procedure into one. Moreover, the role of 
shareholder ratification in the context of derivative claim should be clarified. The 
suggestion is that the ratification should be taken into account by the court as a 
subsidiary consideration and only in the context of shareholders derivative claim. 
In terms of the reforms to the litigation costs, the research argues that the cost of 
the derivative litigation is a major hurdle in the way of derivative claims in the 
UK. The thesis proposes a blended approach, which has been inspired from the 
United States and New Zealand derivative claim financial structures. The general 
proposal is that the company should bear the costs of the litigation in the first 
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instance. Also, in issuing the cost order, the possibility of non-pecuniary benefits 
of the derivative claim should be considered. The detailed proposals for the role of 
ratification and the litigation costs will be discussed in chapter six. 
1.17 Would the research proposals increase the risk of vexatious claims against the 
company? 
In the view of this research, the risk of abuse of the derivative claim has been 
over-estimated. The derivative claim is a claim on behalf of the company and the 
grounds for bringing the claim are limited to the specific wrongs, which damage 
the company. Also, all the probable benefits go back to the company. There is low 
possibility that shareholders or employees make a time-consuming and risky 
litigation from which they would not get any personal benefit only with the aim of 
abusing the directors. Additionally, the derivative claim’s procedural requirements 
and the court’s scrutiny provide sufficient safeguards to prevent any probable 
vexatious claim. Lastly, directors are usually protected by liability insurance for 
their business decisions. The company takes out the insurance to cover the costs of 
any probable litigation against them. It would be unfair if minority shareholders 
and employees, who are exposed to the opportunistic behaviour of company 
directors, would not have a fairly accessible and affordable remedy to protect their 
reflective interests in the company against the wrongdoers’ harm.   
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1.18 The comparative aspects 
 
This research is a comparative study between the UK, the United States and 
New Zealand. The comparative aspects are mainly on the shareholders acting as 
the applicants for derivative claims because just like in the UK, in both of the other 
jurisdictions only shareholders can initiate a claim on behalf of the company. 
However, since the aim of this research is to improve the statutory derivative claim 
framework in the UK as a mechanism for protecting the company itself, regardless 
of who acts as the derivative claim applicant, the United States and New Zealand 
derivative claim structures could still be inspiring.   
The reason for studying derivative suits in the United States is mainly the 
financial structure of the American derivative suits, which through contingency fee 
agreements and its supporting doctrines reduces the risk of litigation costs for the 
shareholders’ meritorious derivative suit. The research suggests that the US 
consideration of the non-monetary benefits of derivative suits under the corporate 
benefit doctrine could be inspiring and would enhance the deterrence function of 
the derivative claim in the UK. The US derivative suits also confirm this thesis’ 
argument that a high quantity of derivative claims is not necessarily a sign of the 
efficacy of this mechanism, and not all of those claims bring benefit to the 
company. The reason for comparing New Zealand is that its corporate governance 
system shares many similarities to the corporate governance system in the UK; 
however, under the New Zealand law, the derivative action provisions have made a 
more affordable and accessible derivative action framework, which, in terms of 
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procedural requirements and derivative litigation costs, could be inspiring for the 
UK. In addition, in terms of availability of the regulations, New Zealand provides 
a good balance between different mechanisms of accountability for directors.  
In the context of the employees’ derivative claim, like in the UK there is no 
comparative ground with the United States and New Zealand. However, the 
consideration of the other stakeholders’ interests have been manifested in terms of 
hostile takeovers in the United States where the Delaware courts in several cases 
have given priority to the interest of the company as a whole. The research has 
found similar attitudes in empowering other stakeholders, including the creditors 
and employees, in other jurisdictions such as Canada and South Africa. In chapter 
seven I will refer to these jurisdictions’ approach. 
 
1.19 Research methodology 
 
It is usually the aim of the research that determines which methods could be 
useful. 
This research mainly aims to make the derivative claim a more efficient 
mechanism in protecting the company alongside the other mechanisms of 
accountability for directors in the UK.  
The research has been based on the black letter law methodology. This means 
the research arguments are based on analysing the derivative claim statutory 
provisions under the Companies Act 2006 and the relevant cases; the wording and 
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interpretation of the derivative claim statutory provisions, as well as existing 
literature. The same methodology is used to analyse the other mechanisms of 
accountability for directors such as the unfair prejudice conduct, public 
enforcement and non-executive directors. The black letter methodology forms the 
epistemological basis for the research. It provides a proper evaluation of the role 
that the derivative claim could play in the UK alongside the other mechanisms. In 
addition to that, the research is also a comparative legal study. 
The thesis adopts a comparative method to assess the function of the derivative 
claim in other jurisdictions. The research looks at the United States and New 
Zealand derivative claim statutes; the law reports, case law and the existing 
literature to determine how these jurisdictions approach the derivative claim. The 
information in this research has been gathered from primary resources such as case 
law, statutory codes, and Government policy documents such as the parliamentary 
reports in the UK, the United States and New Zealand. This research also draws 
from secondary resources such as books, journal articles, online articles, Law 
Reports, working papers and other online resources in all three jurisdictions. 
The arguments in this research have been based on the availability and clarity of 
the derivative claim regulations, rather than the statistical and empirical data. This 
methodology is in line with the thesis argument that regardless of how much the 
derivative claim might be needed in practice, it should be an affordable and 
accessible mechanism under the law. Therefore, the efficiency of the derivative 
claim depends on how much the law makes it a comprehensible and accessible 
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mechanism that is worth pursuing in exceptional situations. The argument is that 
reliance on the empirical data to show the efficiency of the derivative claim might 
not always be accurate.  The need for using the derivative claim depends on the 
many political, cultural and economic elements and could be varied from time to 
time and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The other argument is that the deterrence 
function of the derivative claim, which could play an important role in preventing 
harm to the company, could not be measured under the statistics. The empirical 
data could not estimate how much in practice the deterrence function of the 
derivative claim could work as a threat and prevent the wrongdoers from damaging 
the company. While the thesis does not rely on statistical and empirical 
information, it refers to some anecdotal experience (an example or a case) to 
discuss the role of the derivative claim in other jurisdictions.  
 
1.20 The thesis structure  
The arguments of this research which have been discussed in this chapter are going 
to be addressed throughout the thesis as follows. 
Chapter two reviews the origin of the derivative claims in the UK, problems with the 
derivative action under the common law, and the English Law Commission proposals 
for the reform. The chapter then discusses the current problems with the procedure 
requirements and proposes some reforms.  
Chapter three reviews the limitations of the other mechanisms of accountability for 
directors in protection of the company as a whole. The chapter argues that these 
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mechanisms have been formed to protect the shareholders’ interest and might not 
provide a long-term protection for the company in all circumstances. Therefore, the 
derivative claim could work as a complementary to these mechanisms to enhance the 
company’s protection.  
Chapter four examines the financial structure of the derivative suits in the United 
States to gain inspiration for the derivative litigation costs in the UK. However, the 
chapter also explores the reasons for the frequency of the derivative suits in the United 
States and argues why too much incident of derivative suits is not a good thing.  
Chapter five studies the role of derivative claims (known as derivative actions) in 
New Zealand. The chapter explains how in terms of procedural requirements and the 
approach to the derivative litigation costs, New Zealand could be inspiring for the UK. 
In addition to that, the chapter shows how under the law New Zealand has kept a 
balance between different mechanisms of accountability for directors.  
Chapter six discusses the research proposals for ratification and derivative claims 
costs in the UK. The chapter proposes reforms to the role of the ratification. It also 
reviews the current available funding mechanisms for derivative litigation costs and 
their shortcomings, and proposes a blended approach, which has been inspired by both 
the United States and New Zealand. 
Chapter seven discusses the proposal for expanding derivative claim rights to 
employees. It reviews the UK’s historical attempts in considering the employees’ 
interests under company law. It also reviews the recent corporate governance proposal 
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for involving employees in the management of the company and brings the reasons why 
employees still need to have the derivative claim right to protect the company.  
Chapter eight is the thesis conclusion, which includes a summary of the research 
arguments, an outline of the proposals for reforms and gives some recommendations for 
future research.  
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Chapter Two: Derivative claims in the UK  
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with research critique to the current structure of the statutory 
derivative claim.  
Before the ratification of the statutory derivative claim under the Companies 
Act 2006, the derivative action in the UK was ruled under the common law. The 
common law had limited the minority shareholders’ ability to sue derivatively by 
requiring them to prove the fraud on the minority while wrongdoers were in 
control of the company. However, the minority shareholders’ difficulty with 
common law derivative action finally came to the attention of the English Law 
Commission. The English Law Commission acknowledged at the time that the 
aspiration was to provide a cost-effective mechanism and give derivative actions a 
greater transparency, making the derivative procedure a more accessible and 
affordable mechanism.148 The UK Government later implemented the English Law 
Commission’s recommendations for the derivative action in the statutory 
derivative claim under the Companies Act 2006. 
However, this thesis argues that in spite of the reforms to the common law 
derivative actions, the approach to the derivative claim is still overly restricted and 
that the statutory derivative claim fails to set smooth, clear procedural 
requirements for the derivative claim. In addition, the main critique to the 
                                                
148 The Law Commission Final Report 246, Cm 3769, October 1997, para para 6.9 
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derivative claim reforms is that the Law Commission failed to clarify the concept 
of derivative claim as a remedy for the company as separate legal personality. In 
fact, the Law Commission, based on the traditional shareholder value beliefs, 
reviewed the amendments to the derivative action in the context of shareholders 
remedies. The Commission failed to properly convey the principle of corporate 
separate personality, which was emphasized by the court in Foss v Harbottle and 
clear the boundary between the shareholders personal remedies and the company 
remedies. Consequently, such an approach resulted in ambiguities in the English 
Law Commission’s proposed reforms. These ambiguities have now been 
transferred to the statutory derivative claim provisions. This chapter reviews the 
development of the derivative claim from common law to the statutory derivative 
claim and discusses the current problems in the statutory framework and proposes 
some reforms.  
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2.2 The common law derivative action and the exceptions to the Foss principles 
The common law derivative action was established under the so-called 
‘exceptions’ to the Foss v Harbottle rule during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. English courts generally accepted four exceptions to the Foss v Harbottle 
rule. Those ‘exceptions’ were: (1) personal rights, (2) illegal or ultra vires acts, (3) 
the special majority requirements, and (4) fraud on the minority. A fifth exception, 
the interest of justice was also suggested in the case of Edwards v Halliwell, but it 
was not generally recognised by later courts. In the words of Jenkins LJ:149 ‘the 
rule is not an inflexible one and will be relaxed when necessary in the interests of 
justice’. 
The exceptions are explained below. 
2.2.1 Personal rights 
This ‘exception’ stated that if the alleged wrong was a breach of 
shareholders’ personal rights, and therefore could be remedied by a personal action
, then the claim on behalf of the company does not apply.  
In fact, the personal right exception was not really an exception to the Foss 
rules, but rather indicated circumstances under which a claim on behalf of the 
company does not apply. In Edwards v Halliwell, Jenkins LJ stated that150: ‘Any 
member who wished to sue in such a case was free to do so, not in the right of the 
company but in their own right, to protect from invasion their individual rights 
as members’. The reason that the personal right was recognised as an exception to 
                                                
149 Edwards v Halliwell [1952] 2 All ER 1064 1067 
150 ibid 
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the Foss rule could be because of the confusion shown regularly by the courts 
regarding the true nature of derivative action, 151  or perhaps because of the 
uncertainty regarding the company’s separate legal personality and the 
distinction between personal and company rights. What is the source of this 
confusion? The answer is as follows.  
2.2.1.1 Blurred interaction between personal claims and the corporate claim 
Shareholders personal claims are claims in which the wrongdoing directors or 
controlling shareholders harm the personal interests of shareholders in the 
company. The shareholder personal rights in the company include the right to 
dividends, payment on the winding-up of the company and participation in 
meetings of the company. The violation of any of these personal rights could result 
in shareholder personal claims, which occur in several forms. One personal claim 
is personal action under section 33 Companies Act 2006 for breach of the statutory 
contract between the company and the shareholder. The shareholder has the 
personal right to have the company’s constitution complied with by the company 
and can sue the company personally to ensure that. The other important personal 
claim is ‘unfair prejudice conduct’, where shareholders have the right to make a 
claim in the circumstances that the company’s affairs are being conducted in a 
manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the members’ interests.152 The other form of 
                                                
151 In Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373, 391, Lord Denning stated that the plaintiff 
claim on behalf of himself and all the other shareholders, gave a misleading impression of what 
really occurs in a derivative action: ‘in a derivative action the plaintiff shareholder is not acting as a 
representative of the other shareholders, but as a representative of the company’. 
152 Companies Act 2006 s 994 
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shareholders personal claim is the ‘just and equitable winding up’, which happens 
if shareholders are discontented with the way the company is being run. 
However, the boundary between personal rights and the corporate right is not 
always clear to the courts. The company’s claims are the claims in which the 
directors’ act or omission involves negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of 
trust to the company. 153  It could include the situation that a director diverts 
company property to himself, or gains a benefit in expense of harm to the company 
or is negligent in managing the company.  
 On some occasions, directors’ breach of duty violates both shareholders’ 
personal right and the right that belongs to the company. Considering the role of 
the ‘reflective loss principle’154 such a situation could cause confusion for the 
courts in deciding which remedy they should order the wrongdoing directors to 
pay. 155  The confusing interaction between the unfair prejudice claim and the 
derivative claim will be further discussed in chapter two. 
In the view of this thesis, the main reason for the courts’ confusion between the 
personal rights and company rights arises from the fact that shareholders are still 
traditionally considered as the only beneficiaries of the company under English 
law. Therefore, the company’s remedy is still considered being the same as the 
shareholders remedy because only shareholders benefit from these remedies. 
Broadening the derivative claim to the employees could help in changing this 
                                                
153 Companies Act 2006 s 260(3) 
154 The reflective loss principle is a common law rule, which indicates that shareholders should 
not get a double recovery for the same harm to the company and to their personal interests.  
155 Len Sealy and Sarah Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law (10th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2013) 703 
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attitude to the companies claim. It would make the concept of corporate separate 
personality more clear by indicating that shareholders are not the only stakeholders 
who have the rights and benefits in the company.  
  
 
2.2.2 Illegal or ultra vires acts 
 
In addition to the personal right, the Foss v Harbottle principle could not be 
applied to the action of directors which is illegal156 or wholly ultra vires157 to the 
company nor could they be applied to conduct which needed to be validly 
committed or ratified by a special majority of the shareholders only. This is 
because the Companies Act and/or the constitutional documents of the company 
state in certain instances that a simple majority of shareholders could not confirm 
or ratify a transaction, which needed a greater, specified majority. The former is 
called the ‘illegal or ultra vires act’ exception and the latter the ‘special majority’ 
exception. Such illegal acts could not be authorised or ratified. There was no right 
at common law to approve illegality. The position is similar under common law for 
acts ultra vires to the capacity of the company.158 Thus, there was no room for the 
operation of the rule in Foss v Harbottle if the alleged wrong was either ultra vires 
                                                
156 Northwest Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty [1887] 12 App Cas 589 
157Hutton v West Cork Railway Ltd [1883] 23 ChD 65; Devlin v Slough Estate Ltd [1983] BCLC 
49 
158  The company’s capacity was generally restricted by the mandatory clauses set out in its 
memorandum of association. 
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the company or agreed by less than the requirement159 because the majority of 
members could not confirm such a transaction. In fact, not even a unanimous 
resolution of all the shareholders could authorise or ratify such an act. There was 
also no room for the operation of the rule if the transaction complained of could be 
accurately done or sanctioned only by a special resolution or the like, such as 
imposing some different threshold in order to pass the resolution, because a simple 
majority could not confirm a transaction which required the agreement of a greater 
majority. 160  Just like personal right, the illegal or ultra vires acts were not 
exceptions to the Foss rules, they simply indicated the situations in which the Foss 
v Harbottle rule did not apply. Therefore only “fraud on minority where 
wrongdoers were in control” was truly known as an exception to the Foss 
principles.  
2.2.3 Fraud on the minority where wrongdoers are in control 
For the ‘fraud on the minority’ to be an exception to the Foss v Harbottle rule, 
two criteria needed to be fulfilled: ‘proof of fraud’ and that ‘wrongdoers were in 
control of the company’. The main problem was that in the common law, the 
criteria for proving fraud on the minority were a broadly interpreted concept and it 
was difficult for shareholders to prove it. For instance, Lord Davey in Burland v 
Earl defined the traditionally concept of the fraud on the minority as when: “the 
majority is endeavoring directly or indirectly to appropriate to themselves money, 
                                                
159 In corporate law, the act is ultra vires when the company performs acts which are beyond its 
powers. Such actions may include acts which are specifically prohibited by the company’s articles or 
memorandum or excessive use of corporate power that has not been granted to the company 
160 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 204 210-211 
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properties or advantages which belong to the company or in which other 
shareholders are entitled to participate”. 161  However, in cases such as Cook 
v Deeks162and Pavlides v Jenson163 the court considered the fraud on the minority 
to only include the actual fraud such as dishonesty164 or bad faith.165 Therefore, 
negligence and even gross negligence was not sufficient to give standing to 
minority shareholders to bring a derivative action.  
In Daniels v Daniels, on the other hand, Templeman J held that166: “it would 
seem to me quite monstrous particularly as fraud is so hard to plead and difficult to 
prove if the confines of the exception to Foss v. Harbottle were drawn so narrowly 
that directors could make a profit out of their negligence.” Therefore, the court in 
this case extended the interpretation of fraud on minority and despite no claim for 
actual fraud, Templeman J held that negligence or a breach of duty, which not only 
harmed the company but also resulted in a profit to a director did amount to a fraud 
on minority. In Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2), 167 
Vinelott J held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to allege and prove that a 
defendant, in breaching a duty to the company, acted ‘with a view’ to benefiting 
him or herself at the company’s expense. Moreover, over time, the fraud exception 
was extended from common law fraud to cases where the facts amounted to fraud 
                                                
161 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 93-4 
162 Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554 
163 Pavlides v Jenson [1956] Ch 565 
164 Arwood v Merryweather [1867] L.R. 5 Eq. 464 
165 Menier v Hooper's Telegraph Works [1874] 9 Ch. App. 350 
 
167  Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1981] Ch 257, overruled in 
part by the Court of Appeal [1982] Ch 204 
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in equity as well. Unlike in common law, fraud in equity is a broad concept. 
Equitable fraud includes not only unconscionable transactions, but also any 
behaviour which is unjust, unfair or which breaches equitable principles. It would 
include oppressive discriminatory conduct. In Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v 
Greater London Council, the court held that:168 “It does not seem to have yet 
become very clear exactly what the word “fraud” means in this context; but I think 
it is plainly wider than fraud at common law, in the sense of Derry v. Peek 169… 
Apart from the benefit to themselves at the company's expense, the essence of the 
matter seems to be an abuse or misuse of power. “Fraud” in the phrase “fraud on a 
minority” seems to be being used as comprising not only fraud at common law but 
also fraud in the wider equitable sense of that term, as in the equitable concept of a 
fraud on a power.” 
 Vatcher v Paull170 and Clemens v Clemens Bros Ltd171 are two more cases in 
which the court applied the equitable concept of fraud on a power. Another 
difficulty for shareholders to prove fraud on the minority under the common law 
was the necessity to prove that wrongdoers were in “control” of the company.172  
In terms of majority control at the time of fraud, the early cases interpreted 
control only to the actual control of voting rights.173 In Pavlides v Jenson174 the 
                                                
168 Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council [1982]I All ER 437 445 
169 Derry v Peek [1889] 14 App. Cas. 337 
170 Vatcher v Paull [1915] AC 372 
171 Clemens v Clemens Bros Ltd [1976] 2 all ER 268  
172Paul Von Nessen, Say H GooGoo and Chee Keong Low, ‘The Statutory Derivative Action: 
Now Showing Near You’ [2008] Journal of Business Law 627 
173 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 93 
174 Pavlides v Jenson [n 85] 577 
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court rejected the shareholder’s derivative claim based on the ground that the 
wrongdoers had only de facto control of the company rather than de jure control. 
Therefore, the claim did not fall within the Foss v Harbottle exceptions. 
Nonetheless, the later cases consider the control requirement to be satisfied 
not only in cases where the defendants themselves had the majority of voting 
rights, but also in any other situation where the company has in fact been 
controlled by the wrongdoers. For instance, in situations that a majority of shares 
were held by nominees, bound to vote in accordance with the defendants’ 
instructions, or in circumstances where shareholders were lured to vote in favour 
of the wrongdoers175 or where the wrongdoers were able to control the outcome of 
a shareholder resolution in their own favour by the use of proxy votes.176 However, 
still proving fraud on the minority while directors were in control of the company 
was a significant hurdle in the way of shareholders’ actions on behalf of the 
company.  
2.3 The English Law Commission’s critiques to derivative actions and 
recommendations for reform 
The difficulties with common law derivative action finally came to the attention 
of the English Law Commission. In 1995, the Lord Chancellor and the President of 
the Board  of  Trade required the Law Commission177 to review the shareholder 
                                                
175 Arwood v Merryweather [1867] L.R. 5 Eq. 464 
176 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 324 
177  The Law Commission is an independent statutory body, which was created by the Law 
Commission Act 1965 to keep the law of England and Wales under review and to recommend reform 
where it is needed. < http://www.lawcom.gov.uk 
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remedies with particular reference to the rule in Foss v Harbottle and  its  
exceptions; sections  459  to  461  of  the Companies  Act  1985;  and  the  
enforcement  of  the  rights  of shareholders  under  the  articles  of  association;  
and  to  make recommendations. 178  Upon the request, the Law Commission 
conducted a widespread review of shareholder remedies under the common law, 
including derivative action, between the years 1995 to 1997.179 
2.3.1 Identifying the problem 
On its examination of common law derivative action, the Law Commission 
described the law governing derivative action as “inflexible” and “outmoded” and 
noticed four major problems that should be addressed.180 First, that the Foss v 
Harbottle rule could not be found in rules of court, but only in case law, and much 
of it had been decided many years ago. Second, the derivative action was an 
ineffective mechanism as no action to recover damages suffered by a company 
could be brought unless the wrong conduct had been considered as a fraud and the 
wrongdoers had control of the company. 
The law as to the meaning of “control” in these circumstances was unclear. It 
was not restricted to situations where wrongdoers had voting control, but its 
applicability outside these circumstances was in doubt. The Law Commission 
found it problematic, in particular, in larger companies where, in practice, directors 
                                                
178 The Law Commission Final Report 246, Cm 3769, October 1997, para 1.1 available at < 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/shareholder-remedies ( visited 6/5/2017) 
179 Law Commission Shareholder Remedies (Consultation Paper No 142,1996) 
180 ibid para 14.1 
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exercise control with less than a majority of the votes. 181  Third, minority 
shareholders could not bring an action to recover damages suffered by a company 
by reason of the negligence of a director unless they could prove that the 
negligence confers a benefit on the controlling shareholders or that the failure of 
the other directors to bring an action constitutes a fraud on the minority.182  
Fourth, the standing of the member to bring a derivative action had to be 
established as a preliminary issue by evidence, which showed a prima facie case 
on the merits. However, neither in applications for leave nor in the courts’ 
judgments, it was clear what precisely an applicant must do to form a prima facie 
case. The Law Commission mentioned that it could cause the preliminary stage to 
be excessively lengthy and expensive.183  
2.3.2 The recommendations  
In its approach to solving the common law shareholder remedies problems, 
English Law reached three conclusions. First, within proper boundaries, the rule in 
Foss v Harbottle should be replaced by a simpler and more modern procedure. 
Second, the court must have all necessary powers to rationalize minority 
shareholder litigation so that it is less costly and complicated. Third, a ‘self-help’ 
remedy (or range of remedies) should be provided to avoid the need for 
shareholders to resort to the court to resolve disputes. 184  Later, the Law 
                                                
181 ibid para 14.2 
182 ibid para 14.3 
183 ibid para 14.4; also I will explain in the next section that ambiguities on establishing the prima 
facie case still remain under the statutory derivative scheme. 
184 ibid para 14.13 
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Commission's Final Report on Shareholder Remedies185 completed the task begun 
by their Consultation Paper186 and proposed a statutory derivative claim in the UK. 
The aim of the new proposed scheme was to set a more modern, flexible and 
accessible criteria for shareholders’ derivative actions. 187  The English Law 
Commission’s efforts to reform the derivative actions was later assessed and 
improved through the considerations of the Company Law Review Steering 
Group. 188  This steering group confirmed the Law Commission’s proposals 
regarding derivative claims and agreed that the derivative claim should be 
established under a statutory scheme, restricted to breaches of directors’ duties, 
including the duty of care and skill, and should not be confined to cases of self-
serving negligence or worse (for example fraud).189 
Subsequently the proposed reforms were authorised by the Government and 
were implemented in the statutory derivative claim provisions of the Companies 
Act 2006. 
 	
                                                
185 The Law Commission Final Report 246, Cm 3769, October 1997 
186 (No. 142) of 1996 
187 The Law Commission 246, Cm 3769, October 1997 para 6.15 
188 Company Law Review Steering Group, ‘Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Final Report’ (July 2001) URN 01/942 (CLR Final Report) at para s 7.46-7.51 
189 CLR Developing the Framework para 4.127; CLR Final Report para 7.46; Arad Reisberg, 
Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Application (Oxford University Press 
2007) 
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2.3.3 Keeping the restrictive approach toward the derivative claim  
 
The most important point about the recommendation is that despite the 
recommendations for a new procedure with more modern, flexible and accessible 
criteria for determining whether a shareholder can pursue the derivative action,190 
still the Law Commission policy toward derivative action was based on a 
restrictive approach. The Law Commission was of the belief that in an age of 
increasing globalization of investment and growing international interest in 
corporate governance, greater transparency in the requirements for a derivative 
action is highly desirable. 191  However, the intention was to introduce a new 
scheme, which keeps a balance between the ability of the company to function 
efficiently without the unnecessary interference of challenges from shareholders, 
and the need to protect minority shareholders and enhance shareholder confidence 
by providing shareholders with a route for redress in certain circumstances.192 
Therefore, the English Law Commission’s policy was that derivative actions 
should remain as an exceptional remedy193 subject to tight judicial control at all 
                                                
190 The Law Commission Final Report, para 6.15 
191 ibid para 6.9 
192 ibid para 1.9 
193  The Law Commission Consultation Paper para 4.6; Final Report para 6.4, the Law 
Commission considered it important that in public companies, derivative action should not be too 
readily available as that may lead directors to favour a course which provides benefits to 
shareholders rather than make a more balanced judgment and take a decision which they would 
otherwise feel free to take. The Law Commission’s emphasis was that in the larger companies,  
derivative action should be seen in the context of a complex web of control mechanisms, which 
include regulatory action, institutional investor attitudes, DTI inquiries, and so on (Final report para 
1.12).  
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stages,194 and it did not anticipate derivative actions to be significantly increased195 
or intend to encourage derivative actions.196 Still it considered that where litigation 
is brought, the new procedure would assist in making sure that it is dealt with 
fairly and efficiently. In addition to that, during the Parliament Grand Committee 
stage for codifying the Companies Act 2006, one of the arguments was that 
broadening the directors’ duties under the Companies Act 2006 and at the same 
time, widening the scope of the statutory derivative claim would make it easier for 
shareholders to commence litigation against directors.197 The fear was that it would 
reduce the number of people willing to take directorships in companies.198  
In response, the Government guaranteed that the derivative claim would remain 
as a ‘weapon of last resort’,199 and it would provide sufficient safeguards for the 
new statutory regime to protect against the increase of a litigation culture.200  
                                                
194 Final Report para 6.6 
195 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies: Report on a Reference under section 3(1)(e) of the Law 
Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com, No 246, Cm 3769) (London, Stationery Office 1997) paras 6.12–
6.13    
196  Arad Reisberg.’Derivative claims under the Companies Act 2006: much ado about 
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2.3.4 The thesis critiques to the Law Commission recommendations and the 
Government approach 
Before reviewing the statuary derivative claim provisions, it is necessary to discuss the 
main problem with the Law Commission recommendations and consequently with the 
Government approach to the statutory derivative claim. The initial problem arises from 
the Law Commission’s wrong approach in reviewing the common law derivative claims 
in the context of the shareholder remedies rather than the company as a separate legal 
personality. In fact, the aim of the Law Commission was to protect minority 
shareholders and enhance shareholder confidence by providing shareholders with a 
route for redress in certain circumstances.201 There is no need to mention again that the 
derivative claim is a remedy for the protection of the company as a separate legal 
personality from its shareholders, and reconsideration of its role in the context of 
shareholder remedies was a wrong approach by the English Law Commission and later 
by the Company Law Steering Group and the Government. The consideration of the 
derivative action in the context of shareholder remedies was clearly rooted in the 
traditional shareholder value principle, which views shareholders as the only 
beneficiaries of the company. Nevertheless, such an approach is in conflict with the 
legal principle under the Foss v Harbottle case, which clearly refers to the company’s 
separate personality by establishing the proper plaintiff principle. In addition to that, the 
Law Commission recommendations are also in conflict with each other. On the one 
hand, the English Law Commission refers to the proper claimant principle and the fact 
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that in respect of a wrong done to the company, the company itself should sue the 
wrongdoers. On the other hand, it recommends that a ‘self-help’ remedy (or range of 
remedies) should be provided to avoid the need for shareholders to resort to the court to 
resolve disputes true the derivative claim.202 Taking such a conflicted approach has 
resulted in confusion in the Law Commission recommendations and consequently 
ambiguities in the statutory derivative claim framework under the Companies Act 2006. 
The question which emerges is why should the availability of other remedies, which 
initially have been designed to protect interests of shareholders, should be considered to 
cover the role of the derivative claim? One argument could be that those so-called 
remedies through the shareholders would hold directors accountable to their fiduciary 
duties and consequently would protect the company as a whole. In the view of this 
thesis, such an argument could be acceptable if the protection of the company as a 
whole would be achieved through these other so-called mechanisms. However, as I have 
already reasoned, shareholders may not always care about the long-term protection of 
the company; therefore, these mechanisms would not be optimal in protecting the 
company, even for the interest of minority shareholders, in all circumstances. This issue 
will be discussed in the next chapter in more detail.  
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2.4 The statutory derivative claim 
 
The new statutory scheme which has come into force since October 2007 
provides that derivative claims may only be brought under the Companies Act 
2006, Part 11, Chapter 1203 or pursuant to a court order under section 996(2)(c) in 
the context of the unfair prejudice claim.204 Section 260(1) gives the standing to 
bring the derivative claim only to the members of the company (shareholders). In 
this respect, ‘member’ includes a person who is not a member but to whom shares 
in the company have been transferred or transmitted by operation of law,205 which 
would be a personal representative of a deceased member or the trustee of a 
bankrupt member.206 
The statutory derivative claim may be brought only in respect of a cause of 
action specified in section 260. The cause of action must be vested in the 
company.207 The grounds for bringing the derivative claim is no longer limited to 
the proof of fraud on minority when wrongdoers are in control of the company, 
and the cause of action now arises from an actual or proposed act or omission 
which involves negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director, 
former director or shadow director of the company.208 
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The extension of the derivative claim grounds to negligence was a Law 
Commission proposal. The intention was that while investors take the risk that 
those who run companies may make mistakes, they do not have to accept that 
directors will fail to comply with their duties toward the company.209 Moreover, 
the cause of action could be against a director, or another person or both210 and it 
may have arisen before the claimant became a member of the company.211 
A derivative claim may be brought in relation to a foreign company as well. 
However, the appropriate forum for such a claim is likely to be the country of 
incorporation.212 The statutory derivative claim has failed to set any provision for 
multiple derivative claims and this would cause problems where groups of 
companies are involved. However, in Universal Project Management Services Ltd 
v Fort Gilkicker Ltd & ors,213 Briggs J held that double derivative claims still exist 
and are governed by common law principles. The court cited a number of cases, 
including Wallersteiner v Moir,214 in which the court seemed to have accepted, 
albeit without discussion of the point, that where the wrongdoers were in control of 
both the subsidiary and its parent, a shareholder of the parent had standing to bring 
a derivative action on behalf of the subsidiary. Regarding to double derivative 
claims under the statutory scheme, Briggs J held that the aim of the statutory 
derivative claim was to establish a clear set of rules to control derivative actions. 
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He observed as follows:215 "A conclusion that what Parliament in fact achieved in 
2006 was to place a statutory code for derivative claims by members of the 
wronged company alongside a continued obscure, complicated and unwieldy 
common law regime for derivative claims by others does not commend itself as an 
exercise in common-sense". However, the Briggs J opinion raises a general 
question concerning the issues. The question is, whether such issues should still be 
governed by the common law rules or would it be better if they were covered 
under the statutory regime? In terms of clarity, the latter seems to be a better 
solution, as it would create less confusion for the claimants and the courts. 
2.4.1 Problems with the prima facie requirement  
 
A member of the company who brings a statutory derivative claim must apply 
to the court for permission to continue the claim.216 In addition, the company must 
be joined as co-defendant in the derivative application so that if its rights are 
vindicated it will be able to enforce the judgment.217  
Section 261 provides that the court should consider an application for 
permission to continue a derivative claim in two stages. In the first stage, the court 
should consider whether evidence presented by the claimant provides a prima face 
case. The court should dismiss the application if the evidence does not provide the 
prima facie case for giving permission.218 The prima facie case should show that 
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the company has a good cause of action and the cause of action arises out of the 
directors’ default, negligence, breach of duty and breach of trust.219  If the court 
decides that the prima facie case has been established, the application will proceed 
to the second stage in which the court would ask the company to provide evidence 
for a contested hearing of the application.220 Although one of the Law Commission 
critiques of the common law derivative action was that it was unclear what would 
establish the prima facie case,221 the problem remains under the statutory provision 
as the Act fails to make it clear how the claimant should prove the prima facie 
case. The courts have taken different approaches to this issue. 
In Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd,222 Lewison J held that the applicant had to 
make a prima facie case that the company has a good cause of action and that it 
arose out of a director’s breach. He confirmed that it was the same common law 
approach as the Court of Appeal required in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v 
Newman Industries Ltd.223 In Stainer v Lee224 the court considered the standard to 
be applied when considering the provisional merits of the cause of action against 
the respondents. If the case seemed very strong, it might be appropriate to continue 
even if the sums at stake were not large. The court did not mention what would 
make a strong prima facie case. On the other hand, in Hughes v Weiss225 the court 
ruled that when the sum at stake is very large it might be in the company’s interest 
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that the derivative claim be continued even if the court formed the provisional 
view that the claim was not a strong one. 
In some cases, the prima facie case may be established if the defendant’s 
evidence is ignored, but would fail at the trial if the defendant’s evidence is 
accepted. In such cases, it is open to the court to hold that the claimant had 
established a prima facie case because it might not be possible to predict whether 
the defendant’s evidence would be accepted at the trial.226 
The problem is that lack of clarity under the statutory provisions have resulted 
in courts having not taken a clear or consistent approach on their interpretation of 
the prima facie requirement, and this has made the situation confusing for the 
claimants. Therefore, the recommendation is that in order to solve the confusion 
for claimants, section 261 should set clearer criteria for establishing the prima 
facie case. One suggestion would be that the legislator combined both stages into 
one as it has already happened in some cases upon the agreement of the parties.227 
The reason is that although the Act requires the court to consider the factors set 
out in section 263(2), (3) and (4) only in the second stage, in practice it seems to be 
inevitable for the court to evaluate the prima facie case in the first stage, without 
considering those factors. This might create confusion for a claimant on how far he 
is required to develop a case before seeking permission.  
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In Stainer v Lee,228 Roth J ruled that a court is able to revise its view as to a 
prima facie case at the second stage, once it has received evidence and argument 
from the respondents. If this were the case, then it might be better that, in order to 
save time and money for claimants in a derivative litigation, the legislator put both 
stages into one because the rationale behind the first stage acting as a screening 
mechanism could be achieved in the second stage as well. It was also the main 
reason that the Law Commission did not recommend a two-stage procedure as it 
was concerned that ‘the inclusion of an express test would increase the risk of a 
detailed investigation into the merits of the case taking place at the leave stage, and 
that such a “mini-trial” would be time-consuming and expensive.229 The two-stage 
procedure was the innovation of the legislator, which was in the belief that the 
courts should be able to dismiss frivolous claims without the involvement of 
companies and at the earliest possible opportunity.230  
However, it seems that the prima facie requirement as it stands in its present 
form would create more confusion for legitimate applicants rather than curbing 
troublesome derivative claims. Another difficulty for derivative claim applicants is 
in obtaining evidence to prove the prima facie for a derivative claim. Both 
minority shareholders and employees have very little to do with the internal 
governance of the company and neither have the right to investigate the company’s 
documents. In the context of shareholders as an applicant, they only could 
investigate the company documents if directors authorise them or the company 
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constitution provides a right of discovery for them. The alternative would be to 
apply to the court for inspection of company books and documents pre-trial. 
However, getting the court permission for investigation of the company document 
is not a smooth process, as the court would reject their request if they could not 
provide the need for inspection. Moreover, directors who are in control of the 
company can always find ways to prevent or to delay the release of the company’s 
sensitive information or information that would be damaging to their position. In 
regards to the employees as the derivative claim applicant, they do not have the 
legal right to investigate the company’s documents either. However, in the view of 
this thesis they are arguably in a better position to learn about the directors’ wrong 
conduct or having access to the document which harms the company because they 
are working in the company. Overall, the argument still is that putting the two 
stages of the derivative claim procedure into one would help the applicants to more 
easily prove the merits of their claim. As was mentioned above, the screening of 
the vexatious claims could be achieved in the second stage as well without 
necessarily increasing the time and costs of the litigation. 
2.4.2 Second stage: mandatory and discretionary factors 
The second stage involves the courts considering the list of factors under 
Companies Act 2006 sections 263(2) and (3). Section 263 provides the list of 
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matters which should be taken into account by the court when deciding whether to 
give permission to a derivative claim. These important mattes are:231  
(1) The good faith of the derivative claim’s applicant232 
(2) Whether a person acting in accordance with the duty to promote the success 
of the company would continue the claim233  
(3) Whether there has been or could be authorization or ratification of the act or 
omission giving rise to the claim234 
(4) Whether the company has decided not to pursue the claim235 
(5) Whether the claim is one which the member could pursue in his own right 
rather than on behalf of the company236 
(6) The disinterested member’s view towards the claim237 
(7) Whether the claim would promote the company’s success238 
The factors listed under section 263(2) have a mandatory nature, yet the matters that the 
court should consider under section 263(3) are discretionary. The mandatory factor has 
been established to shut out vexatious cases239 while the discretionary factor allows 
courts to formulate specific factors, which a hypothetical director would consider 
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important, appropriate to each particular case so as to imbue a 'sense of reality'.240 
Section 263(2)(a) provides that permission to continue derivative proceedings must be 
refused if a person acting in accordance with section 172 (duty to promote the success 
of the company) would not seek to continue the claim. In addition to that, section 
263(3)(b) indicates that the court should take into account the importance a person 
acting in accordance with section 172 would attach to continuing the claim. If the 
hypothetical director would undoubtedly not attach much importance to the claim, it 
will be refused. 241  Section 263(4) requires that in considering whether to give 
permission (or leave) the court shall have particular regard to any evidence before it as 
to the views of members of the company who have no personal interest, direct or 
indirect, in the matter.  
In implementing this subsection, Lord Goldsmith states that ‘’courts should 
decide how to implement it.  For example, if the courts knew that there was a 
substantial and highly respectable institutional investor who knew what the 
circumstances were and thought that the directors were doing the right thing in not 
pursuing the claim, then that would be influential with the court.’’242 Nonetheless, 
Lord Goldsmith fails to indicate how the court should understand whether the 
person has a personal interest in the issue or even care about the protection of the 
company at all. Considering the previous discussions on shortcomings of reliance 
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on institutional shareholders, such consideration is particularly debatable. Like the 
role of ratification, such consideration would also be particularly unfair to 
employees’ derivative claims as well. Shareholders and employees could have 
different interests in the company from each other and, therefore, the opinion a 
company member should not be influential on the court in deciding about the 
employees’ derivative litigation.  
In Bridge v Daley243 the claim was made on behalf of a company listed on the 
Alternative Investment Market. The court dismissed the claimant's application for 
permission to bring a derivative action on the basis that any benefit that it might 
have brought to the company was insufficient, or insufficiently clear, to outweigh 
the costs and disruption that it would entail. The court held that no director acting 
in accordance with section 172 would continue the claim. Also it was not an action 
that had gained the support of the company's members, even those disinterested 
members. The relation between section 263(2)(a) and section 263(3)(b) was 
considered in Iesini v Westrip Holding Ltd,244 as well where the court held that 
section 263(2)(a) applies only where the court is satisfied that no director acting in 
accordance with section 172 would seek to continue the claim. If some directors 
would and others would not seek to continue the claim, then section 263(3)(b) 
should be applied. The judge considered the case of the applicant was so weak that 
he was of the view that no director would seek to continue the claim. A 
considerable point in the Iesini judgment is that in determining whether to proceed 
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with the claim, Lewison J said that: ‘the weighing of these considerations is 
essentially a commercial decision, which the court is ill-equipped to take, except in 
a clear case’. However, the court gave no indication as to what would be a clear 
case. In Franbar Holdings Ltd245 the deputy judge held that he believed a court 
would need to consider the following matters in assessing whether a hypothetical 
director acting in accordance with section 172 would continue the claim. The 
factors were: the prospects for success of the claim; the ability of the company to 
recover any damages award; the disruption caused to the development of the 
company’s business by having to focus on the claim; the costs involved; and any 
possible damage that might be done to the company’s reputation. The court 
concluded that since, in addition to the application for permission, a claim for 
unfair prejudice under section 994 of the Act has been instituted and an offer to 
buy-out the claimant has been made, a hypothetical director would be less likely to 
attribute importance to the continuation of the derivative proceedings. 246  The 
appeal court in Wishart247 considered other issues such as the amount at stake,248 
and the prospects of getting a satisfactory result without litigation as reasons that 
the hypothetical director would not continue the claim. In addition, in Langley 
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Ward Ltd v Trevor,249 the court held that the potential winding up of the company 
could influence a hypothetical director in some cases, such as the case before him.  
These cases demonstrate the need for strengthening the deterrence function of 
the derivative claim and the consideration of the non-pecuniary benefits of the 
derivative claim by the legislator.  
In Kiani v Cooper250 the court found that a director acting in accordance with 
section 172 would decide to continue the proceedings, at least up to disclosure 
stage, on the basis that a hypothetical director would consider important the size of 
the claim, approximately £296,000, which if successful would ensure full return 
for all creditors. In Stainer v Lee, 251 Roth J held that there was no particular 
standard of proof that has to be satisfied. The court gave permission subject to 
some control, namely that permission would be limited to the conclusion of 
disclosure and terms as to costs pursuant to section 261(4) of the Act. Also, 
permission must be refused where the cause of action has arisen from an act or 
omission yet to occur and that act or omission has been ratified by the company, or 
is in relation to past acts and omissions which were authorised by the company 
before they occurred or have been subsequently ratified by the company.252 
In Re Singh Brothers Contractors (North west) Ltd253 the court by applying the 
mandatory bar in section 263(2)(c) refused to give permission to continue a 
                                                
249 Langley Ward Ltd v Trevor [2011] EWHC 1893 (Ch) [14]    
250 Kiani v Cooper [2010] EWHC 577 (Ch); [2010] BCC 463    
251 Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] BCC 134 
252 s 263(b)(b) and (c)  
253 Re Singh Brothers Contractors (North west) Ltd [2013] EWHC 2138 (ch), LTL 22/8/2013; 
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derivative claim on the grounds that the directors conduct had been authorised by 
the company. The court held that the real motivation behind the claim was 
animosity between the parties following a family dispute and which also justified a 
refusal of permission under section 263(3)(a).  
2.4.3 What is wrong with the statutory derivative claim?  
Now, after reviewing the statutory derivative claim provisions and the courts’ 
approach to the derivative claim, it is time to discuss that what is wrong with the 
statutory derivative claim framework in the UK. As was reviewed above, since the 
ratification of the statutory derivative claim, courts have taken a cautious and 
restrictive approach to derivative litigation. Part of this approach arises from the 
Government’s policy of keeping a restrictive approach towards derivative claims. 
The main reason, however, is the ambiguities and flaws in the statutory derivative 
claim framework. The other problem is that the legislator has not clarified the 
boundaries between the common law derivative action and statutory derivative 
claim. To overcome the ambiguities in the statuary framework, the courts still rely 
on the common law approach to the derivative action. It has resulted in confusions 
for the courts and the derivative claim applicants. The overly restricted approach to 
the statutory derivative claim is in conflict with the Lord Goldsmith assentation in 
introducing the new statutory regime, where he mentioned: “we have to strike a 
careful balance between protecting directors from vexatious and frivolous claims 
and protecting the rights of shareholders. It would be dangerous to move too far 
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against either of those interests.”254 So, the question is whether that balance has 
been kept, or if the current statutory derivative claim would protect the company as 
whole. 
The low number of cases which have been initiated during 10 years (only 22 
cases according to Professor Keay’s empirical research255) might not per se be the 
evidence that the balance has been disturbed. Nevertheless, it could be an 
indication that the flaws and ambiguities in the procedure requirements, and the 
costs of the derivative litigation, have made the shareholders reluctant to initiate a 
derivative claim. It is not surprising that any rational derivative claim applicant 
would refrain from initiating a derivative claim under the current statutory scheme, 
even if they have good knowledge of the directors’ wrong conduct that harms the 
company. In fact, since the early days of the introduction of statutory derivative 
claims, many scholars have triggered the alarm that the new statutory regime 
would not achieve the balance between the directors’ functions and shareholders’ 
protection as the pendulum is swinging towards the benefit of directors. Reisberg, 
who has conducted an extensive assessment on the impact of the statutory 
derivative scheme in his book published in 2007,256 raises several issues. Reisberg 
rightly argues that the reform’s success should be judged not by the quantity of the 
case law produced under the new regime but by whether the rules governing the 
circumstances in which such an action may be brought have become more 
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comprehensible and accessible to the extent that in exceptional circumstances, the 
derivative claim becomes a remedy worth pursuing.257 Nevertheless, at the time he 
was concerned that the statutory provisions may not be sufficiently detailed to 
prevent the courts from relying on existing case law in the absence of a more 
substantial codification and clarification of the regime. The discretion delegated to 
the courts may continue to impose the same obstacles to derivative claims as 
previously existed under the common law.258 Reisberg warned that the danger 
might be that the judiciary would adopt an excessively restrictive approach to 
statutory derivative claims in order to preserve the exceptional nature of derivative 
action. He concluded that the ambiguities under the statutory provisions, mainly 
with regards to the ratification of directors’ breach of duty and uncertainty 
surrounding the scope of section 172 (duty to promote the success of the 
company), would cause confusion in derivative litigation procedures. In addition to 
that, shareholders’ difficulty in obtaining the company’s information to reinforce 
their claim and lastly the cost of the litigation would still prevent a legitimate 
shareholder from initiating a claim on behalf of the company.  
Reisberg is not the only scholar who brings the efficacy of the reforms into 
question. Andrew Keay also in part of his latest research on assessing the statutory 
derivative claim259 reviews the judicial approach and confirms that Reisberg's view 
in the early days, that the traditional suspicion of the English courts towards 
derivative actions will continue especially now that they are ‘armed’ with a very 
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restrictive legislation to ‘justify’ their attitudes, was correct.260 Keay argues that 
despite the fact that statutory provisions still require courts to make judgments 
concerning the interests of the company, there are some judicial decisions in which 
the courts refused to intervene in directors’ commercial decisions. They dismissed 
the claim for the reason that the courts are ill-equipped to review such commercial 
matters.261 Also because they relied on the view of two directors of the company 
that continuing the claim is not in the interest of the company, despite the fact that 
the applicant argued, perhaps with some validity, that those directors were not 
independent enough.262 
In line with these academic arguments, this thesis argues that the current 
approach to the derivative claim in the UK is problematic. The main problem is 
that while the derivative claim is a mechanism for protecting the company as a 
separate legal personality, the statutory derivative claim in the UK has been 
established on the traditional shareholder value view and with the aim of 
protecting the interest of shareholders only. In the view of this thesis, the objective 
of the company is to maximise the wealth of the entity and at the same time, to 
ensure that the company is sustained financially for the benefit of all the 
stakeholders in long run. The current structure of the derivative claim would not 
achieve such an objective. The critiques to the statutory derivative scheme are the 
lack of clarity in the derivative claim procedural requirements, the problem with 
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the derivative litigations cost and the role of shareholder ratification and the 
limiting of the scope of the derivative claim to shareholders. In terms of the 
reforms to the procedural requirements, this research argues that the ambiguities 
on the prima facie requirement have created confusion for the applicants and the 
courts. Therefore, the research suggests that in order to solve the confusion, the 
Act should clarify how the applicant should prove a prima facie case in the first 
stage. Alternatively, the legislator might integrate the two stages into one as has 
already happened in practice in some cases upon the agreement of the parties. The 
other problem is with consideration of the view of disinterested shareholders under 
263(4). The section fails to indicate how the court should understand whether the 
person has a personal interest in the issue or even care about the protection of the 
company at all. This issue is particularly important in the context of the 
employees’ derivative claim. Therefore, the thesis argues that first the criteria for 
such a consideration should be clear. Second, the consideration of disinterested 
shareholders should not apply to the employees’ derivative claim. The reason is 
that the interest of employees and shareholders are not always in line with each 
other and such consideration could be unfair to the employees. The other proposals 
for reform to the statutory derivative claim will be discussed in chapters six and 
seven.  
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2.5 Conclusion  
 
 
This chapter reviewed derivative action under the common law and the reasons 
that caused the English Law Commission and subsequently the Government to 
reform the derivative action mechanism in the UK. 
The chapter also reviewed the statutory derivative claim regime under the 
Companies Act 2006 sections 260 to 264. Exploring the statutory provisions 
revealed that there are still some ambiguities under the Act, which could cause 
confusion for both the derivative claims applicants and the judicial system.  
Moreover, some procedural requirements such as shareholders’s ratification of 
wrongdoers’ conduct, the consideration of the view of disinterested shareholders 
and the costs of the derivative claim could stop applicants to make a meritorious 
claim on behalf of the company. These requirements would also be unfair to 
employees if they act as the applicant for the derivative claim. In order to improve 
the function of the derivative claim the thesis proposes some reforms to the 
procedure requirements, including reforms to the prima facie case and the role of 
the disinterested shareholder under section 263(4). 
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Chapter Three: Is there any alternative mechanism to the derivative 
claim in the UK? 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter argued that the role of the derivative claim should be 
reconsidered in the English legal system because the derivative claim is a 
mechanism of protection for the company as a distinct personality from its 
shareholders, and the company needs to be protected for the sake of all the 
stakeholders. However, such an argument would be unfounded if there is  proof 
that the role of the derivative claim could be substituted by other mechanisms of 
accountability. One general view is that the different mechanisms of accountability 
can complement and substitute for one another.263 Based on this view, in the UK 
because of the availability of different corporate governance mechanisms and the 
costs of judicial intervention, there is no need to resort to shareholder private 
litigation including the derivative claim as a means of protection against the 
wrongdoing directors.264 This view has been put forward by referring to the power 
of shareholders under UK corporate law which gives them the right to review the 
annual reports and accounts as well as vote on managers' remuneration packages at 
                                                
263 Anup Agrawal and Charles Knoeber, ‘Firm performance and mechanisms to  
control agency problems between managers and shareholders’ (1996) 31(3)  
Journal of financial and quantitative analysis 377-397 
264 Luca Enriques, ‘The law on company directors' self-dealing: A comparative analysis’ 
 (2000) 2(3) International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal; John Armour et al., ‘Private 
Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the UK and US’ (2009) Vol 6 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 687-722 
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the AGM.265 In addition, they have the statutory power to dismiss directors even 
without cause.266 
Moreover the market for corporate control which through the 'City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers' 267  disciplines directors’ conduct, and non-executive 
directors (NEDs), are playing an important role in encouraging the proper conduct 
of company affairs especially in public companies. In addition to the above 
mechanisms, auditors owe a duty to ensure that company accounts reflect a true 
and accurate view of the company's financial position.268  
In private companies also, the unfair prejudice conduct and shareholders 
agreements are known as the common methods of protection for minority 
shareholders. However, as it has already been argued several times in this thesis, 
these so-called alternative methods to the derivative claim have been based on the 
shareholder primacy principle. They have been established to protect the interest of 
shareholders when there is a conflict of interest between shareholders and 
directors, and only shareholders have the ultimate power to use them against the 
wrongdoing directors. Even in terms of protecting shareholders, these mechanisms 
may not be optimal in all circumstances for the protection of minority 
shareholders. One apparent reason is that these mechanisms are normally in the 
                                                
265 Companies Act 2006 ss 281-361  
266  Companies Act 2006 s 168 provides that directors can be removed without cause by an 
ordinary resolution of simple majority.  
267  The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
<http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uklnew/codesars/DATAlcode.pdf  
268  The UK Corporate Governance Code section C.3.2 assigns the audit committee the task 'to 
review and monitor external auditors' independence and objectivity’ and 'to develop and implement 
policy on the engagement of the external auditor to supply non-audit services'. 
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control of majority shareholders such as institutional shareholders, and the interest 
of majority shareholders could be in conflict with the interest of minority 
shareholders.269 In contrast, the derivative claim is a mechanism for protecting the 
company itself, which is more likely to be used by minority shareholders and, in 
the context of this thesis, employees in situations that they have no other option to 
protect their reflective interest in the company. The argument in this chapter is that 
although the availability of other mechanisms of accountability could provide an 
environment in which the derivative claim might be less needed, nevertheless the 
derivative claim could still play a role alongside these mechanisms to provide a 
full protection for the company as a whole. Therefore, under the law it should be a 
more affordable and accessible mechanism. The chapter examines different 
mechanisms of accountability to find to what extent these mechanisms are 
effective in holding directors accountable towards the company as a whole. To find 
the answer the chapter reviews these mechanisms in the context of private 
companies and public companies. The chapter first explores the role of the 
derivative claim in UK private companies and reviews the so-called alternative 
mechanisms to derivative claims such as unfair prejudice claims, and shareholders’ 
agreements in this type of companies. In the next stage the chapter looks at the role 
of the derivative claim in public companies and explores the functions and 
                                                
269 One type of agency cost is the one that arises from the conflict of interest between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders known as the horizontal agency cost; see also Daniel R. Fischel 
and Michael Bradley, ‘The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’ (1986) 71 Cornell Law Review 261  
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limitations of these so-called mechanisms of accountability for directors, which 
have been established under UK corporate governance.  
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3.2 So called alternatives to the derivative claim in private companies 
 
According to the UK Government’s recent Green Paper, the United Kingdom is 
home to a significant number of large, private companies and limited liability 
partnerships (LLPs). There are, for instance, nearly 2,500 private companies and 
90 LLPs with more than 1,000 employees.270 Therefore, private companies are a 
fundamental part of the UK economy. These companies, either large or small, are 
not required to follow formal corporate governance and reporting standards as are 
publicly listed companies; however, the consequences of controlling shareholders’ 
conduct can be equally severe for minority shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Under the recent corporate governance proposals, the UK Government intends to 
encourage a set of corporate governance principles suitable for the ownership 
structures of large private companies. However, this research argues that the 
proposed corporate governance code would not increase the accountability of 
directors in private companies. Firstly, adoption of these principles will be 
voluntary for private companies and they will be allowed to adopt, or continue to 
use their own preferred approaches. 271  Secondly, the proposed corporate 
governance code would only apply to private companies of specific size and with a 
certain amount of employees. Thirdly, in some private companies like BHS, there 
                                                
270  Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance Reform, The 
Government Green Paper ( November 2016) 43 para 3.2 
271  Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance Reform, The 
Government Response to the Green Paper Consultations (August 2017) 41 
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is no shareholder outside the wrongdoers’ team to discipline directors through the 
proposed code.  
 Back to the subject of the thesis, since the enactment of the statutory derivative 
claim, shareholders in private companies in the UK have initiated the majority of 
the derivative litigation. The reason that derivative litigation potentially plays a 
more vital role in private companies is because minority shareholders and 
employees272 in these types of companies are more exposed to an opportunistic 
conduct of majority shareholders, which ruins the company and puts their 
respective interests in danger. With regards to shareholders as the applicants, 
usually in private companies there is no separation between ownership and control, 
and shareholders are also directors of the company. However, due to the role of the 
majority rule principle, minority shareholders have no power to protect their 
interests in the company when controlling shareholders harm the company by their 
opportunistic behaviour, their negligence, and mismanagement of the company and 
misappropriation of the company assets. In the event of majority shareholders’ 
abuse of power in private companies there is no market available to minority 
shareholders comparable to that available to shareholders in public companies to 
sell their shares and prevent further harm to their interests. Even if a buyer were to 
be found for their shares, still there might be some restrictions on the transfer of 
shares in the articles of association of private companies. Therefore, the most 
                                                
272  Since in private companies there are fewer mechanisms of accountability for controlling 
directors’ conduct in comparison to public companies, as with shareholders in these companies the 
employees are also at more risk of being harmed by director wrongdoings. This chapter deals with 
the interest of minority shareholders, whilst the problem of employees will be discussed in chapter 
seven. 
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likely option for minority shareholders when the company is harmed might be to 
sell their shares, often at a reduced price, to controlling shareholders themselves. 
Accordingly, in terms of protecting the company itself, derivative claim is the 
main available mechanism in private companies to protect the company and 
shareholders against the exploitation of majority shareholders. The argument is 
that the other mechanisms such as the unfair prejudice claim could not cover the 
role of the derivative claim in protecting the company. I review these mechanisms 
to demonstrate that they could not provide the protection for the company in all 
circumstances.  
 
3.2.1 The unfair prejudice claim and the blurred interaction with the derivative 
claim 
 
   Among the different mechanisms that have been named by academics and 
practitioners as alternatives to the derivative claim in the UK, the unfair prejudice 
conduct petition seems to play the most substantial role. The main reason is section 
260(2) of Companies Act 2006 provides that a derivative claim may be brought 
either under the statutory derivative claim provisions or in pursuance of an order of 
the court under the section 994 proceedings for protection of members against 
unfair prejudice conduct.273 The reference in the Act is to section 996(c) of the 
Companies Act 2006. Under section 996(c) the court may authorise civil 
                                                
273 s 260(2)(b) 
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proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company. Hence, shareholders could 
either make a claim on behalf of the company or choose a personal remedy. In 
Franbar Holdings 274  the deputy judge confirmed the counsel’s argument that 
where a claim for unfair prejudice has been initiated, in addition to the derivative 
claim, and an offer to buy-out has been made to the claimant, a hypothetical 
director would be less likely to agree with the continuance of the derivative 
claim. 275  Also, in Kleanthous v Paphitis, 276  the court used the fact that the 
shareholder had initiated a claim under section 994 proceedings as a ground to 
refuse permission. The possibility of pursuing corporate wrongs under the unfair 
prejudice conduct petition 277  has caused long debate among academics and 
practitioners as to whether this mechanism can overtake the role of the derivative 
claim.278 One suggestion could be that the scope of remedies available under the 
unfair prejudice claim has made it an attractive remedial mechanism for 
shareholders in the UK. Reisberg argues that the flexibility of remedies under the 
unfair prejudice claim in comparison to the derivative claim, also the blurred 
interaction between the unfair prejudice conduct and the derivative claim have cast 
                                                
274 Franbar Holdings [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] BCC 885 [30] 
275 ibid [37] 
276 Kleanthous v Paphitis [2011] EWHC 2287 (Ch) 80 
277 Companies Act 2006 s 996(2)  
278 Rita Cheung, ‘Corporate wrongs litigated in the context of unfair prejudice claims: reforming 
the unfair prejudice remedy for the redress of corporate wrongs’ (2009) 29(4) Company Lawyer 29; 
Brenda Hannigan, ‘Drawing boundaries between derivative claims and unfairly prejudicial 
petitions’ (2009) 6 Journal of Business Law 606-626; Andrew Keay, ‘Assessing and rethinking the 
statutory scheme for derivative actions under the Companies Act 2006’ 16(1) Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 39-68; Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and 
Application (Oxford University Press 2009) 
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an uneasy shadow, which in return affects the viability of derivative actions.279 In 
particular, unlike the derivative claim, shareholders do not need to make an 
application for leave and go through a difficult two-staged leave procedure to bring 
an unfair prejudice petition. However, the question which emerges is while these 
two mechanisms are different in nature (the unfair prejudice claim is a personal 
remedy for shareholders and the derivative claim is a mechanism to redress the 
company’s wrong), why does the Companies Act allow the possibility of initiating 
a claim on behalf of the company in connection with unfair prejudice proceedings? 
The obvious reason could be that the regulator has considered shareholders as the 
ultimate beneficiaries of both claims. Therefore, they could choose either of 
sections 260 or 996(1). Nonetheless, such a consideration is problematic because 
the derivative claim is a claim on behalf of the company and the company does not 
belong to shareholders. Therefore, a shareholder’s personal claim could not take 
the role of a claim which belongs to the company as separate legal personality 
from its shareholders. To discuss this issue further this section is going to explore 
the remedies available under the unfair prejudice claim, and will review the 
judicial and the academic approaches to the issue of corporate wrongs litigated in 
the context of unfair prejudice claims.  
3.2.1.1 What is unfair prejudice conduct? 
An unfair prejudice petition is a personal remedy for shareholders. The remedy 
has been initially designed to redress the shareholders when the company affairs 
                                                
279Arad Reisberg ibid 274 
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are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the 
interests of members generally, or some part of its members or that any actual or 
proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on its 
behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.280 
Under the Companies Act 2006, the claimant in an unfair prejudice claim 
normally seeks a personal relief. However, section 996 also provides the ground 
for shareholders to pursue relief for the company in the context of the unfair 
prejudice claim. Section 996(1) provides as follows: ‘If the court is satisfied that a 
petition under this Part is well founded, it may make such order as it thinks fit for 
giving relief in respect of the matters complained of’. Section 996(2) provides a 
broad range of remedies including authorising the claimant to bring a civil 
proceeding in the name and on behalf of the company by such person or persons 
and on such terms as the court may direct.281 
The possibility of pursuing the wrongs to the company under section 996, along 
with the wording of section 261(2)(b) which states that a derivative claim could be 
brought either under the derivative claim provisions or under section 996 (c), has 
created the assumption that the unfair prejudice claim could be an alternative 
remedy to the derivative claim. The legislator’s failure in clarifying the 
circumstances that corporate wrongs should be litigated in the context of an unfair 
prejudice claim by shareholders also reinforces this allegation. To add these 
ambiguities, section 263(f) requires the court, in permission hearings for a 
                                                
280 Companies Act 2006 s 94(1) and 995(2)  
281 Companies Act 2006 s 996(2)(c) 
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derivative litigation, to consider whether the action which is the subject of the 
derivative claim could be pursued by the member in his or her own right.  
The statutory ambiguity in the interaction between the derivative claim and the 
unfair prejudice claim has caused different judicial approaches toward the 
remedies available under the unfair prejudice claim, which as a result has created 
confusion for the shareholders as well. I review the courts approach to the 
company’s claim in the context of unfair prejudice conduct to better illustrate this 
confusion.   
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3.2.1.2 Judicial approaches toward the issue of corporate wrongs litigated in the 
context of unfair prejudice claims 
 The flexibility of remedies under the unfair prejudice claim has caused the 
courts to have different and sometimes contradictory interpretations of section 996 
of the Companies Act 2006. Some courts have shown their support in using the 
unfair prejudice provisions to redress the corporate wrongs for breaches of 
directors' fiduciary duties. In Re Saul D Harrison,282 Judge Hoffmann ruled that: 
‘enabling the court in an appropriate case to outflank the rule in Foss v Harbottle 
was one of the purposes of section 459 (now section 994)’. Some later English 
courts showed more support for the issue of the company being reimbursed in the 
context of the unfair prejudice claim. In Anderson v Hogg,283 Bhullar v Bhullar,284 
Clark v Cutland, 285  Re Brightview Ltd, 286  Franbar Holdings, 287  Iesini, 288 
Kleanthous v Paphitis289 and Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic PartnersLtd290 
the courts ruled that the unfair prejudice remedy could substantially substitute the 
derivative claim. In Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc,291 the court held that allowing 
the court in an appropriate case to outflank the rule in Foss v Harbottle was one of 
the purposes of CA 2006 section 994. 
                                                
282 Saul D Harrison [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 14 18 
283 Anderson v Hogg [2002] B.C.C. 923 
284 Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] EWCA Civ 424  
285 Clark v Cutland [2003] EWCA 810 
286 Re Brightview Ltd [2004] 2 B.C.L.C. 191 
287 Franbar Holdings [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] BCC 885 [30]    
288 Iesini [2009] EWHC 2526; [2010] BCC 420 [86]    
289 Kleanthous v Paphitis [2011] EWHC 2287 (Ch) [81]    
290 Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic PartnersLtd [2007] UKPC 26, [2007] Bus LR 1521   
291 Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc [1994] BCC 475 
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In Kleanthous v Paphitis, the court came to the conclusion that the applicant 
had brought the derivative claim only to obtain the benefit of a costs indemnity 
order and in that case the section 994 claim where the shareholder should bear his 
own costs was more appropriate.292 Nevertheless, despite the mentioned judicial 
support for compensating the company under the unfair prejudice claim, still some 
courts have been either cautious or reluctant in using the unfair prejudice petitions 
for wrongs, which happened to the company. In Re Charnley Davies Ltd (No.2),293 
Millett J made it clear that the distinction between “misconduct” and “unfairly 
prejudicial management” does not lie in the particular acts or omissions of which 
complaint is made, but in the nature of the complaint and the remedy necessary to 
meet it. He acknowledged that there may be more than one legal dimension to the 
same set of facts and came to the conclusion that if the essence of the complaint 
was not of mismanagement of the company but was directors’ breaches of 
fiduciary duty by or other misconduct actionable by the company, in such a case a 
derivative claim rather than unfair prejudice action should be the appropriate 
means for relief.294 In Lowe v Fahley295 the court held that where a breach of 
directors' fiduciary duties involves a loss to the company, such as a diversion of 
company funds, the petitioner is entitled as a matter of jurisdiction to seek 
repayment by the wrongdoers to the company through a derivative claim.296 In 
                                                
292 ibid [81]    
293 Re Charnley Davies Ltd (No.2) [1990] B.C.L.C. 760 
294 ibid 783 
295 Lowe v Fahley [1996] 1 B.C.L.C. 262) 
296 ibid 268 
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Wishart297  the court did not consider it to be grounds for refusing permission 
because proceedings under s.994 would constitute an indirect means of achieving 
what could be achieved directly through the use of a derivative claim.  
In other cases like Kiani v Cooper,298 Ritchie v Union of Construction, Allied 
Trades and Technicians,299 Parry v Bartlett,300 and Stainer v Lee301 the courts did 
not consider the availability of the unfair prejudice claim as a ground for rejecting 
the derivative claim. One important relevant issue with regard to litigating 
company wrongs in the context of the unfair prejudice claim is the reflective loss 
principle and its role in preventing unjust enrichment by shareholders. The 
reflective loss rule, which was established under the Prudential Assurance Co Ltd 
v Newman Industries Ltd (No2)302 is based on the need to avoid double recovery 
for shareholders.  
In Johnson v Gore Wood Lord,303 Lord Bingham summarised the reflective loss 
principle as follows: ‘(1) Where a company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty 
owed to it, only the company may sue in respect of that loss. No action lies at the 
suit of a shareholder suing in that capacity and no other to make good a diminution 
in the value of the shareholder's shareholding where that merely reflects the loss 
suffered by the company. (2) Where a company suffers loss but has no cause of 
action to sue to recover that loss, the shareholder in the company may sue in 
                                                
297Wishart [2009] CSIH 65; [2009] SLT 812 [46]    
298 Kiani v Cooper [2010] EWHC 577 (Ch); [2010] BCC 463 
299 Ritchie v Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians [2011] EWHC 3613 (Ch) 
300 Parry v Bartlett [2011] EWHC 3146 (Ch) [88]–[92]   
301 Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] BCC 134 [52] 
302 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No2) [1982] 1 All E.R.354 366-367 
303 Johnson v Gore Wood Lord [2001] 1 B.C.L.C. 313 
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respect of it. (3) Where a company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty to it, 
and a shareholder suffers a loss separate and distinct from that suffered by the 
company caused by breach of a duty independently owed to the shareholder, each 
may sue to recover the loss caused to it by breach of the duty owed to it but neither 
may recover loss caused to the other by breach of the duty owed to that other.’ One 
of the issues, which the court dealt with in this case, was ensuring that the 
company's creditors are not prejudiced by the action of individual shareholders and 
ensuring that a party does not recover compensation for a loss, which another party 
has suffered. Lord Bingham clearly ruled “a shareholder cannot sue to make good 
a loss which would be made good if the company's assets would be replenished 
through action against the party responsible for the loss, even if the company has 
declined or failed to make good that loss.304  
However, some other English courts have taken different approaches toward the 
applicability of the reflective loss principle in unfair prejudice claims.  
The Court of Appeal in Clark v Cutland305  considered the unfair prejudice 
petition as if it was a derivative claim. In this case Lady Justice Arden held that the 
breadth of the discretion of the court in unfair prejudice proceedings would have 
enabled the court to grant the same relief as would have been granted in a 
derivative claim. Also without specifying any reason, she ruled that the reflective 
                                                
304 ibid 337f-338b per Lord Bingham    
305 Clark v Cutland [2003] 2 B.C.L.C. 393  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loss principle is not applicable in the context of unfair prejudice claims. Her 
judgment is considered to have established a new trend in company law.306  
Later in Re Brightview Ltd,307 the Clare v Cultand308 judgment was confirmed 
when Judge Jonathan Crow took a similar approach in ordering corporate relief 
under unfair prejudice litigation. In this case the court rejected the reflective loss 
principle as having any application in the context of unfair prejudice claims. 
However, just like the court in Clare v Cutland, Judge Crow did not provide a 
substantial and clear reasoning for his decision.  
This thesis argues that such concern is rational. The allegation that the reflective 
loss principle does not apply to the unfair prejudice claim would bring the 
corporate separate personality principle, which was established under Foss v 
Harbottle, into question. Corporate separate personality is the fact stated by the 
law that a company is recognised as a legal entity distinct from its members. 
Therefore, when a company suffers loss due to a wrongful act happening against it, 
it should be only the company that should initiate the claim against the 
wrongdoers. On the other hand, the reflective loss principle rules that in such a 
situation the loss that the shareholder suffers is only reflective of the harm to the 
company (for example, where the value of their shares or dividends decreases). 
Thus, a shareholder cannot sue to recover damages for themselves in relation to 
wrongs done to the company and the company’s claim should take precedence 
over the shareholder’s personal claim. Revoking the reflective loss principle in 
                                                
306 Rita Cheung [n 278] 4 
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unfair prejudice claims and permitting shareholders to both recover from the harm, 
which have happened to the company, plus receiving compensation for their 
personal harm would create double recovery, which would unfairly enrich the 
shareholders. It would also be unfair to the other stakeholders as the derivative 
claim applicant, in the context of this thesis the employees, because they would not 
have the equal right to initiate a derivative claim on behalf of the company both 
under the statutory derivative claim and the unfair prejudice claim. Moreover, if 
we allow the reflective loss principle to still apply to unfair prejudice claims, it 
would mean that shareholders should choose to either request an order to 
compensate the company’s harm (under section 996(c) or apply to receive a 
recovery for their personal harm, in situations that both harm to the personal 
interest and the company has arisen from one cause of action. Since the unfair 
prejudice claim is essentially a personal claim, there would be a great possibility 
that shareholders prefer their personal harm to be compensated particularly in the 
form of a buy-out order in private companies.309 Even if shareholders decide to 
seek a corporate relief for misconduct by directors under an unfair prejudice claim, 
it would still be a challenging issue because the court should scrutinise the request 
to decide whether the cause of action is a matter for a derivative litigation or for a 
claim under section 996(2)(c). If the court recognises the claim should be litigated 
in the context of the derivative claim, then the petition should be struck out.  
                                                
309 Companies Act 2006 s 996(2)(e) 
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Considering that recompensing the company in the context of an unfair 
prejudice claim requires applicants to initiate two separate applications and going 
through an extremely expensive procedure, the possibility that the company would 
be reimbursed under an unfair prejudice claim is likely to be small. Unless, that is, 
the court itself decides to order for the company to be remunerated along with the 
personal remedies to shareholders. Based on these arguments, the unfair prejudice 
claim cannot be considered a substitute to derivative litigation to compensate for 
the wrongs to the company, unless the cause of action gives rise to common 
grounds for both an unfair prejudice claim and corporate misconduct and it is not 
clear what role the reflective loss principle should play in such situations. Hence, 
reverting to the argument at the beginning of this section, the legislator ought to 
clarify the boundaries and the extent of the unfair prejudice remedy and the 
derivative claim and solve the ambiguities on this matter for the courts.  
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 3.2.1.3 Academic debates on whether the use of the unfair prejudice claim would 
overtake the role of the statutory derivative claim  
Just like the courts, academic scholars have also given different opinions on the 
issue of corporate remedies in the context of the unfair prejudice claim. 
Some scholars such as Payne suggest that the unfair prejudice petition 
effectively overtakes derivative claims.310 However, others like Haniggan have a 
different idea. She believes that cases like Clare v Cutland and Gamlestaden 
Fastigheter AB v Baltic Partners Ltd are limited in reality and even argues that 
they were fundamentally classic derivative claims, not unfair prejudice petitions.311 
She argues that courts should be ‘very cautious about allowing corporate relief to 
be sought and granted on an unfair prejudice petition.312 Some scholars313 argue 
that both derivative claims and unfair prejudice claims should be combined into a 
single provision, which covers all forms of shareholders’ claims on behalf of the 
company. 314  The argument is that it would solve the procedural differences 
between the derivative claim and the unfair prejudice claim.315 Additionally, a 
single, wide scope provision would solve the debates regarding the dual or 
simultaneous claims and the reflective loss principle under the unfair prejudice 
                                                
310 Jennifer Payne, ‘Sections 459–461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64(3) The Cambridge Law Journal 647-677 
311 Brenda Hannigan [n 278] 606-626 
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claim.316 In the view of thesis and considering  corporate separate personality, such 
arguments are not correct because the remedy which belongs to the company could 
not be combined with a personal remedy for shareholders. In addition to that, the 
English Law Commission in the Consultation Paper has clearly rejected the option 
of channelling the derivative claim into section 459 (now section 994). The Law 
Commission brings some good reasons such that: “under section 459 the applicant 
must show unfairly prejudicial conduct. In a derivative action, apart from the 
preliminary issue as to standing, the issue is whether the company has a cause of 
action against (say) a director”. 317  In addition, it reasons that “there may be 
circumstances where a derivative action can be brought but unfair prejudice 
proceedings cannot. A breach by a director of his duty of skill and care involves a 
wrong to his company but it will not amount to unfairly prejudicial conduct unless 
there is serious mismanagement. An applicant under section 459 (section 994) may 
be able to obtain an order under section 461(2)(c) now section 996(2)(c) if he can 
show that the company’s failure to sue the director is unfairly prejudicial conduct”. 
However, the consideration was that an applicant should not have to expend time 
and money in going through two sets of proceedings where, if a derivative action 
exists, only one is required.318 
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317 The Law Commission consultation paper no.142 on shareholder remedies, paras 16.4, 16.2(i) and 
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3.2.1.4 The unfair prejudice claim is not an ultimate substitute to the derivative claim  
Considering the academic discussion and the courts’ approaches toward the 
issue of corporate relief under the unfair prejudice claim, for the reasons given 
below this research argues that the unfair prejudice claim should not be considered 
as an alternative to derivative litigation.  
First, although the Jenkins Committee, whose report recommended the 
introduction of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy, envisaged that it would have 
a role in relation to wrongs done to the company,319 the legislator never intended to 
replace the derivative claim with the unfair prejudice remedy. In fact, the unfair 
prejudice claim was initially established to give the courts more flexibility and was 
aimed to be an alternative to the just and equitable winding up remedy to avoid the 
drastic consequences of a winding up order.320 To cut the costs and length of unfair 
prejudice petitions, the Law Commission recommended that if the circumstances 
in which a derivative action can be brought are made more transparent, members 
may be encouraged to bring this claim rather than the wide-ranging proceedings 
under section 996 of the Companies Act 2006, and accordingly this will shift some 
of the burden from the unfair prejudice remedy.321 Hence, the Law Commission 
considered that two distinct remedies should be preserved. The argument is that the 
unfair prejudice petition has largely been seen as a remedy for exiting the company 
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because the common order under section 996 is that the respondent purchases the 
shares of the petitioner.322 
Second, in order for the company to be compensated under the unfair prejudice 
claim, the shareholder should initiate a new claim in the company’s name, in 
addition to the one that has already been sought for the personal relief. Considering 
these two sets of proceedings, the costs and the amount of time that the complainer 
would be required to commit would be much more than using a derivative claim 
application. Moreover, the role of the ‘reflective loss principle’ is to distinguish 
between the company remedy and the shareholders personal remedies, and prevent 
shareholders from recovering both in relation to the harm to the company and 
personal harm at the same time. Therefore under an unfair prejudice claim 
shareholders should decide to whether sue directors for the personal harms or the 
harms to the company. There is no guarantee that shareholders prefer the company 
remedy to their personal remedies under the unfair prejudice conduct if they would 
have to choose.  
Third, directors owe their fiduciary duties to the company, not shareholders;323 
therefore, normally, breaches of fiduciary duty by directors should be litigated on 
behalf of the company as a separate legal personality from its shareholders and 
through a derivative claim. The nature of the two remedies is different in essence. 
The unfair prejudice claim is essentially a personal claim, which should be 
initiated in a situation that the company’s affairs have been conducted in a manner 
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which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members. In contrast, the derivative 
claim is litigation on behalf of the company as separate personality from its 
shareholders, which should only be brought under sections 260-264 of the 
Companies Act 2006 in the exceptional situations that the company is harmed by 
the wrongdoers opportunistic behaviour or mismanagement or negligence, and 
where the board of directors refuses to pursue the wrong conduct. Considering all 
the procedural restrictions that the legislator has established in the way of a 
derivative litigation to protect the company by preventing vexatious claims, it 
would not be rational to assume that the unfair prejudice claim has been designed 
for the shareholder to avoid the procedural hurdles of a derivative litigation and 
compensate the company’s loss. With unfair prejudice petitions there is no judicial 
control and scrutiny. While the permission hearing process in derivative litigation 
has its flaws, still it has a vital role in controlling unmeritorious claims and the 
claims relevant to the company should be filtered through that control. 
Given all these arguments, in the view of thesis, the unfair prejudice claim 
could not be an alternative to the derivative claim. Even if the unfair prejudice 
conduct is supposed to compensate the company’s harm through the shareholders 
as the applicant in some circumstances, the Government should clarify what those 
circumstances are. It should be clarified that how those circumstances differ from 
the grounds under section 261 and whether employees as the derivative claim 
applicant could have similar opportunity.  
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3.2.2 Ex ante protection through shareholder agreements 
 
In addition to the unfair prejudice claim, another method of protection in private 
companies is the shareholder agreement. Shareholder agreements govern the 
relations among shareholders in private companies. In fact, shareholder remedies 
in the context of shareholder agreements have created a new angle on the issue of 
shareholder remedies. Through these agreements, shareholders can potentially 
anticipate how the company would be managed and how conflicts would be 
resolved in the future. Minority shareholders can try to protect themselves against 
abuses of majority shareholders by bargaining for suitable protections in the 
articles of association or in separate shareholder agreements.324 Therefore, like the 
other mechanisms, shareholder agreements could in fact work as a mechanism of 
protection for shareholder personal interests in the company, not necessarily for 
the company as whole. 
The most important benefit of the shareholder agreement for minority 
shareholders is that, unlike the company articles, these agreements cannot be 
changed by the majority shareholder power through a special resolution. Changing 
the terms of shareholder agreements needs the approval of all the parties to the 
agreement. Hence, minority shareholders in   private companies, in addition to the 
rights they have under the articles of association, can increase their protection from 
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the abuses of controlling shareholders through the negotiation of shareholder 
agreements. 
Within the boundaries set by general law, shareholders are free to agree 
whatever terms they wish in their agreements.325 For instance, they might be able 
to prevent disputes in these companies by agreeing in advance the ways the 
business will be conducted.326 Some important factors, which can be included in 
shareholder agreements, are: providing management information to shareholders, 
paying dividends and dispute resolution procedure. The question is whether these 
agreements could protect private companies from the majority shareholders’ harm 
and if so to what extent? 
3.2.2.1 The limitations on shareholder agreements 
Although shareholder agreements could play an important role in protecting 
minority shareholders’ personal interests in private companies, nevertheless there 
are some restrictions on these agreements, which could prevent their absolute 
utility. The first problem is that the validity of these agreements depends on 
whether all shareholders in the company have agreed to the agreement or not.  
If all shareholders are parties to the agreement, it might be effective. If, 
however, less than all of the shareholders are parties to the agreement, then its 
validity could be endangered depending on which goals it aims to attain. For 
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example, the agreement could be vulnerable to attack by other minority 
shareholders if it attempts to change the current policy in the company in the form 
of electing or removing directors, and those other shareholders who are not parties 
to the agreement are opposed to this change. The other restriction is that the 
agreement provisions might have been drafted in a way that serve the personal 
interests of individual shareholders rather than considering the best interests of the 
company, so such agreements would not be effective in protecting the company as 
a whole against the wrongdoers.  
The third problem is that, like any other contract, these agreements have a 
limited nature; hence, in practice it would be impossible that the drafters of the 
agreement would be able to foresee all the potential problems in their relationship 
with the directors, or predict all the possible future misconducts of the majority 
shareholders. Lastly, the agreement’s provision is not effective without an 
enforcement mechanism. This depends on what has been defined in the 
shareholders agreement, and could be through the courts or through arbitration. 
However, in most situations, disputes in connection with shareholder agreements 
go beyond contractual disputes under the shareholders’ agreement and happen in 
the form of the more traditional company law shareholders’ remedies such as 
unfair prejudice claim, winding up or derivative claims.327  
Over all, shareholder agreements are a valuable instrument to preserve the 
interests of shareholders and even the company might be protected to some extent 
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against the majority shareholders’ opportunistic behaviour through these 
agreements. However, based on the mentioned shortcomings, these agreements 
could not prevent the misconduct of majority shareholders to the company in all 
situations. Therefore, the derivative claim is still the main means of protection for 
the company itself in private companies.  
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3.3 Mechanisms of accountability in public companies 
 
Although under the Companies Act 2006, statutory derivative claim provisions apply 
equally to shareholders in private and public companies, a common assumption in the 
English legal system is that the derivative claim is a remedy for shareholders in private 
companies. One common argument is that shareholders in public companies do not need 
to refer to derivative claims, because the combination of several ex ante mechanisms 
provide potent protection for shareholders to the extent that shareholders do not need to 
refer to litigation mechanisms to be protected. These mechanisms are the shareholders’ 
corporate rights, which have been supplemented by the mandatory disclosure 
requirements for directors, the market for corporate control, the role of non-executive 
directors and institutional shareholders and, finally, public authorities. Scholars have 
brought the low incidence of derivative claims in public companies as evidence for their 
argument.328 As was discussed in the introduction, the main critique to these arguments 
is that the derivative claim is not a remedy for shareholders. It is mechanism for 
protection of the company. The ax ante mechanisms of corporate governance are the 
mechanisms which are used mainly by institutional shareholders to protect their 
personal interests in the company. Institutional shareholder might not always be 
concerned about the long-term protection of the company for the interests of all. The 
derivative claim could work as a complementary mechanism to enhance the protection 
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of the company as a whole in situations that the other mechanisms of corporate 
governance fail to do so. To illustrate the limitations of the ex ante mechanisms in 
protection of the company as whole, this section reviews the function of these 
mechanisms in detail.  
3.3.1 Shareholders’ rights and power 
 
Under company law, the main protecting mechanism for UK shareholders’ 
interests is shareholders’ corporate rights. The argument is that British 
shareholders, specifically in public companies, have considerable power to define 
the rules of corporate governance. In fact, UK corporate governance in essence has 
been established on the basis of shareholder governance authority.329 Shareholders 
have a veto right over a range of potentially problematic transactions, such as 
managerial services contracts of greater than two years in duration, substantial 
property transactions between a director and his company, loans and remuneration 
to directors, amongst others.330 Additionally, shareholder approval is essential for 
conflicts of interest transactions and it is compulsory for particularly substantial 
property transactions. 331  Shareholders have the right to have a copy of the 
company annual accounts332 as well as voting on directors' remuneration.333 
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Moreover, shareholders have a very direct power over the company governance 
arrangements. For instance, they can by special resolution of 75 percent majority 
amend the articles of association.334 They may also by special resolution require 
the directors to take particular action or stop them from carrying out certain 
transactions. 335  Furthermore, the Companies Act 2006 gives great power to 
shareholders to define the structure of the board of directors. Shareholders with 
five percent voting power can demand a meeting at any time, at which by ordinary 
resolution of a simple majority a director can be removed without any cause. 
However, it should be noted that the director ‘is entitled to be heard on the 
resolution at the meeting’.336 The Companies Act 2006 provides shareholders with 
the right to approve secondary share offerings by ordinary resolution (for example 
50 per cent of voting shares) and in any event they have statutory pre-emption 
rights on all secondary share offerings for cash, although they can approve the 
disapplication of these pre-emption rights by special resolution (for example 75 per 
cent of voting shares). Bruner considers the contractual nature of UK corporations 
as a reason for the highly important role of shareholders in UK corporate 
governance.337 He refers to section 33 of the Companies Act 2006 which provides 
that the company, or more precisely its constitution, is to be treated as a 
contract.338 Consequently, the board’s power in a UK company has been passed on 
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to them by the shareholders, in the manner of a contractual delegation through the 
articles of association, and shareholders can unilaterally determine the terms of this 
contract. John Armour also argues that the power shareholders have over key 
decisions in the company likely serve as a substitute for formal civil enforcement 
in the United Kingdom. He argues that governance rights can reduce managerial 
agency costs by giving shareholders the power to remove directors who do not act 
in shareholders’ interests, as well as ex ante decision rights for transactions that 
could harm shareholders’ interests. 339  Paul Davis argues that the power of 
shareholders to remove directors gives the directors the message that ‘if you 
choose not to follow our views, we will by ordinary majority seek to remove you 
from office’. He argues shareholders’ removal power can be a strong inducement 
for directors to obey the shareholders’ wishes.340  
 In practice, however, there are several limitations on these corporate rights.  
 
3.3.2 Shareholder voting right limitations 
 
Considering all the arguments in favour of shareholders’ rights and power under 
the UK corporate governance, the question which emerges is to what extent 
shareholders’ voting rights are effective in preventing directors from self-serving 
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opportunistic behaviours which could result in misappropriation of company assets 
and damage to the company? 
Although shareholders under the law have strong power in holding directors 
accountable to the company, in practice there are several limitations. For instance, 
in applying their voting rights, shareholders must first know in detail about the 
company’s affairs. In order to consider the proper course of action, which could 
include the veto of a potential harmful transaction to the company or when the 
harm is done to remove directors through a resolution, shareholders must first learn 
about the directors’ mismanagement or misconduct. Nevertheless, with public 
companies, because of the separation of ownership and control, shares are very 
widely dispersed and minority shareholders may not even be aware of the 
directors’ mismanagement or wrongful conduct to prevent it. Also, to be aware of 
the details of the company management and to vote logically, shareholders are 
required to devote a reasonable amount of time to becoming familiar with the 
company’s activities, which in practice may not always happen for shareholders in 
public companies. One reason for this could be that voting is not mandatory and 
many shareholders who do not own a substantial amount of shares may be 
reluctant to participate in general meetings and vote. Attending a meeting in person 
could be expensive especially if the shareholder is living in another city or even 
another country. Even if they attend the meeting, another difficulty for minority 
shareholders is being able to get sufficient numbers at the meeting to pass a 
resolution, stop a transaction or remove directors, for example. Thus, shareholders 
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might have few incentives to participate in general meetings and vote. Even in 
situations in which shareholders’ participation has been facilitated by electronic 
means of voting, they might not exercise their right. This phenomenon is known as 
‘rational apathy’ among academics. 341  They argue that as the result of the 
dispersed capital market in the UK and the cost of becoming aware of the company 
issues, many minority shareholders choose to become rationally apathetic. They do 
not take the time to consider particular proposals and instead prefer to agree with 
directors without giving serious consideration to the issue.342 Rational apathy is not 
only common for individual shareholders but also among many institutional 
shareholders as well. The other issue that may prevent shareholders from taking 
part in voting is the lack of collective action. Under the collective action theory, 
shareholders will not make motivated proposals or keenly stand against directors’ 
proposals unless the potential gains are much larger than the cost of the effort. In 
public companies, since share ownership is dispersed among a large number of 
institutional and individual shareholders, the likelihood of collective action is 
low.343 
Based on the arguments given above, at least in terms of minority shareholders, 
voting in public companies may not be an absolute barrier in the way of directors’ 
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opportunistic conduct in all situations. Therefore, it should be seen how much 
institutional shareholders could be effective in preventing the harm to the 
company.   
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3.3.3 The UK corporate governance comply-or-explain principle and the 
significant role of institutional shareholders under the law 
 
The comply-or-explain principle is a regulatory approach within UK corporate 
governance which provides that public listed companies should either comply with 
the principles of corporate governance in the UK or if they do not comply, explain 
publicly why they do not.344 This idea in corporate governance was introduced in 
the UK in 1992 through a report by the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury.345  
The main reason behind the establishment of the Cadbury Committee was 
several corporate scandals which had occurred in several high profile companies 
during the 1980s. These scandals demonstrated the need for a higher standard of 
controlling companies’ affairs in the UK. 346  The outcome of the Cadbury 
Committee was the introduction of several recommendations in a Code which 
became famous as the “Cadbury Code” and which laid the ground for a series of 
changes in the corporate governance field.347 
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The Cadbury Committee declared that its most important outcome was that 
companies are permitted to not comply with the provisions listed in the Cadbury 
Code as long as they explain in their annual director’s report the reasons for the 
non-compliance.348 The established principle is known as the comply-or-explain 
principle nowadays. The aim of this principle is to provide market-based solutions 
between companies and their shareholders without the need for judiciary 
intervention. The argument is that the disclosure of companies’ information on 
their governance system provides substance for shareholders to make informed and 
sophisticated decisions. On the other hand, the flexibility under the principle 
allows the diversity of companies’ boards to be taken into account. 349 
Nevertheless, despite its advantages, still there are some critiques to the 
implementation of the comply-or-explain principle.350  Overall, these critiques are 
based on two grounds: (1) insufficiency of shareholders engagement in controlling 
the companies’ compliance, and (2) inadequacy of companies’ explanations for 
their non-compliance.351 As for the inadequacy of the explanations, there are some 
indications of cases in which companies either fail to provide any explanations for 
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their non-compliance 352  or their explanations have been characterised as 
uninformative 353  and vague, 354  or perfunctory355  or boilerplate. 356  The problem 
with the comply-or-explain principle is that there is no guidance on how directors 
comply with the corporate governance principles or how companies should explain 
the reasons for non-compliance. Hence, it is completely at the discretion of the 
board of directors. Giving an absolute discretion to the board to define how to 
explain non-compliance would bring the accountability of the board into question. 
In terms of shareholder control of the directors’ report, the reasons for lack of such 
control by minority shareholders have been discussed above. Therefore, only 
majority shareholders, in particular when they work collectively could control 
directors’ conduct in the company and prevent their opportunistic behaviour. That 
is the reason why institutional shareholders have been encouraged by the corporate 
governance code to consider their obligations seriously. In fact, largely the 
effectiveness of the comply-or-explain principle has relied on the stewardship of 
institutional shareholders. In July 2010, the Financial Reporting Council ratified 
the UK Stewardship Code with the aim of improving the quality of engagement 
between institutional shareholders and companies to help improve long-term 
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returns to shareholders, and the efficient exercise of governance responsibility.357 
The Stewardship Code was the successor to the good practice guidelines, which 
were published by the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee in 2002. Under the 
Code, institutions have duties such as publicly disclosing their policy on how they 
will discharge their stewardship responsibilities and monitor their investee 
companies. Also, they should have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of 
voting activity.358 In addition to current responsibilities, under the new corporate 
governance reforms, the UK Government has put additional tasks on institutional 
shareholders to control the board of directors’ remuneration report for the 
executive pay; therefore, the responsibility of institutional shareholders in 
monitoring and controlling the board’s conduct have been increased. However, 
although institutional shareholders are considered to be an important corporate 
governance pillar for the implementation of the comply-or-explain principle, there 
are strong debates on whether they could provide strong protection for the 
company.  
3.3.4 Institutional shareholders in the UK may not actively and effectively protect 
the company  
There are several reasons for why institutional shareholders may not always play 
an optimal role in controlling the directors’ misconduct and protecting the 
company. An argument is that despite UK corporate governance efforts in 
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empowering the institutional shareholders to monitor and control the company’s 
directors, there are some factors which could preclude them from efficiently 
performing the role that the Stewardship Code has considered for them. For 
instance, due to their large portion of shareholdings, they are normally considered 
to be more aware of the company’s affairs and more involved in the company’s 
management in comparison to individual shareholders. However, just like 
individual shareholders, institutional shareholders’ passivity in voting is a common 
phenomenon among institutional shareholders as well. UK institutional 
shareholders may take the ‘box-ticking approach’ towards their duty to monitor the 
company’s compliance with the corporate governance code. In this practice, they 
consider the company’s non-compliance with the corporate governance code as an 
instance of breach and ignore the explanation which the company may have given 
for the alleged non-compliance. 359  Such an approach might be considered an 
incentive to companies to comply with the corporate governance principles but in 
fact would bring the flexibility of comply-or-explain principles into question. The 
approach is in fact a sign that institutional shareholders put no real effort into being 
engaged or evaluating company disclosures. 360  Institutional shareholders could 
also be ignoring the conduct of directors by considering the financial performance 
of the company as a sign that directors are complying with their duties. However, 
the fact is that good performance by the company is not always the sign that the 
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company is protected from the directors’ wrong conduct. Directors could be 
involved in fraudulent activities or any other opportunistic conduct yet the 
company may still do financially well, at least in the short term. The consequence 
is that the institutional shareholder may not care to effectively monitor the 
directors’ conduct and prevent harm to the company as long as the company is 
doing well financially for the period that they are holding shares.361 The problem 
has already been discussed in the thesis before. The main problem is that there is 
no guarantee that institutional shareholders prefer the company’s interest to their 
personal interest. Shareholders will not always take the responsibility for the long-
term protection of the company, which is required in the Stewardship Code. They 
usually have short-term, profit maximising goals which is against the notion of 
both long-termism or good stewardship. 362  Institutional shareholders’ main 
purpose in many situations is to secure a high financial return on their investments 
in the short term rather than the protection of their investee company’s interests. 
Therefore, in many situations they are reluctant to be involved in corporate 
governance matters and costly monitoring of their investee companies simply 
because “they are self-interested stewards who have no specific obligation to one 
particular company and even if they stay with a company for a period it is because 
they have planned their investment on a diverse portfolio so as to spread the risk of 
lower performing shares”. 363  Additionally, institutional shareholders might put 
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directors under pressure to behave in the interests of their shareholders. 
Nonetheless, such control may not necessarily protect the interests of the company 
as a whole.  Even more arguably, it may not always protect the interest of minority 
shareholders because their interests and those of the majority shareholders are not 
always in line.364 
In 2011, the European Union Commission Green Paper 365 raised concerns that 
institutional shareholders, because of their desire for short-term high return, may 
even be responsible for companies’ risky business tactics and short-term business 
objectives as management are practicing risky strategies to fulfil shareholder 
demands. This concern has been recently reinforced by the UK Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) Committee which in response to the Government 
Green Paper for Corporate Governance reforms has referred to the considerable 
concerns about the quality of shareholder engagement in the evidence received by 
them. 366  Hence, few institutional shareholders may focus on monitoring a 
particular company even though it would be on information provided by the 
market. These debates over the role of shareholders, particularly institutional 
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shareholders in providing a long-term protection for the company, reinforce the 
argument that the derivative claim should be more affordable and accessible under 
the law. As has been mentioned several times before, the derivative claim is a 
mechanism for protection of the company itself. It could bring compensation to the 
company or deter further harm to the company. It could be used by minority 
shareholders or employees in situations that they cannot rely on other mechanisms 
to protect the company. Clearly, not all directors are wrongdoers or all 
shareholders ignore their role of monitoring the management of the company. 
Therefore, the derivative claim could still have an exceptional but vital role 
alongside the other mechanisms of corporate governance to provide an ultimate 
protection for the company. 	
3.3.5 Non-executive directors (NEDs) 
 
Non-executive directors (NEDs) are another essential element of UK corporate 
governance for the implementation of comply-or-explain principles in public 
companies. The need and importance of non-executive directors for establishing 
good corporate governance is clear from all of the reports and recommendations, 
which have been made on corporate governance. From the Cadbury Report, which 
was the starting point for emphasising the role of non-executive directors until 
today, all of the reports related to corporate governance have dedicated part of their 
recommendations to the role and importance of non-executive directors. 
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Since the early attempts to reform the UK corporate governance system in the 
early 1990s, different committees and reports have emphasised the establishment 
of a mechanism that would put executive directors under tight scrutiny so that they 
work for the company's interests instead of seeking their own interest. Both the 
Cadbury Committee Report 367  and the Greenbury Committee Report, 368  while 
emphasising the significance of greater reporting to shareholders, had also 
considered a main role for non-executive directors of the board in monitoring the 
performance of the company, including that of the executive directors. The other 
committees which confirmed the important role of non executive directors were 
the Hampel Committee, 369  Turnbull Report, 370  Higgs Committee Report, 371 
Combined Code372 and Walker Report.373 
The UK Corporate Governance Code clearly gives a strong role to the non-
executive directors. Under the code, the non-executive directors should: 
constructively challenge and help in developing proposals on strategy,374 scrutinise  
management’s performance in meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor 
                                                
367 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee 1992)  
368 Directors’ Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury (Gee 
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370  Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales, Internal control: Guidance for 
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Governance-Code.aspx (visited 3/5/2017) 
 
 
138 
performance reports,375 satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial information 
and that controls and risk management systems are robust and defensible, 
determine appropriate levels of remuneration for executive directors, appoint and 
remove executive directors, and carry out succession planning. The board should 
appoint one of the independent non-executive directors to be the senior 
independent director to provide a sounding board for the chairman, and to serve as 
an intermediary for the other directors when necessary. The senior independent 
director should be available to shareholders if they have concerns about contact 
through the normal channels of chairman, chief executive or other executive 
directors that has failed to resolve issues, or about which such contact is 
inappropriate.376  
The board should state in the annual report the steps they have taken to ensure 
that the members of the board, and in particular the non-executive directors, 
develop an understanding of the views of major shareholders about the company, 
for example through direct face to face contact,  analysts’ or brokers’ briefings and 
surveys of shareholder opinion. 377  The Code requires at least half the board, 
excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by 
the board to be independent. A smaller company should have at least two 
independent non-executive directors. 378  Therefore, UK non-executive directors 
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may also take part in management decisions and they are not restricted to post-
decision approval like the German supervisory board.379  
The non-executive directors should meet regularly as a body, with the chairman, 
without the executive directors and at least once a year they should meet on their 
own under the leadership of the senior independent director to appraise the 
chairman’s performance.380 The UK Corporate Governance Code also has made a 
distinction between non-executives who are independent and those who are not. In 
order to be qualified for the former category, the person must not only have the 
necessary independence of character and judgment but also be free of any 
connections that may lead to conflicts of interest.381 
Overall, since one of the crucial roles of the board is to monitor the executive 
management, this duty can be carried out best if those who monitor are 
independent of those who are executive. Therefore, the rationale behind having 
non-executive directors lays in the importance of independence in particular areas 
within the board where conflicts of interests are likely to happen.382 In fact, the 
non-executive director’s role is to prevent self-dealing by observing conflict-of-
interest transactions.383 They also monitor the board to detect managerial fraud and 
also to prevent directors’ mismanagement.384 
                                                
379 Klaus J. Hopt and Patrick C Leyens, ‘Board Models in Europe:  
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382 Wolf-Georg Rings, ‘Independent directors: After the crisis’ (2013) 14(3) European Business 
Organization Law Review 8 
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Some scholars argue that non-executive directors serve not just the interests of 
the shareholders, but those of all stakeholders as well. Their role is to ensure that 
the company’s financial information is accurate and satisfy all the stakeholders in 
the company.385 However, in the view of this thesis, despite the positive role that 
the non-executive directors could play in monitoring the board’s conduct, there are 
still some limitations in their role which would prevent them to protect the 
company in all circumstances.  
 
 3.3.5.1 Limitations on the role of the non-executive directors in controlling 
directors’ misconduct  
In spite of the important role non-executive directors play in the UK corporate 
governance, there are still some practical shortcomings of their role. For instance, 
the UK Corporate Governance Code has failed to indicate how the roles of non-
executive directors should be performed in practice. The lack of guidance on how 
non-executive directors should fulfil their responsibilities while they have a 
diversified range of duties may result in unrealistic expectations of their role.386 On 
the other hand, to define non-executive directors the UK Corporate Governance 
                                                                                                                                          
Director’ (2016) 16(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
384  Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘Corporate Directors in the United Kingdom’ [2017] UCLA School 
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Code387 provides a list of criteria that would normally exclude a specific director’s 
independence, such as where the director:  
• has been an employee of the company or connected entity within the past 
five years; 
• is or has been connected with the company’s auditors, advisers, directors or 
senior employees;  
• has received additional remuneration from the company apart from 
director’s remuneration;  
• has had a material business relationship with the company; or 
• represents a significant shareholder.  
While it has been delegated to the board to determine whether each director is 
independent in character and judgment, 388  the criteria above are just non-
compulsory guidelines for the board. This means that the board is free to diverge 
from these criteria under the well-known comply-or-explain principle.389  Now, 
considering the criticisms of the implementation of comply-or-explain 
                                                
387 The UK Corporate Governance Code, s B.1.1 <http://frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-
Standards/Corporate governance.aspx (accessed 23/4/2017) 
388 The UK Corporate Governance Code section B.1.1 provides that: ‘The board should identify 
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relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s 
judgement. The board should state its reasons if it determines that a director is independent 
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determination, including ...’ 
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principles,390 this approach raises some debates on whether non-executive directors 
would be completely independent from the board in all circumstances.391  
The other criticism of non-executive directors is that they might not be able to 
completely understand the complexities of the businesses, which they direct. Due 
to lack of expertise they might show significant deficiencies in understanding the 
business they were supposed to control, or might remain ineffective in solving 
structural problems.392 Therefore, they may not always be able to fulfil the duties 
which have been delegated to them in improving the company’s performance. 
Another concern is that non-executive directors are expected to perform a wide 
range of duties such as taking an active role in monitoring executive directors, 
watching for self-dealing by examining conflict-of-interest transactions, preventing 
fraud and directors’ mismanagement, guaranteeing the quality and reliability of 
corporate information disclosures, keeping executives focused on the generation of 
shareholder value via the design and implementation of appropriate employment 
and remuneration schemes, and the disciplining of company executive directors 
who are not performing their duties well. Nonetheless, non-executive directors 
may lack enough incentives to effectively perform all tasks that have been 
assigned to them, unless they are provided with strong financial incentives, which 
                                                
390  Shortcomings in implementation of the comply-or-explain principle was discussed in the 
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391 Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black, ‘The Non-Correlation between Board Independence and Long-
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might not be the case in all companies.393 The last concern is that non-executive 
directors may increase the costs of companies. Some scholars have raised this 
concern over the non-executive directors’ lack of familiarity with the business,394 
and in addition to that concern is the cost of human resources which are expected 
to be used in the appointment and training process.395  
To conclude, non-executive directors are potentially playing a significant role in 
monitoring directors’ conduct and controlling the management, still there might be 
some practical shortcomings in implementation of their duties. Therefore, there 
might still be some situations of directors’ misconduct that harm the company that 
the non-executive directors fail to monitor and detect. The derivative claim could 
be used in these circumstances to compensate for that harm. 
3.3.6 The market for corporate control 
As was mentioned before, the aim of this chapter is to explore different 
corporate governance mechanisms in public companies, and evaluate whether they 
could provide sufficient protection for the company to the extent that they would 
cover the role of the derivative claim. One of these corporate governance 
mechanisms in the UK is the market for corporate control. The market for 
corporate control has been viewed as an essential tool to restrict the misconduct of 
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directors. It is believed that it could reduce the agency costs between shareholders 
and directors by reducing directors’ opportunistic behaviour. 396  However, the 
question is what role does the market for corporate control play in increasing the 
accountability of the board toward the company and not just shareholders? Would 
market-based solutions prevent managers from engaging in wrongdoing to such a 
degree as to render derivative claim intervention redundant? 
The initial philosophy behind the market for corporate control is that the 
opportunistic behaviour of directors may cause the company’s share value to fall 
and this would provoke a corporate takeover threat. If the takeover bid goes ahead 
and results in acquisition of the company, the incumbent opportunistic directors 
will be removed. Hence, because of the fear of losing their positions, directors 
would put their best effort into increasing company profits and act in the best 
interests of the company as a whole, rather than in pursuing their self-interests 
which could harm the company. In fact, the market for corporate control is based 
on the theory that the market for the company’s share is always effective enough to 
the extent that it would react to the executives’ wrongful conduct by dropping the 
value of the company’s shares. Consequently, the bidder would take over the 
company and incumbent wrongdoing directors would be sacked from the board.  
The regulations governing the UK market for corporate control have been 
established under Chapter 1 of Part 28 of the Companies Act 2006, with its 
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supervisory powers pursuant to the EC Directive on Takeover Bids.397 Takeovers 
in the United Kingdom are controlled through a market-based arrangement in 
which institutional shareholders have the leading roles. 398  The City Code of 
Conduct on Takeovers and Mergers, which was established in 1968, is executed by 
the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers which is comprised of institutional 
shareholders such as insurers, investment companies, pensions and banks.399  
Although the Panel was given a statutory right by the Companies Act 2006, in 
order to comply with the EC directive which requires the establishment of a public 
authority to supervise takeover bids,400 the Panel nonetheless remains completely 
rooted in the private sector, both in composition and in practice.401  
The Code of Conduct itself encompasses a series of principles, which make it 
completely clear that shareholders control the fate of takeover bids. The general 
principles require that all the targeted company’s shareholders be treated equally, 
and provides that the targeted company board “must not deny the holders of 
securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid.402 The City Code 
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effectively rejects all defensive actions when a takeover bid is pending or when the 
target has ‘reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent’.403  
In fact, like the other mechanisms of corporate governance, the UK takeover 
regulations have only put shareholders in the driver’s seat and is strongly 
favouring their interests by giving the target company’s shareholders an almost 
autonomous discretion to accept or reject a hostile bid.404  
The market-based solution to corporate misconduct is the replacing of directors, 
mostly through the hostile takeover. Hence, since the takeover regulations 
favouring shareholders and directors have no defensive power, it has been 
suggested that it could reduce the agency costs by the threat or reality of a hostile 
takeover bid, which would result in the incumbent wrongdoer being dismissed 
from the board of the company. Moreover, due to the UK’s permissive regulation 
of takeover bids, it is accepted that the UK’s corporate governance system, 
compared with that of the US, has been much friendlier to hostile takeovers.405 As 
a result, the wrongdoing directors in the UK are more endangered by takeover 
bids. Nevertheless, such an allegation could not always be true for the reasons 
stated in the following section.  
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3.3.6.1 The market for corporate control is not a sufficient alternative to the 
derivative claim  
In assessing the efficiency of the market for corporate control, several factors 
should be considered. One important concern in the market for corporate control 
solution lies in its weakness in preventing the managerial misconduct, particularly 
in situations known as the ‘one shot’ breaches of fiduciary duty406 which are in fact 
a frequent subject of derivative claims. The takeover is generally considered more 
effective in displacing wrongdoing directors from the targeted company’s board 
without necessarily forcing them to compensate the company. The argument is that 
wrongdoing directors who are benefiting from so-called ‘one shot wrongs’ might 
not care about being dismissed from the company’s board after committing such a 
wrong.407 Moreover, corporate takeovers are extremely expensive; therefore, the 
scale of a manager's wrongdoing must be enormously high in order to affect the 
company’s share price or attract a bid for control. The agency cost-related issues 
might not be big enough to trigger a takeover bid even if they result in a notable 
reduction in a company’s share value. 408  The other point is that even if the 
takeover happens, with such high transaction costs the market for corporate control 
will not effectively control all management misconduct.409 The importance of the 
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market for corporate control arises from the nexus of contract theory under which 
hostile takeovers are appreciated because they reduce the agency costs caused by 
non-shareholder value pursuing, or directors’ self-serving behaviour. Hence, 
Contractarians argue that hostile takeovers ensure that directors accomplish their 
contractual obligations to shareholders. From an efficiency perspective, hostile 
takeovers create a more efficient economy by cleaning out weakly performing 
companies.410 This thesis argues that the market for corporate control is inefficient 
in protecting the company as whole. The problem is that hostile takeovers might be 
a favourite mechanism for shareholders, who want to accept premium bids for their 
shares but such interests might be at the expense of harm to other stakeholders, 
such as innocent directors and employees who might fear losing their jobs and the 
creditors who might fear additional corporate debt. Let us consider takeover cases 
in which the targeted company has huge pension deficits at the time of takeover, 
and where the interests of employees in such situations are not considered. A 
takeover not only would help directors of the acquired company to easily walk 
away from their responsibility but also could cause the employees to lose their job 
as well. One argument is that the potential employment impacts of a takeover 
could be compensated by the social welfare benefits available to employees in the 
UK.411 The Labour Party in 1966 eventually became satisfied with the potential 
employment impacts of takeover activity based on the belief that the right mergers 
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would maximise employment opportunities and external protection could 
adequately mitigate any harm to employees. 412  In fact, it was recognised that 
although there would be unemployment problems following mergers, these were 
felt to be problems of a transitional phase, and that the social costs faced by 
unemployed workers were also more broadly mitigated through the social care 
scheme and the Redundancy Act 1965 which was established under Labour.413 To 
compensate the harm of losing their job, pro-employee legislation was established 
in the UK during the 1960s and 1970s under Labour and Conservative 
governments.414 Also, the Industrial Relations Act 1971 introduced the concept of 
‘unfair dismissal’ to the common law, requiring the employer to show a ‘fair 
reason’ for dismissal, which could include redundancy. 415  Moreover, the 
Redundancy Payments Act of 1965 introduced mandatory redundancy 
payments.416 The argument is that before the introduction of the pro-employee 
regulations, redundancy was risky to employers as they were often met by 
spontaneous industrial action. However, pro-employee regulations were effective 
in mitigating the number of strikes over redundancy cases.417 Hence, back to the 
question of whether the market for corporate control solution represents an 
alternative to derivative litigation, could we argue that the market for corporate 
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control would compensate the role of the derivative claim? The answer is still no. 
Takeovers would not provide the deterrence and compensation role, which could 
theoretically be provided by the derivative claim for the company as a whole, not 
just the shareholders. The derivative claim would be initiated in situations that the 
directors are in breach of their fiduciary duties, either by negligence or by their 
opportunistic behaviour which harms the company. The takeover would not 
necessarily punish the wrongdoing directors in such circumstances. Nor would it 
bring compensation to the company for the harm. In addition to that, employees 
and other stakeholders in the company might get personal support which could 
compensate their harm if they get made redundant because of a takeover in some 
circumstances. However, the harm to their interest might not be compensated in 
situations that the directors intentionally harm the company by their opportunistic 
behaviour, and put the company on the verge of insolvency or a hostile takeover 
which would cause them to lose their job and benefits in the company. The 
argument is that the deterrence role of the derivative claim could help the 
employees and minority shareholders to prevent these circumstances to happen.  
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3.3.7 The power of public authorities  
 
Another mechanism, which has been named by academics as a means of 
controlling directors’ misconduct in the UK, is the power of public authorities both 
through investigating conflicted transactions and through the use of public suits 
and criminal sanctions to deter illegal self-dealing transactions. 418  However, 
enforcement by securities regulators in the UK is rare.419 Although shareholders in 
a publicly traded UK company can potentially sue directors to recover losses 
caused by false or misleading disclosures, still private litigation enforcement such 
as shareholder class action and derivative claims are rare under the securities law. 
In fact, the problem with the UK procedural rules is that they obstruct claims under 
corporate law including the problem with the costs of the litigation, and 
discourages suits under securities law too.420 The UK securities regulations have 
been mainly based on the disclosure model, which relies on the principle of 
mandatory disclosure.421 The regulatory bodies such as the Stock Exchange have 
an essential role in deterring directors’ misconduct and reducing agency costs by 
enforcing the Stock Exchange Listing Rules. Listed companies are faced with a 
wide range of disclosure obligations under the EC Transparency Obligation 
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Directive.422 UK companies fulfil these obligations through the FCA Disclosure 
Rules and Transparency Rules (DTR).  
Companies are required to disclose on time all dealings in their securities, 
including non-voting securities, by ‘persons discharging managerial 
responsibilities’ and certain connected persons. Companies are also required to 
take all necessary steps to ensure that their persons discharging managerial 
responsibilities and persons connected with them comply with the Model Code on 
dealings in securities, which is annexed to the Listing Rules.423  
Moreover, in addition to shareholder approval requirements under the 
Companies Act, Stock Exchange Rules require independent shareholder approval 
by ordinary resolution for related-party transactions, unless they fall within certain 
exceptions, for example small related-party transactions. 424  Additionally, 
significant related-party transactions entered into by listed companies are subject 
to a strict procedure of shareholder approval proposed by the Listing Rules of the 
Financial Services Authority.425  
The Listing Rules require the directors’ annual financial report to disclose, 
among other things, details of contracts of significance where a director is 
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interested or between the company and a controlling shareholder.426 Furthermore, a 
listed company, which enters into a transaction with a related party, must make a 
notification to the stock market via a regulatory information service approved by 
the FCA.427 
Despite the significant function of public bodies in monitoring and controlling 
directors’ conduct through the mandatory disclosure rules, it is still impractical to 
rely exclusively on public enforcement for protecting the company. The mandatory 
disclosure rule may not necessarily detect all breaches of the law. One general 
argument with regards to the mandatory disclosure model is that it may not be 
always functional as minority investors may not read or understand the 
disclosures.428 Therefore, they may need a stronger consumer protection by the 
law. However, the issue of investors’ personal protection is outside the subject of 
this thesis. The thesis argument is that in terms of the company protection as a 
separate personality from its shareholders, although like the other mentioned 
mechanisms of corporate governance the public bodies could provide protection 
for the company through shareholders, such protection might not be optimal in all 
circumstances. The reason goes back to the limitations on the role of shareholders 
in protecting the company.  Therefore, it is correct that the public authorities in the 
UK, alongside other corporate governance mechanisms could provide an 
environment in listed companies in which the derivative claim is less needed. Still 
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they would not completely cover the role that the derivative claim could play in 
protection of the company as whole.  
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter debated the general belief that availability of the other mechanisms 
of accountability for directors, especially in public companies substitutes the role 
of the derivative claim in holding controlling shareholders and directors 
accountable toward their responsibilities. Such arguments are based on the 
traditional shareholder value principal,429 which mainly considers the protection of 
the company as the protection of the shareholders’ interest rather than of the 
company as a whole. Hence, in order to find that how much the company as a 
whole could be protected through these mechanisms, this chapter explored these 
so-called alternative mechanisms to the derivative litigation both in the context of 
private companies and public companies. The result confirmed that derivative 
claims still have a role to play in the English legal system. There is no doubt that 
the combination of these corporate governance tools could moderate the role of the 
derivative claim. Still, such protections have been mainly based on the majority 
shareholders role and, therefore, there could be some limitations on this reliance. 
The argument of this thesis is that the derivative claim is a mechanism for 
protecting the company as a separate entity from its shareholders, and there is no 
guarantee that shareholders always care about the long-term well-being of the 
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company and the interests of other stakeholders. Even in terms of protecting 
shareholders’ interests, reviewing these so-called means of accountability revealed 
that each of them has its limitations, which prevent them from being optimal in 
detecting and monitoring directors’ conduct in all circumstances. For this reason 
the derivative claim still has a role to play. Overall, in order to provide sufficient 
protection for the company (shareholders and other stakeholders together), a body 
of mechanisms of accountability including the derivative claim, should work 
together and complement each other rather than being replaced by each other. The 
derivative claim in this regards is the claim that both minority shareholders and 
employees are able to initiate it. The reason is that in some private companies there 
is no shareholder or any other external mechanism to monitor the directors and 
controlling shareholders’ conducts and to prevent them from harming the 
company. In such circumstances the employees could take the role of protecting 
the company. As was mentioned in chapter one, BHS provides a good example in 
this regards.  
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Chapter Four: Mechanisms of accountability in the United States 
and the role of derivative suits 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Reviewing different mechanisms of accountability for directors in the United 
Kingdom reinforced the argument that the availability of other corporate 
governance mechanisms could affect the need for the derivative claim. However, 
each mechanism of accountability has its own limitations, especially in terms of 
protecting the company as a whole. Therefore, the conclusion was that the 
company would be better protected if mechanisms of accountability including the 
derivative claim work together as a body to provide a long-term protection for the 
company. This is providing that other stakeholders, including employees, would 
also have a role to play in such a protection. Like in the UK, in the United States 
only shareholders have the right to be involved in the management of the company 
or sue company wrongdoers on behalf of the company. However, despite having 
similarities such as dispersed ownership corporate governance systems and the 
unitary board models, still the United States and United Kingdom diverge in 
dealing with corporate affairs. The main difference between the two corporate 
governance systems is on the issue of mechanisms of accountability for the board. 
Accordingly, while UK corporate law has remained pretty much loyal to the ex 
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ante430 mechanisms of protection, the United States’ corporate system has mainly 
relied on ex post431 remedial-based corporate governance through the shareholders 
as the only applicants. This means that while shareholder litigation is more potent 
in the United States, some other mechanisms of corporate governance such as 
shareholder voting power are weaker. In fact, one argument is that the   
shareholders’ weak power in monitoring and controlling the directors’ wrong 
conduct in advance, has resulted in frequency of shareholder litigation such as 
derivative suits and class actions in the United States.432 It has been mentioned in 
the previous chapter that mere reliance on ex ante mechanisms in the UK might 
not provide a potent long-term protection for the company as a whole. The same 
argument applies to the heavy reliance on the ex post mechanisms in the United 
States. The argument is that there should be a balance between the availability of 
ex ante mechanisms that monitor the directors’ conducts and the litigation 
mechanisms that bring compensation to the company. The lack of such balance has 
resulted in an extensive amount of shareholder litigation in the United States, 
which might not always benefit the company. While this research criticizes the 
high incident of derivative suits in the United States, it argues that there are still 
some positive aspects in the derivative suits financial structure which could be 
                                                
430 Ex ante is a phrase meaning ‘before the event’ and ex ante mechanisms of protection refers to 
a series of actions that protect the company through the monitoring of the board’s conduct such as 
the corporate governance ‘comply-or-explain’ principle, market for corporate control and non-
executive directors. 
431 Ex post or ‘after the event’ mechanisms are the methods that companies use in litigation to punish 
directors’ misconduct and win compensation for the company. 
432 For example see John Armour, Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins and Richard Nolan, ‘Private 
Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the UK and US’ (2009) 6 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 687-722; also Christopher Bruner, Corporate governance in the common-law 
world: The political foundations of shareholder power (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
 
 
158 
inspiring for the UK. Under the financial structure of the derivative suits the 
company is responsible for the cost of the litigation through the availability of 
contingency fee agreements. Moreover, in the United States the non-monetary 
benefits of derivative suits are also considered under the corporate benefit doctrine. 
This chapter reviews the role that derivative suits play in providing protection for 
the company and discusses the inspiring aspects of the financial structure of US 
derivative suits. The chapter also explores the availability of other corporate 
governance mechanisms in the United States to ascertain how much they could 
affect the need for the derivative suits.   
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4.2 Corporate governance in the United States   
	
The United States’ corporate governance is known as a ‘board-centric’433 model 
of corporate governance by many scholars. 434  However, like in the UK, 
shareholders in the company have been given a primacy over other stakeholders. 
Therefore, in common with the UK, shareholders are the only company 
stakeholders which can be involved in decision-making in the company to some 
extent and have the right to sue directors for harm to the company.435  
Moreover, in the United States under the internal affairs doctrine,436 corporate 
law including the rights of shareholders has traditionally been left to the states to 
govern. 437  However, under the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution, Congress also has plenty of power to federalise corporate law to the 
level it likes.438 Following some major financial crises, Congress used its power to 
                                                
433 The board-centric or director primacy model is a model of corporate governance in which the 
board of directors has an ultimate power over the company, and shareholders theoretically have few 
rights to get involved in the decision-making of the company. The United States’ corporate 
governance is typically known as ‘board-centric’, which is in contrast with the UK and New 
Zealand’s ‘shareholder primacy’ or ‘shareholder-centric’ models of corporate governance. For more 
information on this issue see Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Director versus Shareholder Primacy in New 
Zealand Company Law as Compared to U.S.A. Corporate Law’ [2014] UCLA School of Law, Law 
and Economics Research Paper Series No 14-05 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=241644 (visited 27/4/2017) 
434 Edward Rock, ‘Adapting to the new shareholder-centric reality’ (2013) 161(7) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1907-1988 
435 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The end of history for corporate law’ (2000) Geo. 
LJ, 89 433-34 
436  The ‘internal affairs doctrine’ confirms that such issues as voting rights of shareholders, 
distributions of dividends and corporate property, and the fiduciary duties of directors are all 
determined in accordance with the law of the state in which the company is incorporated. 
437 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 302(2), 304 (1971); CTS Corp. v Dynamics 
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v Green, 430 U.S. 462,479 (1977) 
438 U.S. Const. art. I. § 8, cl. 3; also Christopher Bruner, Corporate governance in the common-
law world: The political foundations of shareholder power (Cambridge University Press 2013) 37; 
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draft some considerable federal regulations on corporate law including the federal 
securities regulation and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which 
were established following the 1929 stock market crashes. In addition to that, 
following scandals such as Enron and the financial and economic crisis in recent 
years, some major amendments have been made to those statutes.439 Alongside 
these, the Delaware jurisprudence also plays a crucial role in forming the legal 
mechanisms for regulating company affairs. Despite the fact that among different 
stakeholder groups, only shareholders have the right to hold directors accountable 
toward their duties in the United States, still American shareholders do not have 
significant power over the board. It means that in the United States the board of 
directors has the ultimate power to manage the company.440 For instance, Delaware 
General Corporation Law provides that the ‘business and affairs of every 
corporation organised under this chapter shall be managed by or under the 
direction of the board of directors’.441 
The Model Business Corporation Act also provides that ‘all corporate powers 
shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the 
                                                                                                                                          
Leo Strine, ‘Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington Some Constructive 
Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward’ (2008) 63(4) The Business Lawyer 1107 
439  Christopher Bruner, ‘Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach to the 
Shareholder Bylaw Debate’ (2011) 36 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 26–29  
440  Margaret Blair, ‘Shareholder value, corporate governance, and corporate performance’ in 
Peter K. Cornelius and Bruce Kogut (eds), Corporate governance and capital flows in a global 
economy (Oxford University Press 2003) 64-65 
441 Delaware General Corporation Law, § 141 
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corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or 
under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors’.442 
Because of the directors’ ultimate power under US corporate governance, 
shareholders are theoretically allowed to vote on fewer issues in comparison to 
their British counterparts, such as on the sales of substantially all of the listed 
corporation’s assets, voluntary dissolution and approval of charter or bylaw 
amendments.443 Even for the bylaw amendments, although the power to amend the 
corporation’s constitutional documents has initially been assigned to the 
shareholder body, the Delaware law provides that the directors have simultaneous 
power to amend or revoke the bylaws.444 Moreover, apart from hostile takeovers 
which target the company, shareholders must vote on a merger with another 
company,445 whereas the board alone can approve almost all other transactions. 
Even in some instances when there was a potential takeover bid, some quoted 
companies have diverged from the principle that shareholders should vote and 
have recategorised the shares by placing major voting power in only one of the 
classes of shares - mainly those owned by the directors - thus retaining their 
position by preventing the bid.446 Additionally, in terms of removing wrongdoing 
directors from the board, it is more difficult for US shareholders to remove 
                                                
442 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann §. 8.01. This power is subject to any limitations in the articles of 
association.  
443 Blair [n 442]; Bruner [n 439] 
444 Delaware General Corporation Law § 109 
445 Delaware General Corporation Law § 251 
446 Arthur Pinto and Gustavo Visentini, The legal basis of corporate governance in publicly held 
corporations: a comparative approach (Kluwer Law International 1998) 259; Fahad Mohammed 
Almajid, ‘A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly 
Held Companies: a Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective’ (Doctoral research, 
The University of Manchester 2008)  
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directors from the board in comparison to their British counterparts. In fact, the 
American shareholders have a default power to remove directors with or without 
cause by vote of a simple majority of shares,447 but in practice if the corporation 
has a classified board448 then directors can only be removed ‘for cause’.449 Even if 
the certificate of incorporation can be amended by shareholders to provide that 
directors should be removed ‘without cause’, in a substantial number of large 
corporations with classified boards can directors still only be removed ‘for 
cause’. 450  Because of the above-mentioned restrictions on shareholder voting 
rights, scholars like Bruner argue that the restrictions on US shareholders has made 
them ‘spectators’ in the company, who have very few powers in comparison to 
their counterparts in the UK or other common law jurisdictions. 451  Although 
shareholders in the United States have weaker power to interfere in the 
management of the company, still like in the UK, their interests are preferred to 
those of other stakeholders. 452  Shareholder primacy principles still govern US 
                                                
447 Delaware General Corporation Law § 141(k) 
448 The classified board is a prominent practice in US corporate law in which a portion of the 
directors serve for different term lengths, depending on their particular classification.  
Under a classified system, directors serve terms usually lasting between one and eight years;  
longer terms are often awarded to more senior board positions. 
449 Daniel Attenborough, ‘The Vacuous Concept of Shareholder Voting Rights’ (2013) 14(2) 
European Business Organization Law Review 166 
450 ibid  
451 Christopher Bruner, ‘Corporate governance reform in a time of crisis’ (2010) 36(2) Journal of 
Corporation Law 329–39 
452 Kevin Turner, ‘Settling the Debate: A Response to Professor Bebchuk's Proposed Reform of 
Hostile Takeover Defences’ (2006) Ala. L. Rev. 57 928 
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corporate governance because the board of directors only provides the 
shareholders with an annual report about the affairs of the company.453  
The question is that to what extent shareholders in the United States could hold 
directors accountable to their fiduciary duties for protecting the company?  
  
                                                
453 John Colley et al., What Is Corporate Governance? (McGraw-Hill Executive MBA Series 
2005 ) 33 
 
 
164 
4.3 Institutional shareholders  
In order to bring the board conduct more under control, institutional shareholder 
activism has become an increasingly common phenomenon among US public 
corporations in recent years. The substantial amount of capital that flows into 
activist funds, especially hedge funds, provides them with a greater financial 
power to stand up against opportunistic managers. 454  Institutional shareholder 
activists have been successful in persuading corporate directors through proxy 
contests and other interventions.455 Nowadays, several institutional shareholders 
hold vast amounts of shares in the US stock markets and they monitor directors by 
putting them under tight scrutiny. Institutional shareholders normally pursue their 
interests through the constructive dialogues they have with corporate directors, 
preferably out of the spotlight. However, many of the institutional shareholders in 
large corporations also take advantage of the federal mandate rule to include the 
institutional investors' governance proposals in the management's proxy statement, 
and then to submit them to a vote in the company’s general meetings.456 This 
mandate empowers institutional shareholders to prevent the board from abusing its 
position. For instance, through the mandate, institutional shareholders are able to 
                                                
454 Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Director versus Shareholder Primacy in New Zealand Company Law as 
Compared to U.S.A. Corporate Law’ [2014] UCLA School of Law, Law and Economics Research 
Paper Series No 14-05 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=241644 ( visited 
27/4/2017) p14; also Stephen Arcano, ‘Activist Shareholders in the U.S.: A Changing Landscape’ 
(2013) The Harvard Law School Forum On Corporate Governance And Financial Regulation < 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/06/28/activist-shareholders-in-the-us-a-changing-landscape 
(visited 16/4/2017)  
455 Bainbridge ibid 
456 Joseph McCahery and Luc Renneboog, 'Recent Developments in Corporate Governance' in 
Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers and Luc Renneboog (eds), Corporate 
Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press 2002) 15; Fahad 
Mohammed [n 446] 83 
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submit proposals to remove defensive tactics often designed by managers to deter 
hostile takeovers or to adopt proxy voting or to limit executive directors’ 
compensation.457 Nonetheless, despite their efforts in influencing the companies’ 
management, their role has had little impact in preventing directors’ opportunistic 
behaviour in US corporate governance. Bainbridge argues that despite these 
successes, the board’s power still remains powerful and the shareholders’ ability to 
control corporate decision-making is still restricted; therefore, significant 
protection for minority shareholders in the United States comes from other legal 
devices, such as derivative suits.458 
 	
                                                
457 ibid 
458 Bainbridge [n 454]  
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4.4 The US market for corporate control and the approach in consideration of the 
other stakeholders’ interest  
The market for corporate control in the United States has been seen as a device, 
which could put pressure on directors who run the company poorly or prefer their 
own interests instead of the company’s interest.459 Nonetheless, in comparison to 
the United Kingdom, American shareholders have less power to accept or reject 
hostile takeover bids for the company. In fact, in the United States, shareholders’ 
ability to accept hostile bids is effectively weak  because of the Delaware courts’ 
significant role, as well as the existence of regulations460 which permit the board of 
directors to take defensive strategies to  protect current company commercial plans 
from the threats of hostile takeovers. Indeed, the US boards have a clear freedom 
to consider the interests of other stakeholders, such as employees and creditors, in 
deciding how to respond to a hostile bid.461 One of the most defensive methods 
which has been used by directors to defeat a takeover bid in the United States is 
the ‘poison pill’ or shareholders’ right plan. The important usage of the ‘poison 
pill’ is that it deters a potential bidder from buying the shares of the targeted 
company by making a takeover unprofitable. There are two types of ‘poison pill’: 
                                                
459 Maria Maher and Thomas Andersson,  'Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance  
and Economic Growth' in Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers and Luc 
Renneboog (eds), Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University 
Press 2002) 
460  Williams Act 1968; also several important Delaware courts decisions confirming board 
discretion to take takeover defences include Unocal Corp. v Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 
(Del. 1985); Moran v Household Int‘l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v MacAndrews 
& Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Paramount Commc‘ns v Time Inc., 571 A.2d 
1140 (Del. 1990); Paramount Commc‘ns v QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 994); Unitrin, Inc. 
v Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).  
461 Christopher Bruner [n 451] 325 
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the ‘flip-in’ and the ‘flip-over’. The ‘flip-in’ allows shareholders, except the 
acquirer, to buy additional shares at a discount. This would make the takeover 
more expensive. The ‘flip-over’ lets shareholders buy the acquirer’s shares after 
the merger at a discounted rate.462 The other most frequently used tactic is what is 
known as a ‘staggered’ or ‘classified’ board in which the term of each board 
member is three years and only a third of the board is elected each year. This 
mechanism of appointing directors can provide a potent takeover defence 
particularly when combined with ‘poison pills’. This is because they require a 
bidder to wait through at least two election cycles to replace enough members of 
the board to gain control.463 Bruner argues that in the context of hostile takeovers, 
Delaware’s courts have left the issue of corporate objective largely unclear by 
stating that directors owe duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its 
stockholders simultaneously. It means that the Delaware courts’ general approach 
to takeover bids reveals that shareholder interests are not the same with corporate 
interests in United States in the way that it is in the United Kingdom. 464 
Considering this thesis’ argument that the interest of the company as a whole 
should be preferred to the mere interest of shareholders, such an approach is not 
necessarily a wrong approach. For instance, in Unocal,465 the court ruled that a 
                                                
462  Jordan Barry and John William Hatfield, ‘Pills and Partisans: Understanding Takeover 
Defences’ (2011) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 642 
463  ibid 645; Margaret Blair, 'Shareholder Value, Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Performance: A Post- Enron Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom' in Peter Cornelius and 
Bruce Kogut (eds), Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in Global Economy (Oxford 
University Press 2003) 63-64 
464 Bruner [n 451] 
465 Unocal Corp. v Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 954 (Del.1985) 
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targeted company’s board, in evaluating how to respond to the hostile takeover 
bid, could consider ‘its effect on the corporate enterprise’ generally, including 
impacts on ‘creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community 
generally’. In Time,466 the court ruled that in evaluating the takeover offer, a target 
board might consider ‘the impact on “constituencies” other than shareholders’. 
In addition to Delaware’s approach, Bruner also refers to some other states 
which in their so-called ‘constituency statutes’ indicate that the interest of other 
stakeholders in addition to shareholders should be considered in the context of 
hostile takeover bids.467 
Despite the previous discussion that the market for corporate control is not an 
optimal device for preventing directors’ opportunistic conduct in all circumstances, 
the US approach, particularly the Delaware judicial approach in considering the 
other stakeholders’ interests in the context of takeovers, is still potentially a 
positive approach. Of course, such consideration is only acceptable as long as it 
would not give the wrongdoing directors the opportunity to misuse such 
considerations for their personal benefit. Considering the role of the court, the 
scale of abuse could not be great.  
 
  
                                                
466 Time 571A.2 dat115 
467 For instance, both Indiana and Connecticut’s states constituency statutes provision refer 
 to the consideration of other stakeholders’ interests in taking commercial decisions.  
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4.5 Power of public regulator in protecting the company 
Some scholars argue that in light of the weaknesses of states’ company law, 
securities regulation is arguably a significant part of protection for the company. 
The possibility of civil enforcement permits injured shareholders to seek 
compensation for disclosure failings or market abuse such as insider dealing.  
A significant amount of protection available to companies through shareholders 
in the US is provided through private securities litigation and in the form of 
securities class action suits.468 In fact, with the development of the fraud-on-the-
market theory which was established under Basic v Levinson,469 the class action 
suits became the popular types of shareholder litigation against the corporate 
wrongdoers. The reason for the popularity of these types of litigations roots in the 
availability of the contingency fee agreements which shift the costs of the litigation 
from the claimant to the company. In addition to shareholder private securities 
litigation, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) which was created in 1934 
as part of the New Deal under the Securities Exchange Act 1934, provides a 
variety of disclosure requirements for companies that are public. The establishment 
of the Securities Exchange Commission was the response to a serious need for 
investor protection in securities markets.470 The SEC has been based on reliance on 
                                                
468 Roger Barker and Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘Protecting minority shareholders in blockholder-controlled 
companies: evaluating the UK’s enhanced listing regime in comparison with investor protection 
regimes in New York and Hong Kong’ (2014) 10(1) Capital Markets Law Journal 98-132; also 
Steven A Ramirez, ‘The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and Macroeconomic 
Perspective’ (2014) 5 Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 669  
469 Basic v Levinson [1988] 485 U.S. 224 
470 Barker and H-Y Chiu [n 468]; Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street: A History of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance (Aspen Publishers 1982) 
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disclosure, and enforcement by an independent regulatory body and it can either 
sue for an injunction in court or issue orders on its own to prevent violations of the 
law. 471  The discretion which has been given to the SEC is a priority for its 
enforcement in comparison to other jurisdictions, particularly as the market 
regulators it often has more information and can react quicker to the violation of 
law.  
The SEC’s power is limited by the so-called ‘internal affairs doctrine’ which 
favours state corporate law when authorising corporate governance matters. 472 
However, to support the SEC, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002473 provides that the 
Stock Exchange establishes mandatory listing rules and requires all listed 
companies to have an audit committee comprising only of independent directors to 
be responsible for hiring auditors,474 and that financial statements should be signed 
off by the Chief Executive and Financial Officers.475 In addition to that, the Dodd-
Frank Act 2010 rules that shareholder rights in an advisory vote on executive 
compensation and golden parachute 476  should be increased. 477  In addition, the 
stock market should establish mandatory listing rules to check the strategies 
regarding executive compensation.478  On the other hand, the New York Stock 
Exchange listing rules combat the agency problems arising from abuse of power 
                                                
471 § 2.2 
472 Barker and H-Y Chiu [n 468] 
473 Rule 14a-11  
474 Section 301  
475 Section 302  
476 A golden parachute is a substantial benefit given to top executives if the company is taken 
over by another company and the executives are terminated as a result of the merger or takeover. 
477 Section 951  
478 Section 954 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by directors, and rely fundamentally upon mandating a significant oversight and 
monitoring role to independent board members.479  
Despite the existence of mandatory disclosure requirements under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the majority of protection for shareholders still arises from the ex post 
remedial litigation, either through the security class action claims or shareholder 
derivative suits.480 Good evidence to prove this argument is the World Bank Doing 
Business Report, which shows that the strength of the United States’ corporate 
governance has been based on the shareholders litigations.  
 
4.6 US corporate governance from the Doing Business Report point of view 
 
To review the strength of the corporate governance mechanisms of protection in 
public companies, it would be useful to look at the indicator of protecting minority 
investors in the World Bank Doing Business Report. 
The Doing Business Report methodology has not been based on statistics but instead 
on the so-called ‘law in the book’. The information for each jurisdiction comes from the 
securities regulations, company laws, civil procedure codes and court rules of evidence. 
The Protecting Minority Investors index measures the protection of shareholders 
                                                
479 Usha Rodrigues, ‘The Fetishization of Independence’ (2008) 33 Journal of Corporation Law 
447 
480 ‘Director versus Shareholder Primacy in New Zealand Company Law as Compared to U.S.A. 
Corporate Law’ [2014] UCLA School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper Series No 14-05 
< https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=241644 ( visited 27/4/2017); John Armour et 
al., ‘Private enforcement of corporate law: an empirical comparison of the United Kingdom and the 
United States’ (2009) 6(4) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 687-722 
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against directors’ misuse of corporate assets for personal gain, by distinguishing three 
dimensions of regulation that address conflicts of interest: transparency of related-party 
transactions (extent of disclosure index), shareholders’ ability to sue and hold directors 
liable for self-dealing (extent of director liability index), and access to evidence and 
allocation of legal expenses in shareholder litigation (ease of shareholder suits 
index).481 This thesis refers to these reports for two reasons. First, the Doing Business 
Report methodology is in line with this thesis’ argument that regardless of how much 
the corporate governance devices would be needed in practice, the availability of these 
mechanisms under the law is important. Second that the information they use comes 
from reliable sources of regulations and case law in each jurisdiction and this 
information is in line with the academic literature on each country’s corporate 
governance to a great extent.  
In order to define the strength of each country’s corporate governance in 
protecting shareholders, the Doing Business ‘protecting minority investors’ 
indicator has been divided into nine indices. Each index is assumed to display one 
aspect of protection for shareholders. 
To summarise the information provided by the report, the information is 
displayed on several charts.  
                                                
481  Protecting Minority Investors Methodology, available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/Protecting-Minority-Investors 
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Chart number 1482 shows the distribution of shareholders’ protection among the 
different mechanisms of corporate governance in the US, mainly in public 
companies.  
 
As is clear from the chart, the report shows that protecting shareholders’ 
interests in the US arises from aspects such as shareholders’ litigation suits, 
regulations on directors’ liability, conflict of interest regulations and extent of 
disclosure. 
Likewise, the chart shows US corporate governance weakness in areas such as 
shareholders’ voting rights and the extent of ownership and control.  
To get a better understanding of how US corporate governance differs from that 
in the UK, I have compared the US and the UK scores on another chart. Chart 
                                                
482 The chart has been based on the scores that the Unites States has obtained under the various 
indices of the ‘protecting minority investors’ indicator available on the Doing Business website: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/united-states#protecting-minority-investors 
11% 
15% 
7% 
12% 16% 
16% 
7% 
7% 
9% 
Chart number 1: 
US Minority Investors Protection Indicator 
Doing Business Report 2017 
Strength of minority investor 
protection
Extent of conflict of interest 
regulation
Extent of shareholder 
governance
Extent of disclosure 
Extent of director liability 
Ease of shareholder suits
Extent of shareholder rights 
Extent of ownership and control
Extent of corporate transparency 
 
 
174 
number 2483 shows the weakness and strength of shareholder protection under US 
corporate governance in comparison to the UK. 
 
 
The chart reveals that in areas such as shareholders’ governance, shareholders’ 
voting power, extent of disclosure and extent of corporate transparency, the UK is 
stronger than the US. Nonetheless, with regards to areas such as directors’ liability 
and ease of shareholders’ litigation suits, the US shows more strength. Overall, 
according to the Doing Business Report, the United Kingdom provides stronger 
protection for shareholders in comparison to the US and has obtained a better 
ranking under the report. The report confirms the academics’ arguments on the 
                                                
483 Like the previous chart, the comparison in this chart has also been formed on the scores that 
 the United States and the United Kingdom have obtained under the various indices of the 
‘protecting minority investors’ indicator available on the Doing Business website: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/united-states#protecting-minority-investors  
and here: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/unitedkingdom#protecting-
minority-investors 
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power of shareholders’ rights in the United Kingdom and the strength of 
shareholder litigation in the United States.  
 
4.7 The role of derivative suits in the United States 
 
From the academic literature and the Doing Business Report, we discovered 
that the derivative suits, along with class action suits are the dominant sources of 
protection for shareholders in the United States. Now it needs to be found how 
much this frequency helps with the protection of the company itself and what other 
factors are effective in the popularity of the American derivative suits. To find the 
answers I explore the role of the derivative suits both in the context of public and 
private companies.  
The derivative suit has been in use in the United States for quite a long time. In 
Cohen v Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., the United States Supreme Court states 
that the derivative suit has long been ‘the chief regulator of corporate management 
and has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal of 
stockholders interests’. 484  In performing their responsibilities, directors in the 
United States are charged with fiduciary duties of loyalty, due care and acting in 
good faith to the corporation and to the corporations’ shareholders. 485  If 
                                                
484 337 US 541,548 (1949) 
485 See William Lafferty, Lisa A. Schmidt and Donald J. Wolfe, ‘A Brief Introduction to the 
Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under Delaware Law’ (2011) 116 Penn St. L. Rev 837; Guth v Loft, 
Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); In certain situations, such as when the corporation is insolvent, 
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shareholders believe that directors and officers are in violation of their duty of care 
or loyalty toward the corporation and its shareholders, they can initiate a derivative 
suit.  
However, since in a derivative suit shareholders sue to compensate the harm to 
the company rather than injuries to themselves, the applicants must satisfy a 
number of strict standing requirements to bring the suit.486 
As will be explained in the next section, the provisions under the Delaware 
Corporate Law, MBCA and federal rules impose restrictions, such as the demand 
on board requirement, the contemporaneous ownership rule and the continuous 
ownership rule, which stand in the way of shareholders’ derivative suits.487 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                          
directors of a Delaware corporation also owe fiduciary duties to the creditors of the corporation. 
Adlerstein v Wertheimer, No. 19101, 2002 WL 205684 at 11  (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2002) 
486 See Pogostin v Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) in which the court held that ‘because the 
derivative action impinges on the managerial freedom of directors, the law imposes certain 
prerequisites to the exercise of this remedy’. 
487 See Del. Code Com. S327, Fed, R.Civ.p.23.1, RMBCA § 7.41; ALI Principles of Corporate 
Governance § 7.02 
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4.8 Procedural requirements 
 
The standing requirements for bringing derivative suits are established both by 
statute and by court rules.488 The important point is that despite the regularity of 
derivative suits in the United States, the procedural requirements are tough to 
prevent the misusing of this mechanism. In order to have a proper standing to 
initiate a derivative suit in the United States, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and also most states’ courts, impose the following requirements. 
	
4.8.1 Prerequisites 
This rule applies when shareholders or members of a corporation bring a 
derivative suit to enforce a right of a corporation. 
The derivative suit may not be continued if it appears that the plaintiff 
shareholder does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of shareholders 
or the corporation.489  
	
  
                                                
488  Del. Code Com. S327, Fed, R.Civ.p.23.1,RMBCA s 7.41; ALI Principles of Corporate 
Governance s 7.02 
489 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; also see John D. Hughes, Gregory D. Pendleton and Jonathan Toren, 
‘Shareholder Derivative Litigation: A Primer for Insurance Coverage Counsel and Other Lawyers’ 
[2012] < http://media.lockelord.com/files/uploads/documents/17908572_1.pdf (visited 7/5/2017) 
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4.8.2 The contemporaneous ownership rule 
The major purpose of the rule is to prevent unjust enrichment by deterring the 
purchase of derivative suits. 
In Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp,490 the court held that the purpose of the 
contemporaneous ownership rule is ‘to prevent what has been considered an evil, 
namely, the purchasing of shares in order to maintain a derivative action designed 
to attack a transaction which occurred prior to the purchase of stock’. 
Nonetheless, the rule has been the subject of critiques from some academics. 
For instance, Hamilton argues that the real reason for the contemporaneous 
ownership rule is a repugnant attitude towards derivative suits rather than the 
purpose of deterrence of unjust enrichment or prevention of purchase of suits.491 
He argues that if preventing of abuse of litigation through share purchase is the 
real concern, then the law should allow the shareholder who has already bought the 
company shares but has just discovered the wrong conduct, to bring a derivative 
suit even if he was not a shareholder at the time that the wrongdoing happened.492 
Li also suggests that to prevent unjust enrichment, it would be better if the rule 
were to require that the plaintiff must have bought the shares before the 
misconduct was publicly known, rather than the current approach.493 
                                                
490 Rosenthal v Burry Biscuit Corp.60 A.2D 106 at 111 (DEL.Ch.1948) 
491 Robert Hamilton and Richard Freer, The Law of Corporations in a Nutshell (West Academic 
2010) 
492 ibid 
493 Xiaoning Li, A comparative study of shareholders' derivative actions. England, the United 
States, Germany and China (Kluwer Law International 2007) 157 
 
 
179 
These arguments are correct. The reason is that the derivative claim is a law suit 
for the protection of the company and any probable compensation goes back to the 
company and not shareholders personally; therefore, a shareholder should be able 
to bring a claim on behalf of the company even if they were not shareholders at the 
time of the alleged wrongful conduct of directors.  
In addition to the academic critiques to the contemporaneous ownership rule, 
The American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance also depart 
from the rule and suggest that instead of the current requirement, the shareholder 
should prove he acquired the shares before the material facts relating to the breach 
were publicly disclosed.494 Unlike in the United States, the statutory derivative 
claim provisions under the Companies Act 2006 allow a shareholder to bring a 
derivative action for a wrongdoing that happened before he purchased his 
shares.495 
 
  
                                                
494  ALI Principles of Corporate Governance, s 7.02(a) 
<https://www.ali.org/publications/show/corporate-governance-analysis-and-recommendations/ ; also 
Douglas M Branson, ‘The American Law Institute Principles Of Corporate Governance And The 
Derivative Action: A View From The Other Side’ (1986) 43(2) Washington and Lee Law Review  
495 Companies Act 2006 s 260(4) 
 
 
180 
4.8.3 The continuous ownership rule 
	
According to the US continuous ownership requirement, the rule requires that 
the plaintiff must continue to hold shares in the corporation so as long as the suit 
continues. In this way, the plaintiff will share in the corporation’s financial gains 
or losses during the litigation. 
In Lewis v Anderson,496 the Delaware court stated that ‘A plaintiff who ceases 
to be a shareholder, whether by reason of a merger or for any other reason, loses 
standing to sue derivatively’. Also, in Strategic Asset Mgmt., Inc. v Nicholson, the 
court rejected the argument that a shareholder need not preserve his or her status as 
a shareholder in situations where a settlement agreement has been reached, and 
held that ‘a settlement agreement without a final judgment by the court does not 
terminate the litigation’.497 Furthermore, under the continuous ownership rule, in 
situations in which a merger occurs and the shareholder is merged out of the 
corporation or a corporation buys back the plaintiff's shares, the plaintiff loses 
standing.498  There are some exceptions with regards to mergers. For instance, 
Delaware allows a shareholder to preserve a derivative suit if the merger is the 
subject of a fraud claim and the fraud was committed merely to deprive 
shareholders of standing. 499  In Arnett v Gerber Scientific, for example, 
shareholders had standing to sue after a merger because ‘(1) the plaintiff’s 
                                                
496 Lewis v Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040,1049 (Del.1984) 
497 Strategic Asset Mgmt., Inc. v Nicholson, 2004 WL 2847875, at*3(Del.Ch.Nov.30, 2004) 
498 Quinn v Anvil Corp., 620 F. 3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) 
499 Kramer v Western Pac.Indus., 546 A.2d 348,354 (Del.1988) 
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disposition of the stock was involuntary, (2) the disposition was related to the 
allegedly illegal acts of defendants and (3) the remedy sought [rescission of the 
merger] would result in plaintiffs regaining shareholder status’.500 
Additionally, the plaintiff has the right to bring a derivative suit if the merger is 
simply a reorganisation that does not affect the plaintiff’s ownership in the business 
enterprise. In Schreiber v Carney the court held that because the ‘structure of the old 
and new companies was virtually identical’ and thus the reorganisation ‘had no 
meaningful effect on the plaintiff ownership of the business enterprise,’ the plaintiff did 
not lose standing to maintain a derivative action.501 Based on the argument of this 
research that the derivative claim is a claim for protection of the company and the 
company does not belong to its shareholders, there is therefore a big critique to the 
Continuous Ownership Rule. The outcome of the derivative suits is supposed to benefit 
the company, hence the claimant shareholder decision for getting out of the company or 
a merger should not make a ground for the court to withdraw a derivative litigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
500 Arnett v Gerber Scientific, Inc., 566 F.Supp.1270,1273 (1983) 
501 Schreiber, 447 A.2d 17 
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4.8.4 The demand on the board requirement 
 
A shareholder who wishes to initiate derivative litigation must secure the 
corporate action through making a demand to the board of directors. The demand 
requirement is considered as one of the most substantial barriers under the 
American law to shareholders’ derivative suits.502 Federal courts and most state 
courts permit a shareholder to initiate a derivative suit only after making a demand 
on the board to rectify the challenged transaction.503  The rationale behind the 
demand requirement is that it gives the board the opportunity to consider the 
dispute before the issue goes to court. Additionally, since generally the board of 
directors is granted the power to execute business matters including the decision to 
bring a lawsuit on behalf of the company and derivative suit is a lawsuit on behalf 
of the corporation, so the plaintiff shareholder in the first instance should request 
the board of directors to pursue the alleged misconduct.504 Moreover, courts are 
generally reluctant to interfere in companies’ business matters so the demand 
requirement is considered a way of encouraging intra-corporate dispute resolution 
and preventing unnecessary lawsuits.505 
                                                
502 William Meade Fletcher et al., ‘Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations’ (2011) 2011 
perm. ed., rev., section 1.06 
503 The demand requirement was first codified in Federal 
Equity Rule 94, then in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b), which was incorporated into 
Federal Rule 23.1 in 1966. Also, all states now require demand on the corporate board prior to 
initiation of a derivative suit. 
504 Xiaoning Li [n 493] 160 
505 Pogostin v Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (“The demand requirement ... exists at the 
threshold ... to promote inter corporate dispute resolution.”) 
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The demand requirement must simply ‘fairly and adequately apprise the 
directors of the potential cause of action so that they, in first instance, can 
discharge their duty of authorising actions that in their considered opinion are in 
the best interest of the corporation’.506 
In general, the demand requirement must: (1) identify the alleged wrongdoers; 
(2) describe the factual basis for the allegations; (3) describe the harm caused to 
the corporation and (4) describe the request for relief.507 However, in practice by 
using a procedure known as the ‘futility test’, plaintiff shareholders are usually 
attempting to bypass the demand requirement by asking a court to ‘excuse’ the 
requirement to make the demand because it would be futile. The ‘futility test’ first 
was established in Aronson v Lewis in which the court held that: ‘Under the 
particularised facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are 
disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the 
product of a valid exercise of business judgment’.508 
	 	
                                                
506 ibid 
507 Lewis ex rel. Nat’l Semiconductor Corp v Sporck, 646 F.Supp.574,578 (N.Y.Cal.1986) 
508 Aronson v Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,14 (Del. 1984) 
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4.8.5 Is the demand on the board a proper requirement for derivative suits?  
	
On the one hand, the demand requirement is rational as it works as a filter for 
preventing unnecessary litigation against the company, and it encourages the use 
of intra-corporate solutions rather than court intervention. Nevertheless, on the 
other hand, it might be unreasonable to use the board as a filter for derivative suits 
because the whole reason for the derivative suit is that the board has failed to 
prevent the alleged misconduct.  
Hence, accepting the shareholders derivative suit request would be admitting 
the board’s own failure and it is unlikely that the wrongdoing directors would 
admit such a thing. Therefore, it is not surprising that in most situations the board 
rejects the demand request. As such, it is unlikely that the board will be able to 
judge objectively whether a derivative action is meritorious.  
In contrast to the United States’ ‘demand requirement’, the UK has made the 
courts the primary filter for unmeritorious derivative claims. Under the statutory 
derivative claim, shareholders are required to obtain permission from the court 
before they can initiate a derivative claim. They are required to demonstrate that 
pursuing the derivative action would be in the best interests of the company and 
that the action is being brought in good faith. However, overall, the UK approach 
in referring the claim to the third party independent body (i.e. the court) to decide 
is a better approach than the US. Although, as was explained in chapter two, the 
UK approach has its own deficiencies, which need to be amended.  
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4.8.6 The special litigation committee  
	
One independent body which could decide on the merit of the derivative suits in 
the United States is the special litigation committee. In fact, when a plaintiff makes 
a demand on the board of directors, the corporation’s board has two choices: take 
over the litigation or oppose it. The board’s decision to take over the claim ends 
the shareholder’s control of the derivative suit, but if the board decides to take over 
the action, it may delegate control to an independent and disinterested special 
litigation committee. 509  The special litigation committee is responsible for 
investigating the merits of the plaintiff’s claim and defining whether or not 
litigation is in the corporation’s best interest.510 Nevertheless, the special litigation 
committee rarely happens in practice in Delaware. The reasons are that 
establishing a special litigation committee could be every expensive, the 
independency of the committee’s members could be a challenging issue for the 
board of directors and, lastly, there is no guarantee that the court will approve the 
committee’s opinion.  
	
	 	
                                                
509 William Meade Fletcher et al. [n 505] § 6019.50 
510 Zapata Corp v Maldonado, 430 A 2d 779, 786 (Del.1981) 
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4.8.7 The role of the business judgment rule 
 
Another difficulty in the way of shareholders derivative suits in the United 
States is the role of the business judgment rule which is a widely adopted principle 
in that jurisdiction. 
Under the business judgment rule, in evaluating directors’ decisions, the court 
should mainly examine the procedure by which the decision was made, instead of 
examining the merits or the substantive aspects of the decisions.511 
The rule protects directors from liability for their business decisions if they 
fulfil the requirement of the rule. The requirement is that they have acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interest of the company. Therefore, under the business judgment rule, a 
rational decision made with due process will be valid and binding on the 
corporation even if it turns out badly later.512 
There are some rationales for the business judgment rule. The first argument is 
that directors rather than shareholders should have discretion in running the 
corporation and if their discretion has been rationally exercised then it should not 
be subject of judicial review.513 Secondly, the rule acknowledges that there are 
inherent risks in making business decisions due to reasons such as inadequate 
information or unpredicted changes in events. Therefore, the evaluation of 
                                                
511 Robert Hamilton and Richard Freer, The Law of Corporations in a Nutshell (West Academic 
Publishing 2011) 455 
512 ibid 453 
513 ibid 454 
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business decisions should be based on the process of decision-making rather than 
on the merits. In this way, directors are encouraged to take business risks which 
may bring substantial profit for the corporation.514 The last justification for the 
business judgment rule is that the courts should not second guess business 
decisions because they are not business experts and are less qualified than directors 
to cope with business issues.515  
However, the business judgment rule does not apply when the director is self-
interested in a transaction, so if the plaintiff shareholder is able to prove that it is a 
conflicted interest transaction the business judgment rule will be rebutted. Yet 
again, the director may be exempt from liability if he is able to prove that the 
transaction is entirely fair to the corporation, 516  or it has been authorised by 
disinterested directors or a vote of disinterested shareholders after a full 
disclosure.517  
 
  
                                                
514  Norman Veasey and Christine Di Guglielmo, ‘What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law 
and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments’ (2005) 153(5) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1399-1512 
 
516 DGCL s 144(a); Xiaoning Li [n 493] 150 
517 Stephen Bainbridge, Corporation law and economics (Foundation Press 2002)  
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4.9 The distinct role of derivative suits in private and public companies 
 
4.9.1 The role of the derivative suit in private companies 
Unlike in the UK, where the derivative claim is generally known as a remedy 
for shareholders in private companies, in the United States there are two different 
opinions on this issue. Some scholars argue that the derivative suit is not a suitable 
mechanism for closely-held corporations for several reasons.518 First that due to 
the nature of derivative suits, even if the litigation is successful, all the probable 
compensation goes back to the corporation and since it is hard to dismiss the 
wrongdoing directors from the board or to remove their controlling power, they 
would still indirectly benefit from the recovery, based on the shares they owned. 
Therefore, considering the procedural impediments in the way of shareholders, 
derivative suits might not be as effective in closely-held corporations.519 In the 
view of this thesis, such argument does not seem to be rational. The argument 
indicates that because majority shareholders might indirectly get some of the 
recovery back through the increase in value of the company, derivative claim is not 
effective in protecting minority shareholders. It is true that controlling shareholders 
in closely-held corporations might also benefit indirectly. On the other hand, 
having the derivative suit is better than not using it at all, particularly as it is still 
the main way of compensating the harm to the company as whole and not merely 
the shareholders. In contrast to the previous argument, some other scholars - for 
                                                
518 Xiaoning Li [n 493] 
519 ibid 
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instance Kenneth520 - argue that for private corporations with inter-shareholder 
conflicts and transactions involving controlling shareholders, the derivative suit 
still remains a critical mechanism because these companies are usually too small to 
be the subject of securities markets, media scrutiny and public enforcement. 
Therefore, the derivative suit is often the main way for minority shareholders in 
these companies to be protected against exploitation by the majority shareholders. 
This view is in line with this thesis argument. Nevertheless, I still argue that in 
addition to minority shareholders, the employees (especially in private companies) 
should also have the right to protect the company.  
 
	
	 	
                                                
520 Kenneth Davis, ‘The forgotten derivative suit’ (2008) 61 Vand. Law Review 61 387 
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4.9.2 The role of the derivative suit in US public companies 
 
In the Unites States, recourse for public companies depends on the nature of the 
rights being violated. There are generally two types of litigation: class action suits 
and derivative suits.  
When the injury is personalised to a shareholder or a substantial number of 
shareholders and arises from violation of personal rights, the shareholders may 
bring a direct or a class action suit. On the other hand, where the harm is to the 
corporation and only affects the shareholders indirectly, the action must be brought 
as a derivative suit.521 
However, in some situations the classification of suits is not as clear as it first 
appears, especially if the same misconduct gives rise to both direct and derivative 
claims. As an example, the claim for compelling dividends is generally considered 
as a direct claim because the right to dividends arises from the share ownership, 
but on the other hand, a derivative suit may also be allowed to hold directors 
responsible for their duties to the corporation. In such situations, in addition to a 
direct suit or class action claim for shareholders’ personal rights, a derivative suit 
may also be initiated to protect the rights which belong to the corporation.522 
                                                
521 Dowling v Narragansett Capital Corp, 735 F Supp.1105,1113 (D.R.I.1990)  
522 James Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen, Cox & Hazen on Corporations (Aspen Law & Business 
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Such an interaction between the class action suits and derivative suits is similar 
to the interaction between derivative claims and unfair prejudice claims in UK 
private companies.  
Although the class action and the derivative suit differ in concept and to some 
extent in procedure, they share important similarities. Both require plaintiffs to 
give notice to the absent interested parties; both permit other parties to petition to 
join the suit; both provide for settlement and release only after notice, opportunity 
to be heard and judicial determination of fairness of the settlement; and finally 
under the common fund and corporate benefit doctrines, in both actions successful 
plaintiffs are customarily compensated from the fund that their efforts produce.523 
Overall, unlike the scarcity of derivative claims in UK public companies, it seems 
that the United States’ derivative suits play the same important role in public 
companies as in closely-held corporations. As I discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter, the reason could have root in weakness of other corporate governance 
legal devices. Particularly that like in the UK, the focus of derivative suits is on the 
protection of shareholders rather than the company as whole. Nevertheless, there 
are some controversial debates over the effectiveness of derivative suits in public 
companies. During the 1980s, some scholars argued that the cost of derivative 
litigation usually exceeds its compensatory value.524 This argument, however, was 
                                                
523 Compare Fed.R.Civ.P23 (Class action) and Fed.R.Civ.p.23.1 (derivative suits); William Allen, 
Reiner Raakman and Guhan Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on The Law of Business 
Organizations (Wolters Kluwer 2003)   
524 Thomas Jones, ‘An empirical examination of the incidence of shareholder derivative and class 
action lawsuits’ (1980) 60 Boston University Law Review 60, 2 306–30; Daniel Fischel and Michael 
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questioned by the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance which claim that the 
overall rate of plaintiff success, in derivative suit cases where some compensation 
was granted, was about forty-four per cent which is considered positive in 
comparison with the rate of plaintiff success in similar forms of civil litigation.525 
In another argument, Romano examined all shareholder suits filed from the late 
1960s through to 1987 against a random sample of 535 public corporations. She 
found that of the 139 total lawsuits filed against these corporations, only 12 ended 
with a monetary settlement in a derivative suit. Romano argues that nearly 65% of 
derivative suits resulted in settlement. Cash payments were made to shareholders 
in 21% of derivative suits and the total cash recoveries obtained were on average 
0.5% of the value of the corporation’s total assets. In only 25% of settlements were 
some changes in the composition of the board of directors or in the transaction 
approval procedures of the corporation obtained. However, both plaintiff and 
defendant’s lawyers were paid rewarding fees in 90% of the shareholders’ suits.526 
Romano also examined the stock price reactions to announcements of initiation 
and termination of shareholder litigation in both class action and derivative suits, 
and drew the conclusion that the change in stock price does not provide convincing 
                                                                                                                                          
Bradley, ‘The role of liability rules and the derivative suit in corporate law: a theoretical and 
empirical analysis’ (1986) 71 Cornell Law Review 261–97  
525 ALI Principles of Corporate Governance (II), 2007 Part VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, 
Reporter’s Note, p 9; also Xiaoning Li [n 493] 124 
526 Roberta Romano, ‘The shareholder suit: litigation without foundation?’ (1991) 7(1) Journal of 
Law, Economics, & Organization 55-87 
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support for the proposal that shareholders experience significant wealth effects 
from litigation.527 
Nevertheless, again the ALI Principles questioned Romano’s research 
conclusion. ALI reasons that these studies wrongfully assumed that the stock 
market would sensibly react to the relatively small recoveries from derivative suits. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that the expected reaction from the market was 
unfulfilled by the termination of any derivative suits. Hence, the difference 
between two market prices should not necessarily result in the conclusion that the 
derivative suits were ineffective. The indifference could be because of concern 
over collusive or cosmetic settlements, which leave nothing to the corporation. 
Lastly, the deterrent effect of the derivative suit will not be reflected in the price of 
stocks in one single corporation.528 In addition to Romano’s research, Thompson 
and Thomas in their studies in 2004 found that during the two-year period of 1999 
to 2000, relatively few derivative suits had been established in the Delaware 
Chancery Court by shareholders in either public or private corporations. 529 
According to their study there were 137 derivative suits, among which eighty per 
cent (108) suits were filed against public companies and the remaining twenty per 
cent (26) suits were against private companies.530 Among the suits against closely-
held companies, only one third were granted relief and almost half were 
                                                
527 ibid 65-66 
528 ALI Principles of Corporate Governance (II), 2007 Part VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, 
Reporter’s Note, p 12  
529 Robert Thompson and Randall Thomas, ‘The public and private faces of derivative lawsuits’ 
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dismissed.531 They argue that, based on their study, the derivative suits have little 
role to play in Delaware private companies.532 However, they concluded that they 
found little evidence of strike suits and in most derivative actions resulting in 
monetary recovery, the amount recovered by the corporation appreciably exceeded 
the plaintiff attorney’s fee. 
Therefore, they argue that derivative litigation is more effective as a 
compensatory mechanism than other forms of representative litigation such as 
class actions.533 Likewise, Erickson based her research findings on shareholder 
derivative suits in the United States federal courts and showed that shareholders 
file more derivative suits than securities class actions. However, Erickson confirms 
that remarkably few of the derivative suits in the United States result in monetary 
compensation for the company. Instead, as the non-monetary function, most of the 
suits frequently ended with corporations agreeing to reform their own corporate 
governance practices, either in the form of increasing the number of independent 
directors on their boards or changing the methods by which they compensate their 
top executives. However, she argues that improving the other corporate 
governance mechanisms in the United States is a better approach than mere 
reliance on non-pecuniary outcome of derivative suits. The reason for her 
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argument is that some of these corporate governance reforms achieved through 
settlements are unlikely to benefit the corporation itself.534 
So what is the role of derivative suits in the United States finally? One 
argument is that since the early 1980s the derivative suit has started to play a less 
important role in the US than in earlier days. 535  Several reasons have been 
suggested by academics for this decline. Some believe that the economic growth 
by the 1970s had resulted in a reevaluation of the balance between the 
corporation’s efficiency and protection of minority shareholders. As a result, the 
shareholders’ right to derivative suits was restricted.536 
Some others bring the development of other mechanisms of corporate 
governance as a reason for the decline of derivative suits. Thompson and Thomas 
argue that until the early 1980s, derivative suits were the main method for 
disciplining corporate management and there were few efficient alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms to the derivative suits in existence.537 
However, after the 1980s, the development of the market for corporate control 
and also the requirement by American stock exchanges for more independent 
directors for large public corporations’ boards, along with the development of 
large institutional investors, provided effective alternatives to litigation.538 Davis 
                                                
534 Jessica Erickson, ‘Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis’ (2010) 
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535 Xiaoning [n 493] 98 
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Kenneth argues that derivative suits are not as effective a mechanism of protection 
as they used to be in the past. He argues that in public corporations derivative suits 
are almost forgotten and over the last three decades, they have not played a central 
role in controlling director’s fiduciary duties and this role has now shifted to other 
mechanisms, mainly the independent members of a corporation’s board of 
directors. He believes that in terms of controlling the corporate affairs in public 
companies, the role of derivative suits has been substituted with efficient securities 
markets, media scrutiny and public enforcement which together provide 
shareholders the protection that was traditionally provided by derivative suits, 
without the cost and distraction associated with litigation. Nonetheless, he still 
argues that in spite of the decline of derivative suits in public corporations, for 
closely-held corporations with inter-shareholder conflicts and transactions 
involving controlling shareholders the derivative suit remains a critical mechanism 
because these companies are usually too small to be the subject of serious scrutiny 
by financial analysts. Therefore, the derivative suit is often the only means for 
minority shareholders to be protected against the exploitation by the majority 
shareholders in smaller publicly traded companies.539 
Unlike Kenneth, Mark Lebovitch540 believes that derivative suits still play an 
important role in protecting companies from corporate executives’ misconduct. He 
argued that a meritorious derivative litigation not only can compensate aggrieved 
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shareholders with a significant monetary recovery but can achieve a deterrent to 
corporate managers who want to avoid the shaming effect of adverse judicial 
rulings. 
Lebovitch mentioned numerous instances of shareholder litigation including 
derivative lawsuits that have achieved meaningful economic and non-monetary 
governance-based benefits to companies.541 
 These contradictory views on the role of the derivative suits in the United 
States result in the following conclusions. First, in spite of the fact that derivative 
suits are lawsuits on behalf of the company, still like in the UK the dominant view 
sees the derivative claim as a mechanism of protection for shareholders. Based on 
this view, since the emergence of the other mechanisms of corporate governance, 
derivative suits are less in use in the United States. The fact that many derivative 
suits in the United States result in changes to corporate governance through a 
settlement confirms the view that in comparison to their British counterparts, 
American shareholders have weaker corporate governance power. Therefore, 
American shareholders rely on the derivative suit as a tool to correct the corporate 
governance of the company and curb corporate managers’ misconduct. 
Nevertheless, the scholarly opinions show that even in the United States in which 
non-monetary settlements are common, the dominant attitude regards the 
                                                
541  As for examples, Lebovitch mentions: re S. Peru Copper Corp. shareholder derivative 
litigation, 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011); also re News Corp. shareholder derivative litigation, 2013 
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derivative suit as a mechanism for bringing financial compensation. As a reason, 
some academics do not consider it as an efficient device in situations that 
derivative suits result in non-monetary settlements. 
 Corporate governance settlements in the context of derivative suits is a 
worthwhile point to note. At least in terms of the deterrence function of derivative 
suits, some of these settlements still play an effective role. Derivative suits are 
intended to control corporate management and improve corporate governance 
generally. Therefore, by correcting the internal corporate governance of a 
corporation through a settlement, the danger of potential misconduct in the future 
will be curtailed.  
As I argued in chapter one, the deterrence function of derivative claims has 
been widely ignored in the English legal system. Although derivative claims might 
be less needed in the UK in comparison to the United States, because of the role of 
other corporate governance devices, still this aspect of the derivative claim is 
beneficial in improving the corporate governance of companies by minority 
shareholders and employees in situations that they are not able to rely on other 
mechanisms to discipline directors in the company. 
 
4.10 The role of financial incentives in pursuing the derivative suit 
 
As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, one main reason for 
comparing the American derivative suits with the UK is the financial structure of 
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this mechanism in the United States. According to the academic literature, the 
financial structure of derivative suits plays a significant role in the frequency of 
derivative suits in the United States; therefore, it provides a convincing reason for 
the relatively high rate of derivative litigation in the United States.542 The aim of 
this research is not to increase the quantity number of derivative claims in the UK 
by promoting the US approach. The purpose is to help with the removal of 
unnecessary financial obstacles in the way of meritorious derivative claims. I 
explore the details of the US approach to the derivative litigation costs and explain 
what the inspiring aspects are. 
Unlike the English principle of loser party rule in which the plaintiff 
shareholder pays their expenses of litigation as well as the legal expenses of the 
defendant if the action is unsuccessful, the general American rule is that each party 
bears his own litigation costs.543 The winning party costs will not be shifted to the 
losing party. Additionally, a plaintiff shareholder in US derivative litigation, even 
if the litigation fails, may not even be burdened with litigation costs for himself 
because of contingency fee agreements which have been available in the United 
States for over a hundred years and which are widely applied in derivative suits.544 
Under contingency fee agreements, the shareholder and attorney agree that the 
attorney will undertake the financial cost of pursuing the derivative litigation and 
                                                
542  Dan Puchniak, Harald Baum and Michael Ewing-Chow [n 38]; Arad Reisberg, ‘Funding 
derivative actions: a re-examination of costs and fees as incentives to commence litigation’ (2004) 
4(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 345-383 
543 Deborah DeMott, Shareholders derivative actions: Law and practice (Callaghan 2010) § 3.1 p 
3-3 
544 ibid   
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will be compensated only on a fixed percentage of the amount recovered if the 
derivative suit is successfully litigated or settled.545  Such agreements shift the 
financial risk of initiating a derivative suit from the plaintiff shareholder to the 
attorney, thereby making it worthwhile for a shareholder to proceed, even if there 
is only a small chance of being compensated. The contingency fee agreement is 
supported by two unique common law doctrines that have been established by US 
courts, the common fund doctrine and the corporate benefit doctrine.546 
 
4.10.1 The common fund doctrine	
	
According to the common fund doctrine, if attorneys’ efforts generate a fund or 
tangible monetary benefit for other shareholders in addition to the plaintiff 
shareholder, the court is authorised to award the attorney’s fees from that fund.547 
The common fund doctrine has been accepted as a valid principle by the courts 
of most states. The literature on the common fund doctrine is vast548  but the 
general idea is that this doctrine, by making the other shareholders share the cost of 
                                                
545  Herbert Kritzer, Risk, Reputations, and Rewards: Contingency Fee Legal Practice in the 
United States (Stanford University Press 2004) 
546  Harvard Law Review, ‘Attorneys' Fees. Substantial Benefit Doctrine. Delaware Supreme 
Court Grants Fees to Plaintiff Suing As an Individual Shareholder. Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio 
Partners, 562 A.2d 1162 (Del. 1989)’ (1990) 103(5) Harvard Law Review 1187-1192 
547  Curtis Milhaupt, ‘Non-profit organizations as investor protection: economic theory and 
evidence from east Asia’ (2004) 29(1) Yale Journal of International Law 169–207  
548  The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations (Proposed Final Draft) s7.17; Carol Hamme, ‘Attorneys’ fees in shareholder 
derivative suits: the substantial benefit rule re examined’  (1972) 60(1) California Law Review 
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the litigation with the plaintiff, prevents unjust enrichment at the expense of the 
litigating party.549 
If the litigation generates a common fund or tangible monetary recovery for the 
company, the court applies the ‘percentage scale’ method. This method has existed 
in the United States for almost a century. It was first used in the 1880s with the 
start of the common fund doctrine.550 Under this method the attorney will be paid 
in the range of 20 to 30 percent of the common fund, depending on the prior 
agreement between the shareholder and his attorney.551 
 
4.10.2 The corporate benefit doctrine	
 
The corporate benefit doctrine was first explored in Chrysler v Dann.552 This 
doctrine allows for the award of fees to a shareholder who successfully litigates 
against a corporation in a way that creates a benefit for the corporation but not in 
the form of a monetary relief.553 
The corporate benefit doctrine significantly increases the economic incentive 
for plaintiff attorneys to pursue derivative actions by allowing them to receive a 
contingency fee even when the company does not receive tangible monetary 
                                                
549 Boeing Co. (1980) 444 U.S. at 478; Sprague v Ticonic Nat’l Bank (1939) 307 U.S. 161, 167; 
and Trustees v Greenough (1882) 105 U.S. 527 
550 See Central R.R. & Banking v Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 128 (1885) 
551   Hamme [n 548] 
552 223 A.2d 384 (Del. 1966) 
553 Sean Griffith, ‘Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting 
the Doctrine on Fees’ (2015) 56(1) Boston College Law Review  
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recovery, but nevertheless is thought to benefit from the litigation through 
corporate governance reform. This reform may include the nullification of an 
election of directors, the termination of a detrimental transaction or making some 
procedural changes.554 
 Courts will apply the ‘lodestar’ method to calculate the attorney’s fees under 
the corporate benefit doctrine. 555  The ‘lodestar’ method is applicable if the 
derivative suit results in a non-monetary recovery to the corporation, whether by 
judgment or settlement. The US Supreme Court in Mills v Electric Auto-Lite Co 
formally recognised the ‘lodestar’ method.556 In that case, the court held that this 
method is simply one for calculating attorneys’ fees based on the number of hours 
reasonably spent on the work, multiplied by the reasonable market hourly rate. The 
‘lodestar’ method may be used regardless of whether a common fund is generated, 
and the final figure can then be adjusted upward or downward for certain factors 
known as multipliers, such as complexity of the case, quality of representation, risk 
and the like.557 
The corporate benefit doctrine is a great advantage for attorneys in derivative 
lawsuits. Much academic evidence shows that non-monetary relief in the form of 
corporate governance change is the common result of US derivative litigation and 
attorneys still receive profitable fees in these cases.  
                                                
554 James Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporations (2nd edn, Aspen Publishing 2003)  
555 Mark Loewenstein, ‘Shareholder derivative litigation and corporate governance’ (1999) 24(1) 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law  
556 Mills v Electric Auto-Lite Co 396 US 375, 392 (1970) 
557 Friedrich v Fidelity Nat. Bank, 545 SE 2d 107 - Ga: Court of Appeals 2001 
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Nonetheless, over time, despite its advantages, the corporate benefit doctrine 
has given rise to excessive amount of attorney-driven derivative suits, which has 
created many criticisms among academics.  
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4.10.3 The role of attorneys in American derivative suits 
 
In the US there is an entrepreneurial class of attorneys that specialise in class 
action and derivative litigation. This has formed a strong financial incentive for 
attorneys to boost derivative suits not only to protect shareholders against the 
wrongdoing directors, but also to increase their own financial rewards through a 
contingency fee agreement.558 
A plaintiff shareholder in a derivative suit, no matter whether he wins or not, 
bears no risk for the litigation costs, yet he still benefits indirectly from a 
derivative suit via the increase of a nominal value of his shares. 
The attorney, however, directly benefits from any successful trial or settlement 
under the common fund and corporate benefit doctrines.559 
Some argue that the US political environment under which lawyers are the 
proponents of derivative suits and also the main financial winners of these suits is 
the main reason for the high incidence of derivative litigation in the United States. 
This provides a contrast to the UK where no such rights and common fund and 
corporate benefit doctrines exist. 
The unitary system of one bar in the UK weakens and lessens the impact of 
negotiations and discussions with authorities for settling the suits.560 It is not a bad 
thing in fact, because while attorneys’ role in US derivative suits has the 
                                                
558  James Kirkbride, Steve Letza and Clive Smallman, ‘Minority shareholders and corporate 
governance: Reflections on the derivative action in the UK, the USA and in China’ (2009) 51(4) 
International Journal of Law and Management 51.4 206-219 
559 Xiaoning Li [n 493] 179 
560 ibid 104 
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advantages of encouraging shareholders’ meritorious litigation and disciplining 
corporate managements, nevertheless the attorneys’ interests are not always 
consistent with the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.  
For instance, attorneys generally prefer the assured rewards which result from 
derivative suits settlements than the uncertain result of a trial.561 That is why most 
American derivative suits are settled.  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure restrict derivative suit settlements by 
requiring that the proposed settlement and dismissal of derivative suits should be 
approved by the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall 
be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs. 562 
However, some of these settlements are strike suits, which fail to bring significant 
benefit to the company. 
 
 
  
                                                
561 Deborah DeMott, Shareholders derivative actions: Law and practice (Callaghan 2010)  
section 6:3 pp 6-7 
562 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure s 23.1 
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4.10.4 Rethinking the corporate benefit doctrine 
	
The growing concerns over the increasing amount of shareholder litigation 
(both class actions and derivative suits) in the United States, also the concerns 
about the American attorneys’ misuse of the corporate benefit doctrine have 
caused some academics to challenge the doctrine’s current role. For instance, 
Griffith argues that the problem is too many suits by shareholders and not enough 
achievement at settlements. He argues that in terms of filings, class action suits 
challenge almost every merger transaction and derivative suits happen often 
alongside prosecutorial or regulatory interventions during many corporate crises. 
Yet, Griffith believes that the vast majority of these claims settle for non-monetary 
relief and the plaintiff counsel is nevertheless entitled to receive fees from the 
defendant under the corporate benefit doctrine.563 
In addition to the growing academic debate, a decision by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in 2014, further challenged the current role of the corporate benefit 
doctrine in the context of shareholder litigation. The Delaware Supreme Court in 
an opinion in ATP Tour Inc v Deutscher Tennis Bund564 held that fee-shifting 
provisions in a Delaware non-stock corporation’s bylaws are not per se invalid.565 
What were the fee shifting bylaws? ATP Tour Inc, a Delaware membership 
corporation, runs a worldwide professional men's tennis tour. Two entities, 
                                                
563 Griffith [n 553] 
564 91 A.3d 554,560 (Del.2014) 
565 ibid 560 
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Deutscher Tennis Bund (the German Tennis Federation) and Qatar Tennis 
Federation, joined ATP in the early 1990s and agreed to be obliged by its bylaws, 
as amended from time to time. In 2006, ATP's board of directors revised ATP's 
bylaws to add a provision stating that if a current or former member brings 
litigation against ATP and "does not obtain a judgment on the merits that 
substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought", the 
member bringing litigation will be obliged to reimburse ATP for any fees, costs 
and expenses spent by ATP in connection with such litigation.  
In 2007, the two tennis federations challenged a decision made by ATP and 
sued it in federal court alleging several federal antitrust and Delaware corporate 
law claims.566 However, the plaintiffs lost their claims on the merits and ATP 
invoked its fee-shifting bylaw to recover its fees, costs and expenses. The district 
court brought four questions regarding the validity and enforceability of fee-
shifting bylaws to the Delaware Supreme Court.567 
The Delaware Supreme Court ruled that fee-shifting bylaws are facially valid. 
Although Delaware generally follows the American Rule on civil procedure on 
legal fees,568  Delaware law permits parties to modify that rule by contract.569 
Because the bylaws amount to a contract between the corporation and its 
shareholders, a bylaw could validly create an exception to the American Rule.570 
                                                
566 ATP Tour, Inc. v Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014) (quoting ATP Bylaw 
Article 23.2(a)) 
567 ibid 557 
568 ibid 558 
569 ibid 
570 ibid 
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Finally, the court held that such a bylaw was binding even on persons who became 
members of the corporation before the bylaw was adopted.571 
The court acknowledged that an otherwise valid fee-shifting bylaw would be 
unenforceable if adopted for an improper purpose.572 Although the court did not 
explain clearly what would create an improper purpose, it held that seeking to 
deter shareholder litigation was ‘not invariably an improper purpose’.573 
The Delaware Supreme Court held that fee-shifting bylaws are consistent with 
Delaware law, stating that contracting parties may agree to amend the so-called 
‘American Rule’ which generally requires parties to pay their own costs and fees, 
regardless of the outcome of a litigation and instead require the losing party to pay 
the winner's attorneys' fees.574 
The ATP Tour decision soon became a controversial issue among academics 
and practitioners.  
Soon after the court decision, over fifty Delaware corporations adopted similar 
fee-shifting bylaws575 and the ATP Tour court ruling received both critique and 
support from academies and practitioners.  
Some proponents argued that an increase in fee-shifting bylaws would result in 
the non-filing of many, if not most, derivative suits and it would deter ever-
                                                
571 ATP, 91 A.3d 560 
572 ibid 
573  ibid; Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Fee Shifting: Delaware's Self-Inflicted Wound’ (2015) 15(10) 
UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 15-10 
574 Bainbridge ibid  
575 Rudy, Hostile Takeover of Shareholder Litigation (TRIAL 2015) 28, 30  
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increasing shareholders’ litigation.576 Some suggested that it would be an instant 
check for plaintiffs' attorneys to ask themselves for the first time how good their 
cases actually are.577 On the other hand, many scholars and practitioners criticised 
the ATP Tour ruling. For instance, Griffith argued that the court’s ruling on 
allowing the fee-shifting bylaws, which is similar to the so-called English losing 
party rule, cannot solve the problem of excessive litigation by shareholders but will 
discourage potentially valuable shareholder claims. Therefore, as an alternative to 
fee-shifting bylaws, which in his view penalised plaintiffs in desirable and 
undesirable lawsuits alike, Griffith provides three recommendations. First, that the 
corporate benefit doctrine no longer be accepted in non-derivative suits; such as 
class action suits. Second, that the burden for proving the merit in certain corporate 
governance settlements be shifted to plaintiffs. And lastly, that the scope of 
defendant release in corporate governance settlements should be appropriate to the 
benefit received by the company.578 
Like Griffith, Lebovitch in opposing fee-shifting bylaws suggested that in order 
to curtail the problem of frivolous lawsuits that achieve no substantial benefits for 
corporations and shareholders, the plaintiff should be required to show that a 
corporate governance settlement provides material benefits to the corporation or 
                                                
576 Claudia Allen, ‘Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?’ (2015) 39 Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law 751, 818; Pamela Park, ‘More Delaware Companies Adopt Fee-Shifting 
Bylaws to Deter Shareholder Litigation’ (2014) Westlaw Corporate Governance Daily Briefing  
577  Liz Hoffman, ‘Shareholder Suits May Prove Costly’ (2014) 
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-shareholder-suits-may-prove-costly-1400447173 (visited 
3/3/2015)  
578 Sean Griffith [n 553] 
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the class; also the defendants release be appropriate to the benefit of the company 
obtained during the settlement.579 
Finally, in order to fix the court ruling in ATP Tour, in March 2015 the 
Delaware bar proposed legislation that would limit the availability of fee-shifting 
bylaws to non-profit corporations.580 The proposal was introduced as Senate Bill 
75,581 and finally the Delaware legislature accepted alterations to the Delaware 
General Corporation Law (S.B. 75) that effectively bans such bylaws.582 
By the Delaware ruling, the attempts to give a role to the loser party rule in 
order to reduce the excessive amount of shareholder litigation failed. However, in 
line with the opinions of the opponents of the fee-shifting bylaws, this thesis 
agrees that the loser party rule is not a proper solution for controlling frivolous 
lawsuits either in the United States or in the UK. The reason is that the rule, by 
putting the responsibility of the whole litigations’ costs on the applicant, could 
discourage potentially valuable shareholder claims as well. The alternative 
proposed solutions such as proving the material benefits in derivative suit 
settlements or limiting the corporate benefit doctrine to derivative litigation only 
(omitting corporate benefit from class actions), would be more effective.  
                                                
579 Mark Lebovitch and  Jeroen van Kwawegen, ‘Of Babies and Bathwater: Deterring Frivolous 
Stockholder Suits Without Closing the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate Claims’ (2015) 40 Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law  
580 Hazel Bradford, ‘Delaware Bar Association Law Council Recommends Fee-Shifting Limits’ 
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4.11 The corporate benefit doctrine remains potentially advantageous  
The potential advantages of considering the non-pecuniary aspect of derivative 
claims was explained earlier above. Hence, as was mentioned, this thesis argues 
that the losing party rule and shifting the burden of derivative claims costs to the 
applicants is not a proper solution for controlling frivolous lawsuits. Thus, some 
safeguards could be put in place to prevent abuse of the corporate benefit doctrine. 
For example, putting burden of proof of material benefits in the derivative claims’ 
non-monetary outcome on the derivative claim applicant. Also, the extent of 
defendants’ release from the responsibility should match the benefit the company 
obtains from the non-pecuniary result or corporate governance settlement.  
The general opinion of this thesis is that many aspects of the American 
derivative suits, including the frequency of this mechanism, which is against the 
nature of the derivative claim, could not be applicable in the English legal system. 
However, there are still some valuable lessons to be learnt from the United States 
for the UK. The American approach potentially encourages shareholders’ 
legitimate claims by imposing the liability of derivative suits costs on the company 
as the substantial beneficiary of the claim. This non-pecuniary but still substantial 
benefits happening in the form of corporate governance changes in the companies 
could be a true motivating factor for a derivative applicant. It could help the 
minority shareholders and the employees particularly in private companies to 
change the corporate governance of the company and prevent further harm to the 
company with the help of a court order. Such an approach would make 
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wrongdoing directors more cautious because they can be sued for any failure in 
their duties toward the company. Therefore, the recommendation is that with 
putting the above safeguard in place, this aspect should be promoted in the UK.  
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4.12 Conclusion 
The chapter revealed that the weakness of other corporate governance 
mechanisms, combined with the availability of contingency fee agreements and the 
corporate benefit doctrine has caused shareholder litigation including derivative 
suits to be more frequently used in the United States than in the UK. The high 
incidence of derivative suits in the United States is not necessarily a sign of their 
efficacy in preventing harm to the company in all circumstances. Some of these 
claims are non-meritorious claims, which mainly benefit the plaintiff’s lawyers 
through settlements with defendants. Studying derivative suits in the United States 
confirms this thesis’ argument that the efficiency of the derivative claim is not 
necessarily associated with the high number of the derivative claim cases. The 
availability of the other mechanisms of accountability for directors could provide 
an environment in which the derivative claim is less needed. Therefore, the thesis 
argument is that the derivative claim should not be used excessively. Nor it should 
be forgotten in practice. Either of these approaches could undermine the potential 
benefits of the derivative claim in protecting the company. This chapter also 
explored the financial structure of the derivative suits in the United States. This 
financial structure has the positive aspects of encouraging legitimate derivative 
claims. Particularly, the consideration of the non-monetary benefits of the 
derivative claim could be inspiring for the English legal system in terms of 
enhancing the deterrence aspect of the derivative claim. In chapter six, I will 
discuss the derivative litigation cost problems in the UK in more detail and I will 
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propose the way for including the non-pecuniary aspects of the derivative claim in 
the cost order.  
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Chapter Five: New Zealand corporate governance: more signs of 
balance among different mechanisms of corporate governance 
5.1 Introduction 
One of this thesis’ argument is that the efficiency of the derivative claim is not 
associated with the high number of the cases but the accessibility of the derivative 
claim procedure under the law. New Zealand, at least under the regulations, 
follows such an approach. The derivative claim is an exceptional mechanism. Only 
in very exceptional circumstances where the board of directors refuse to prosecute 
the wrongdoers because they are involved in the wrong conduct, does the 
derivatives claim become applicable. Therefore, by nature, the derivative claim is 
an exceptional remedy, which is not supposed to be frequently used; otherwise it 
could result in the abuse of the mechanism. A comparison between the UK and 
New Zealand is valuable for several reasons. The United Kingdom and New 
Zealand corporate governance frameworks share many similarities to each other. 
Like their British counterparts, shareholders in New Zealand have strong voting 
power over the company’s affairs. 583  In addition, among the corporate 
stakeholders, only shareholders have the right to sue directors for their 
wrongdoings to the company. Similar to the UK, the New Zealand Takeovers 
Code contains some disclosure provisions, which are an attempt to prevent abuse 
                                                
583 Susan Watson, ‘The Board of Directors’ in John Farrar and Susan Watson (eds), Company  
and Securities Law in New Zealand (2nd edn, Brookers Ltd 2013) 298 
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in the area of defensive measures of directors. Moreover, in common with the UK, 
New Zealand corporate governance has been based on the comply-or-explain 
principle.  
Nevertheless, in spite of these similarities, there are also some differences 
between the two jurisdictions. The main difference is while New Zealand provides 
similar ex ante mechanisms for controlling directors to those of the UK (significant 
shareholding rights, non-executive directors on the board, disclosure 
requirements), on the other hand, ex post remedial mechanisms such as the 
derivative action provisions and procedure are more lenient in comparison to the 
UK. For example, under the statutory derivative action provision, the company 
should first have met the whole or any reasonable costs of the derivative 
proceedings unless the court considers it would be unjust or inequitable for the 
company to bear the cost.   
 Regardless of how often in practice either of the corporate governance 
mechanisms is needed, New Zealand corporate governance has under the law kept 
more balance between availability of different mechanisms of accountability for 
directors. The argument of this chapter is that taking a less restrictive approach 
towards the derivative claim would not necessarily open the floodgate of litigation 
against the company, because availability of other corporate governance devices 
moderates the function of the derivative claim to some extent. The chapter 
explores the inspiring aspects of statutory derivative action provisions and 
procedural requirements in New Zealand.  
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5.2 Shareholder voting power in New Zealand 
 
New Zealand is a smaller country than the UK, therefore in terms of the number 
and types of companies, there are differences between the UK and New Zealand. 
The main corporate types in New Zealand are private limited liability companies 
(non-listed companies) and widely-held limited liability (listed) companies that are 
listed by New Zealand Exchange Limited (NZX) on the New Zealand Stock 
Market (NZSX). However, despite these differences in practice, under company 
law, shareholders in both jurisdictions have similar voting power.  
New Zealand corporate law has been established under the Companies Act 1993 
with supporting regulations and government institutions such as the Companies 
Office, Ministry of Economic Development, the Securities Commission, and the 
Serious Fraud Office and, for listed companies, the Stock Exchange. 584  The 
Securities Commission has drafted Principles and Guidelines for Corporate 
Governance. 585  The New Zealand Stock Market listing rules binds listed 
companies. In addition, companies can draft their own Codes of Conduct, which 
may be included in their constitutions.586 Like their British counterparts, the New 
Zealand Companies Act 1993 has empowered shareholders by both special and 
ordinary resolution in general meetings.  
                                                
584 Susan Watson and Rebecca Hirsch, ‘The link between corporate governance and 
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585 ‘Securities Commission Corporate Governance’ in Corporate governance in New Zealand: 
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The Companies Act 1993 provides the following powers to shareholders by 
special resolution: (1) the adoption of a constitution where the company does not 
have a constitution,587 (2) the alteration or revocation of the constitution,588 (3) 
approval of major transactions,589 (4) approval of amalgamation proposals in some 
circumstances,590 and (5) putting the company into liquidation.591 
In addition, through an ordinary resolution, shareholders have the power to: (1) 
appoint 592 or remove directors593 unless the constitution provides otherwise, and 
(2) appoint auditors. 594  Moreover, section 109(1) of the Companies Act 1993 
provides the shareholders with the right to question, discuss or comment on the 
management of the company at a shareholders’ meeting. Shareholders also have 
power under the Companies Act to pass a resolution relating to the management of 
the company, but unless the constitution of the company provides otherwise, the 
resolution is not binding on the board.595 
Similar to the UK, the shareholder voting shortcomings of shareholders’ voting 
power, which was discussed in chapter three, would apply in New Zealand as well. 
The argument is that shareholders might not properly be aware of the company’s 
                                                
587 Companies Act 1993 section 32(1); Silvana Schenone and Igor Drinkovic, Duties and 
Responsibilities of Directors and Company Secretaries in New Zealand (Wolter Kluwer 2013)  
503 
588Companies Act 1993 section 32(2) 
589 ibid section 129(1). Major transactions are those in which ‘the company would acquire or 
dispose of, or incur liabilities, which would represent more than half of the value of the company’s 
assets for the transaction’. 
590 Section 221(5) 
591 Section 241(2) 
592 Section 153(2) 
593 Section 156 
594 Section 196(1) read with section 201 
595 Section 109(2) and (3) 
 
 
219 
affairs so may not know about the wrongful conduct to prevent it. In order to be 
aware of the details of the company management and to vote logically, 
shareholders are required to be familiar with the company’s activities, but they 
may be reluctant to participate in general meetings and vote. The reason for 
comparison between the shareholder voting power in both the UK and New 
Zealand is to illustrate that both jurisdictions are strong in terms of shareholders’ 
power and, consequently, the availability of ex ante mechanisms which 
shareholders could use to monitor the directors’ conduct and prevent the harm to 
the company. However, as has been discussed before, in addition to the 
shareholder voting power, New Zealand in terms of regulations and procedural 
requirements is strong in ex post litigation mechanisms such as the derivative 
claim too. Therefore, if shareholders fail to monitor the directors’ conduct and 
prevent the harm to the company, they could compensate the harm through a 
derivative claim litigation.  
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5.3 The comply-or-explain principle and the disclosure requirements 
 
In common with the UK, in New Zealand all companies must comply with 
certain mandatory rules contained in the Companies Act 1993 and related 
legislation such as the Financial Reporting Act 1993. In addition to these, there is a 
set of mandatory requirements imposed on listed companies by the Listing Rules, 
which require listed companies to ‘comply-or-explain’ the extent to which they 
have complied with the NZX Corporate Governance Best Practices Code.596  
The New Zealand Securities Commission recommends nine principles and 
guidelines that are aimed to ensure a high standard of corporate governance 
practices in New Zealand companies. The key features of these principles and 
guidelines include: independence of the chair, non-executive/independent 
directors, audit independence, non-audit services, board committees, adoption of 
international accounting standards and continuous disclosure. 597  Moreover, the 
Securities Commission principles consider it desirable for boards of larger or listed 
companies to have independent directors. Also, the Securities Commission 
considers ‘independence of mind is a basic requirement for directors’.598  
                                                
596  NZSX LR 10.5.5 (h) and (i), also Mark Fox, Gordon Walker and Alma Pekmezovic, 
‘Corporate governance research on New Zealand listed companies’ (2012) 29 (1) Arizona Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 
597  Krishna Reddy et al., ‘Corporate governance practices of small cap companies and their 
financial performance: an empirical study in New Zealand’ (2008) 4(1) International Journal of 
Business Governance and Ethics 
598 The Securities Commission states that ‘…. board effectiveness is not always enhanced by 
directors' formal independence if this is given too much weight in contrast to the independence of 
mind, and the skills, knowledge, experience, and time that a director can contribute to the entity. 
Independent representation is an important contributor to board effectiveness, but only when 
considered along with the other attributes sought in a non-executive director.’  
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In New Zealand, private corporations are not required to publicly disclose their 
financial accounts at present. However, the New Zealand Ministry of Economic 
Development (MED) has proposed in a recent discussion document, “Review of 
the Financial Reporting Act 1993, Part II”, that large private corporations should 
have to publicly disclose their financial accounts.599 One probable reason for that is 
New Zealand's economy is dominated by small to medium-sized companies. Many 
of them are private corporations, which expressly influence New 
Zealand's corporate governance culture.600 
A unique characteristic of the New Zealand board is that directors are required 
by the Companies Act 1993 to buy shares in the company before being appointed 
to the board of that company. Under the Companies Act 1993,601 directors are 
required to pay or receive fair value when they buy or sell shares; for issuer 
companies the Securities Markets Act 1988 prohibits insiders using inside 
information to their advantage. 602  This latter Act also contains continuous 
disclosure provisions and disclosure requirements for directors. These provisions 
also seek to address the information asymmetry problem.603  
                                                                                                                                          
 
599  Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies 
in Emerging Markets, OECD Publications, 
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/37190767.pdf (visited 4/3/2017) 
600 Oliver Krackhardt, ‘New Rules for Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany- 
A Model for New Zealand’ (2005) 36 Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev 327 
601 Companies Act 1993 sections 146-149  
602 Securities Markets Act 1988 part 1 
603 Securities Markets Act 1988 sections 21-22 
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In non-listed companies, related party provisions are permitted as long as the 
interest is disclosed and fair value paid.604 However, the New Zealand Securities 
Exchange Listing Rules have restricted the ability of directors on related party 
transactions in listed companies.605 
5.4 Institutional shareholders  
Institutional shareholders play an important role in mediating any governance-
performance relationship in New Zealand.606  
Similar to the UK, institutional shareholders in New Zealand are expected to 
improve the company value in several ways, including enhancing capital market 
productivity and liquidity; monitoring the affairs of the company to prevent harm 
to the company; and taking action to stop unreasonable compensation schemes that 
do not reflect the company performance.607 However, like the UK, the problem of 
‘shareholder passivity’ could exist in New Zealand as well.   
There is some evidence that institutional shareholders do not intervene 
effectively in the governance of their investment companies. Considering the size 
of most institutional investors in New Zealand, the institutional shareholders may 
face a collective action problem as in order to be effective, the activism of several 
institutional shareholders may be needed to participate in actions against the 
                                                
604 Companies Act 1993 sections 139-144  
605 Rule 9 of NZSX Listing Rules 
606 Fox et al. [594] 8 
607 ibid 
 
 
223 
board.608 The other reason is the cost of such involvement. For instance, these 
costs include the cost of circulating lobby documents, proxy solicitation and 
dedicating time and effort to argue their case at shareholders’ meetings. 
Considering that institutional investors’ primary goal is profit maximisation, 
expending cost and time on governance issues may not be proportionate to the 
probable benefits received for their effort. Still the most important problem is that 
the institutional shareholders in many situations have only short-term profit 
maximisation interests and might only care about their own investing returns in the 
near future. Therefore, they might not care about the protection of the company in 
the long run.  
Overall, in terms of reliance on shareholder power only for protection of the 
company, New Zealand bears the same shortcomings that we discussed on the UK 
corporate governance. Therefore, in the context of broadening the scope of the 
derivative claim applicants, New Zealand could not be inspiring for the UK. 
Nevertheless, as was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, in addition to 
strong ex ante mechanisms of protection, the ex post mechanisms are fairly potent 
under New Zealand law. Therefore, like in the United States, some aspects of the 
derivative claim procedure requirements in New Zealand could be inspiring to 
improve the quality of the derivative procedure in the UK, regardless of who is 
acting as the applicant for the derivative claim.  
                                                
608 Aik Win Tan and Trish Keeper, ‘Institutional investors and corporate governance: a New 
Zealand perspective’ [2008] Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 65 < 
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/centres-and-institutes/cagtr/working-papers/WP65.pdf (visited 
10/8/2016) 
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In terms of having a good law on both ex ante and ex post corporate governance 
mechanisms in New Zealand, the World Bank Doing Business Report provides 
good evidence. New Zealand obtains the highest ranking among different 
jurisdictions on the index of minority investors’ protection.  
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5.5 New Zealand minority shareholder protection from the World Bank Doing 
Business Report point of view 
 
The chart below (Chart number 1)609 shows the distribution of shareholders’ 
protection among New Zealand’s different mechanisms of corporate governance, 
mainly in public companies. 
 
 
 
As we observe from the chart, under the Doing Business Report, New Zealand 
shows strength on all the different aspects of protecting investors.  
Chart number 2610 shows the differences between New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom. 
                                                
609 The chart has been based on the scores that New Zealand has obtained under the various 
indices of the protecting minority investors indicator available on the Doing Business website at: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/new-zealand#protecting-minority-investors 
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The chart reveals that both countries are almost equally strong in the different 
aspects of protecting shareholders. However, in areas such as shareholders’ 
litigation, directors’ liability and conflict of interest regulations, New Zealand 
shows more strength than the UK.  
To complete this comparison, Chart number 3 shows the strength of minority 
shareholders’ protection in all the three countries of the United Kingdom, United 
States and New Zealand: 
                                                                                                                                          
610 The comparison in this chart has also been formed on the scores that New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom have obtained under the various indices of the protecting minority investors 
indicator available on the Doing Business website at: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/new-zealand#protecting-minority-investors 
and http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/unitedkingdom#protecting-minority-
investors 
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Chart number 3 confirms previous discussions on these countries’ strengths and 
weaknesses in protecting shareholders.  
Overall, the United Kingdom and New Zealand provide stronger protection for 
minority investors according to the Report, but in terms of directors’ liability and 
shareholder litigations both the United States and New Zealand show more 
strength than the UK.  
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5.6 Derivative actions in New Zealand  
 
New Zealand statutory derivative action provisions have been in use for more 
than twenty years. Since 1994, the common law rules governing the availability of 
derivative actions were replaced with rules contained in sections 164 to 168 of the 
Companies Act 1993. 
The derivative claim provisions in both the UK and New Zealand are, in 
substance, very similar in many ways. In both countries, derivative claims mostly 
happen in closely-held companies; both countries’ provisions require the 
permission of the court to initiate or intervene in derivative proceedings, both 
provide the court with the wide power to make any order it thinks fit in relation to 
the derivative proceeding, also both prohibit the plaintiff from discontinuing a 
derivative claim without the court’s approval. 
Nevertheless, the New Zealand statutory derivative action provisions appear to 
establish easier criteria for leave of the court to initiate a derivative litigation and 
seem to be more shareholder-friendly on the litigation costs provisions; 
accordingly, statutory derivative action has been used more frequently in New 
Zealand than in the UK. 
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5.6.1 Standing to bring a derivative action under the England and New Zealand 
provisions 
 
Unlike in the UK, in which only shareholders have the right to initiate a 
derivative claim, in New Zealand, section 165(1) provides that a shareholder or 
director of a company can grant leave to bring proceedings in the name and on 
behalf of the company or any related company.  
Moreover, section 165(1)(b) indicates that a shareholder or director can not only 
bring proceedings in the name of the company, but they can also intervene in 
proceedings to which the company or any related company is a party for the 
purpose of continuing, defending, or discontinuing the proceedings on behalf of 
the company or related company, as the case may be. Nevertheless, like in the UK 
and the United States, under the New Zealand statutory provisions other 
stakeholders such as employees do not have the right to initiate a derivative action.  
Also, there is no specific section under the New Zealand Companies Act 1993 
which clarifies the causes of action for which the derivative claim is available.  
Unlike in the UK, the multiple or double derivative action has been given 
statutory recognition and a derivative action can now be brought in the name of a 
subsidiary and certain other companies. The possibility of bringing a multiple 
derivative action has been recognised under section 165(1) of Companies Act 1993 
in the name of a ‘related company’. 
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Moreover, the New Zealand Companies Act, except in some limited 
circumstances, such as when a derivative action is brought on behalf of an overseas 
company or a company registered under a different statute,611 has clearly abolished 
the right to bring a derivative action under the common law.612  
 
5.6.2 Criteria for the granting the leave in New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand, the statutory criteria for the granting of leave are set out in 
section 165 of the Companies Act 1993, subsections 2 and 3.  
Under section 165, the leave requirements are divided into two categories: first, 
the factors to which the court shall have regard613 and second, the factors with 
which the court must be satisfied in order to permit a derivative action to be 
continued.614 
As with the UK, the New Zealand statutory provisions give the court a wide 
discretion to permit or deny leave to a derivative action. Section 165(1) indicates 
that the court ‘may’ grant leave having regard to the matters listed in section 
165(2) and when it is satisfied with one of the criteria in section 165(3). There is 
no requirement that an application ‘must’ be granted leave if any or all of the 
required criteria are met.615  
                                                
611  Carre v Owners Corporation, Strata Plan 53020 (2003) 58 NSWLR 302 (NSWSC) 
612 Companies Act 1993 s 165(6) 
613 Companies Act 1993 s 165(2) 
614 ibid s 165(3) 
615 Land Thai and Matt Berkahn, ‘Statutory derivative actions in Australia and New Zealand: 
What can we learn from each other?’ (2012) 25(2) New Zealand universities law review 370-401 
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However, the New Zealand criteria under which only one of the factors in 
165(3)(a) or (b) must be satisfied by the court seems to set out an easier standard to 
grant leave for a derivative action than the criteria under section 263(3) in the UK, 
in which all of the list of requirements have to be satisfied by the court.  
Section 165(2) also sets out four factors to which the court shall have regard in 
deciding whether to give permission to a derivative action.  
The first consideration is the likelihood of the proceedings succeeding.616 Some 
scholars617 believe that the leading authority as to proper interpretation of this 
requirement was the judgment in Vrij v Boyle.618 In this case, in assessing the 
likelihood of a claim succeeding, Fisher J made it clear that this criterion does not 
require a court to conduct an interim trial on the merits.619 The court held that the 
appropriate test is that which would be exercised by a prudent business person in 
the conduct of his or her affairs when deciding whether to bring a claim.620 Also, in 
judging how a prudent business person would act, the court in re Russley Hotel & 
Villas Ltd held that ‘a court must assume that such a person has knowledge of his 
or her rights and actions of the other parties’.621 
The second consideration in section 165(2)(b) requires the court to have regard 
to the costs of the proceedings in relation to the relief likely to be obtained. In 
Stichbury v One4All Ltd the court described this section as requiring the court to 
                                                
616 Companies Act 1993 s 165(2)(a) 
617 Peter Watts; Neil Campbell; Christopher Hare, Company Law in New Zealand (LexisNexis 
New Zealand Ltd 2011) 
618 Vrij v Boyle [1995] 3 NZLR 763 (HC) 
619 ibid [765] 
620 ibid 
621 re Russley Hotel& Villas Ltd [2000] 8 NZCLC 262,399 (HC) [30] 
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consider ‘the economics of taking a derivative action relative to any possible 
return’.622  
Also in Peters v Birnie, Asher J held that the requirement in section 165(2)(b) is 
linked to the issue of the strength of the claim’s merits.623 
The third factor to which the court shall have regard is section 165(2)(c) in 
which the court should consider if any action has been already taken by the 
company or related company to obtain relief. In many cases the courts have not 
considered this particular section as an important factor and not even mentioned it 
in their judgments.624 In Cameron v Coleman, Gendall J held that this section 
would only be really relevant if the company has actually taken some other 
additional steps to obtain relief.625 
Finally, under section 165(2)(d) the fourth factor to which the court shall have 
regard is the interests of the company or related company in the proceedings being 
commenced, continued, defended, or discontinued, as the case may be. As the 
court in Irving Baker Ltd held, considering the best interest of the company has 
been a challenging issue for the courts, and the courts have struggled to find a truly 
separate role for the consideration in this section beyond factors that in reality 
relate to the costs or the likely success of the derivative proceeding in the previous 
subsections.626 
                                                
622 Stchbury v One4All Ltd [2005] 9NZCLC 263,792 (HC) [37] 
623 Peters v Birnie HC Auckland CIV-2009-404-8119-22 April 2010 [57[-[58] 
624 Peter Watts; Neil Campbell; Christopher Hare [n 617] 
625 Cameron V Coleman HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-2151-22 June 2011 [51] 
626 Re Irving Baker Ltd HC Whangarie CIV-2003-488-42-29 July 2004 [45] 
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In re Russley Hotel & Villas Ltd the court related the best interest of the 
company to the financial situation of the company and held that, because the 
company was not financially strong and required the further injection of 
shareholders’ funds, derivative action would not be in the company’s best interest 
as it might lead to the unwinding of the share allotments and ultimately deprive the 
company of much needed capital to fund the operation.627 
 Besides consideration of the factors in section 165(2), pursuant to section 
165(3) in order to give permission to a derivative action the court must be satisfied 
that either (a) the company or the related company does not intend to bring, 
diligently continue or defend or discontinue the proceedings as the case may be, or 
(b) it is in the interest of the company that the conduct of proceedings should not 
be left to its directors or to the determination of the shareholders as a whole. 
Lynne Taylor argues628 that in the great majority of derivative action cases, 
there has been no difficulty for the court in concluding section 165(3)(a) is met, as 
the company itself has not taken action on its own behalf. She also argues that the 
court may be satisfied of the matters set out in section 165(3)(a) and (b) where 
there is a deadlock between a company’s directors and shareholders.629 
  
                                                
627 re Russley Hotel& Villas Ltd [2000] 8 NZCLC 262,399 (HC) [41] 
628 Lynne Taylor, Company and Securities Law in New Zealand (Thomson Reuters 2013) 580 
629 ibid 
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5.6.3 Ratification 
 
Unlike in the UK which considers the issue of ratification of directors’ conduct 
as an important element in giving permission to a derivative claim, none of the 
New Zealand statutory derivative action provisions mention anything about 
shareholders’ ratification and whether it may prevent a derivative action from 
being continued. However, in general, Companies Act 1993 section 177 deals with 
the issue of ratification of certain actions of directors.  
Thai and Berkahn argue that under section 177(3)630 the ability of shareholders 
to ratify certain actions of directors does not limit the courts’ power under section 
165 to give permission to a derivative action. They suggest that this section has 
superseded the common law rule under which derivative actions could only be 
brought in relation to non-ratifiable actions of directors.631  
However, despite that argument, it seems that section 177(4) preserves the 
common law rule on ratification of directors by providing that: ‘Nothing in this 
section limits or affects any rule of law relating to the ratification or approval by 
the shareholders or any other person of any act or omission of a director or the 
board of a company’. 
Peter Watts makes the point that section 177(3) and (4) sit rather uneasily 
together. He argues that section 177(3) has been designed to provide that 
                                                
630 Companies Act 1993 section 177(3) provides that: ‘The ratification or approval under this 
section of the purported exercise of a power by a director or the board does not prevent the court 
from exercising a power which might, apart from the ratification or approval, be exercised in relation 
to the action of the director or the board’. 
631 Land Thai and Matt Berkahn [n 615] 
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ratification by shareholders is no longer a bar to derivative action proceedings but 
that it is merely a fact to be taken into account by the courts.632  
In MacFarlane v Barlow the New Zealand High Court admitted the uncertainty 
in the wording of section 177 but decided that: ‘an application for leave such as 
this is not an appropriate forum for a considered analysis of the exceptions to the 
ratification rule’.633 
However, it seems that in New Zealand the role of ratification in a derivative 
action procedure is less important than in the UK. Even if under section 177(4) the 
ratification is considered to be effective by the court in a derivative procedure, it 
would only be effective with regard to the directors’ conduct which shareholders 
have already ratified and therefore potential future ratification of the particular 
wrong is not a bar to a derivative proceeding. In contrast, in the UK under section 
263(3)(d) Companies Act 2006, the court must take into account where the cause 
of action arises from an act or omission that has already occurred, whether the act 
or omission could be, and in the circumstances would be likely to be, ratified by 
the company. 
  
                                                
632 Peter Watts; Neil Campbell; Christopher Hare [n 617] 
633 Macfarlane v Barlow [1997] 8 NZCLC 261,470 at 261,475 
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5.6.4 Costs 
 
While in the UK the statutory derivative claim provisions under the Companies 
Act 2006 do not mention anything about the costs of the derivative procedure, 
Civil Procedure Rule 19.9E provides that in a derivative claim procedure the court 
may order the company, body corporate or trade union for the benefit of which a 
derivative claim is brought to indemnify the claimant against liability for costs 
incurred in the permission application or in the derivative claim or both. 
Nonetheless, as will be discussed in the next chapter, in practice the operation 
of indemnity orders has shown severe flaws, and the court has ordered the 
company to indemnify the plaintiff shareholder for the costs in only a few cases 
since the introduction of statutory derivative claims in the UK. 
 In New Zealand, however, under section 166 of the Companies Act 1993, the 
court, on an application of shareholder or director to whom leave has been granted 
to bring or intervene in proceedings, shall order that the whole or any reasonable 
costs of the proceedings be met by the company, unless the court considers it 
would be unjust or inequitable for the company to bear the costs.  
There are some factors that the court relied upon to justify a decision that it is 
unjust for the company to bear the costs.634 One factor is the lack of company 
assets to fund the derivative action. In Re Kambrook Manufacturing Ltd,635 Master 
Thomson ordered that no costs order should be made against the company and 
                                                
634 Peter Watts; Neil Campbell; Christopher Hare [n 617] 
635 Re Kambrook Manufacturing Ltd HC Wellington M505/95, 23 May 1996 
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even indicated that the absence of corporate funds might point towards the court 
denying leave. 
Also in Fryberg v Heaven,636 Heath J relied upon the fact that the plaintiff has a 
substantial stake in the company to justify his conclusion that it would be unjust 
and inequitable for the company to bear the costs.637 
Tylor points to an interesting aspect that while under the statutory derivative 
action the company should bear the costs of a derivative proceeding, some 
surprising cases suggests that the applicants have frequently declined to make any 
application that the company bear the costs of the derivative action, or even have 
given a positive undertaking to bear the costs themselves.638 
Watts639 believes that one reason for adopting such an attitude is the fact that 
the applicant’s ability and willingness to bear the costs of the derivative action can 
be an important consideration for the courts when deciding whether to give 
permission to a derivative action.640  
  
                                                
636 Fryberg v Heaven [2002] 9 NZCLC 262, 966 
637 ibid 45-52-54 
638 Lynne Tylor, ‘The Derivative Action in the Companies Act 1993:An Empirical Study’ (2006) 
22 NZULR 355 and 362 
639 Peter Watts; Neil Campbell; Christopher Hare [n 617] 
640 Needham v EBT Worldwide Ltd [2006] 3 NZCCLR 57 (HC) [20],[40] and [70]-[74] 
 
 
238 
5.6.5 The courts’ power and supervision 
 
In New Zealand under section 167 Companies Act 1993, the court at any time 
may make any order that it thinks fit in relation to derivative proceedings, 
including, but without limitation that the plaintiff or any other person should 
control the conduct of proceedings or order the directors to control the conduct of 
proceedings, or order the company or director to provide information or assistance 
in relation to the proceedings. 
However, the most interesting order that the court may make is in section 
167(4) which provides that the court may order that any amount ordered to be paid 
by a defendant in the proceedings must be paid, in whole or part, to former and 
present shareholders of the company or of a related company, instead of to the 
company or the related company itself.  
This is a very interesting point as nothing similar to this order exists under the 
statutory derivative claim in the UK, and in fact such an order seems to be in 
contrast with the nature of a derivative action which is a claim on behalf of the 
company and any compensation naturally should go back to the company itself. 
Therefore, finding the ways that the courts operate such an order is the subject of 
further study in this research.  
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5.7 Conclusion 
 
The chapter reviewed the New Zealand approach to the derivative claim. The 
argument is that in different aspects of corporate governance such as corporate 
transparency and shareholders’ rights and conflict of interest regulations both the 
UK and New Zealand are almost equally strong. However, while the UK has taken 
an overly restrictive approach to the derivative claim, the New Zealand statutory 
provisions show a smoother approach. Exploring the leave requirements and the 
costs provisions, which are the main factors in a derivative proceeding in both the 
UK and New Zealand, shows that there are some major differences between the 
two countries’ statutory derivative actions. 
While multiple derivative action has got statutory recognition under the New 
Zealand provisions, the statutory provisions on derivative claims in the UK has not 
mentioned it, which has caused some uncertainties and ambiguities under the court 
procedure.  
Moreover, although ratification still plays an important role in preventing 
shareholders to continue a derivative action under the statutory derivative claim in 
the UK, it has not been mentioned as a factor which needs to be considered by the 
court under the New Zealand derivative action provisions. Unlike the role of 
shareholder ratification in the UK, it does not apparently play much role as an 
obstacle in the way of derivative actions in New Zealand.  
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Another difference is in the provisions related to the costs of the derivative 
litigation. In the UK the general rule is that the derivative claim applicant should 
bear the costs of the litigation himself. Nonetheless, under the statutory derivative 
action in New Zealand, it is the company which should pay the costs of a 
derivative application unless the courts consider it to be unjust or inequitable for 
the company to pay the costs. The issue of ratification and the derivative litigation 
costs will be further discussed in the next chapter.  
To sum up, studying the corporate governance systems and the different 
corporate governance tools in both jurisdictions revealed that New Zealand, at 
least under the law, has kept more of a balance between different mechanisms of 
accountability for directors. The other point, which has been revealed, is that the 
taking of a more lenient and not overly restrictive approach has not opened the 
floodgates of litigation towards companies. In New Zealand despite more friendly 
derivative action provisions, derivative actions are not frequently used.  
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Chapter Six: Reforms to the UK derivative claim  
6.1 Introduction  
Exploring the role of the derivative claim in the three jurisdictions of the UK, 
United States and New Zealand revealed that although the rate of the derivative 
claim could be affected by the availability of other mechanisms, none of those so-
called alternative methods substitutes the role of the derivative claim in terms of 
protecting the company itself. Therefore, in order to provide optimal long-term 
protection for the company for the benefit of all the stakeholders, the derivative 
claim framework which is subject of this thesis should be amended.  
Based on this argument, this chapter gives some recommendations for 
reforming the derivative claim on the grounds of the shareholder ratification as a 
procedure requirement and the derivative litigation costs. In the context of the UK 
derivative claim, ratification has inherited some of the uncertainty and complexity 
of the common law approach and could discourage potentially valuable derivative 
claim applications. In addition to the problems the ratification causes in the way of 
minority shareholder derivative claim, this research adds another argument too. 
The argument is that in the case of employees’ derivative claim which is the 
proposal of this research, shareholders ratification should not be considered as a 
procedural requirement. The reason is that the interest of shareholders and that of 
employees is not always in line in the company. Therefore, their concerns for 
protection of the company should be considered on separate grounds. Otherwise it 
would be unfair to the employees if the claim they initiate on behalf of the 
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company would be rejected because the directors’ wrong conduct has been 
authorised by shareholders previously.  
In addition to the issue of ratification, the cost of derivative litigation is a 
constant and major problem which stands in the way of derivative claim 
applications. This chapter proposes a blended approach which has been inspired by 
the financial structure of the United States and New Zealand derivative claims. The 
aim of the proposal is to make the derivative claim a more affordable mechanism 
for legitimate applicants. 
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6.2 The role of ratification in UK derivative claims 
 
Despite the reforms to the derivative claim, ratification of the directors’ breach 
of duty by shareholders plays a significant role in defining whether permission 
should be granted by the court to hear a derivative claim. 
Section 263(2)(c) of the Companies Act 2006 provides that the court must 
refuse to give permission to the derivative claim if the cause of action arises from 
an act or omission that has been ratified by the company. At the next stage, section 
263(3)(c)(ii)) provides that, in its discretion to whether to give permission, the 
court must have regard to whether the act or omission is likely to be ratified. 
The problem with the reforms to the derivative claim procedure is that neither 
the Law Commission nor the Government in drafting the statutory derivative claim 
provisions made substantial changes to the role of ratification in a derivative claim 
procedure.  
In fact, the Law Commission did not support substantial reforms to the 
ratification question based on the view that any changes would need to be 
considered within a comprehensive review of directors' duties. Hence, it would not 
be appropriate to make piecemeal changes within the reform of shareholder 
remedies, which may have wider implications.641  
                                                
641 Law Corn No. 246, para 6.8; Julia Tang, ‘Shareholder Remedies: Demise of the Derivative 
Claim’ (2012) 1(2) The University College of London Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 178 
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However, the Law Commission’s decision in not reforming the substantive law 
on ratification resulted in allowing the uncertainties and defects of the common 
law to pass into the statutory derivative claim and ruined the certainty and 
accessibility that was the original purpose of the reforms. 
The only substantial change to the issue of ratification by the corporate law 
reforms was in relation to shareholders’ voting ability. Section 239 of the 
Companies Act 2006 now provides that the votes of wrongdoing directors and 
connected members will be omitted in ratifying such wrongful conduct.  
6.2.1 Ratification under the common law  
Under the common law, shareholders’ ratification of directors’ breach of duty 
was an absolute bar in the way of a derivative action.  
The rationale behind this position was that if an effective ratification discharges 
a director from her breach of duty, then there would be no wrong to the company 
that entitled a shareholder to sue derivatively on the company’s behalf.642 A further 
rationale was based on the principle of majority rule. If the majority shareholder 
voted to ratify, then minority shareholders had to accept that decision and could 
not sue derivatively.643 
However, not all wrongs were ratifiable under the common law. In Edwards v 
Halliwell,644 the court held that four categories of wrongful conduct were beyond 
                                                
642 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 at 93  
643 Christopher Riley, ‘Derivative claims and ratification: time to ditch some baggage’ (2014) 
34(4) Legal Studies 584 
644 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064  
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the power of majority to ratify.645 These categories were in fact the grounds for 
bringing the derivative action under the common law.  
Just one of the four unratifiable wrongs was considered to be a true exception to 
the Foss v Harbottle principle and consequently was considered as an unratifiable 
wrong. This was ‘fraud on the minority’, where ‘wrongdoers were at the control of 
the company’ at the same time. Such a breach was incapable of ratification by 
shareholders.646  
The notion of ‘fraud on the minority’ was a complicated and obscure concept, 
which had made it extremely difficult for minority shareholders to prove in court. 
Therefore, in terms of ratification, the category of ‘fraud on the minority’ was also 
fraught with confusion.647  
In fact, the main critique to ratification under the common law was that the 
ratification was based on the transaction-based approach.648 This meant that the 
legitimacy of ratification was dependent upon whether that breach could be 
considered as ‘fraud’ and there was uncertainty about which breach constituted a 
fraudulent act.649 Nevertheless, in addition to the uncertainty on the concept of the 
fraud, there were some other conflicted views on the ratifiability of the fraudulent 
                                                
645 These non-ratifiable acts were ultra vires and illegal acts, the special majority requirement, 
breaching personal rights of shareholders and acts that constitute a fraud on the minority. A fifth 
exception, which was wherever the justice of the case so requires, was also mentioned in some cases 
but later was rejected by the Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries 
Ltd (No 2) [1982] 1. 
646 Burland v Earle [n 642] 
647 Christopher Riley [n 643] 585 
648 ibid; also Hans C. Hirt, ‘Ratification of breaches of directors' duties: the implications of the 
reform proposal regarding The availability of derivative actions’ (2004) 25 Company Lawyer  
649 Kenneth Wedderburn, ‘Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ 
 (1957) 15(2) The Cambridge Law Journal  
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act as well. While the dominant view was that a fraudulent act is not ratifiable, the 
other opinion was that such wrongs were not inherently incapable of being ratified. 
Rather, it is only their fraudulent character, which avoided the wrongdoers from 
getting released from the consequences of their conduct through the ratification. 
 For instance, in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 
2)650 the court interpreted the earlier case law to conclude that fraud happens when 
the wrongdoer gets a personal benefit from his act.651 However, that opinion was 
opposed to Regal v Hastings 652  where the court held that liability applied 
regardless of whether the company has in fact been damaged or the wrongdoer has 
benefited by his action.653  
In Prudential, however, Vinelott J argued that Regal proved that even 
fraudulent wrongdoing was capable of ratification, provided that the wrongdoers 
‘did not control the company’ and that the majority ‘does not have an interest 
which conflicts with that of the company’.654  Vinelott J also argued that the House 
of Lords in Regal had confirmed that the directors could have had their misconduct 
ratified.655 
However, in addition to the ambiguities surrounding the definition of fraud, the 
other problem under the common law was that the wrongdoing director was 
                                                
650 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1981] 1Ch 257 
651 ibid 316 
      652 Regal v Hastings [1967] 2 AC 134    
653 ibid 144 
654 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [n 636] 307 
655 Christopher Riley [n 643] 587 
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authorised himself to vote as a shareholder in favour of ratification of his own 
misconduct.656  
 
  
                                                
656 North-West Transportation v Beatty [1887] 12 App. Cas. 589 
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6.2.2 Ratification under the statutory derivative claim  
The English Law Commission was aware of the importance of ratification in the 
context of the derivative claim through confirming that ‘it is not always clear when 
ratification will be effective’.657 
Nevertheless, it argued that ratification was outside its terms of reference, and 
hence refused to offer recommendations for its reform. 
Rather it recommended that actual, and ‘effective’, ratification should continue 
to be a complete obstacle to the derivative claim. 658  Nonetheless, the Law 
Commission raised the concern that there was a ‘danger that our desire to simplify 
the derivative action could be undermined by the complexities which arise where it 
is claimed that the relevant breach of duty has been (or may be) ratified’.659  
Despite the Law Commission’s reluctance in suggesting reforms to the question 
of ratification, the Company Law Reform Steering Group (CLRSG) considered 
reforms to ratification in the context of the derivative claim. In its consultation 
paper,660 the CLRSG confirmed that ‘modernisation and simplification’ of the law 
on ratification might be appropriate. The CLRSG proposed that defining whether a 
derivative claim should be permitted to continue depends upon whether any 
                                                
657  Law Commission Shareholders’ Remedies: A Consultation Paper (Law Commission 
Consultation Paper 142, 1996) para 5.2 
658 ibid para 6.84  
659 ibid para 6.81   
660 CLRSG, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework 
(London: DTI, March 2000) 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decision not to sue ‘has been taken by, or was dependent on, the votes of the 
wrongdoers or those under the influence of the wrongdoers’.661 
If ratification has been obtained other than in these ways, then ‘it should clearly 
not be valid to preclude a derivative claim’.662 This view was largely based on the 
voting-based approach to ratification.663  
In the second Consultation Paper the CLRSG confirmed that the validity of 
ratification ‘depends on whether the necessary majority had been reached without 
the need to rely upon the votes of the wrongdoers, or of those who were 
substantially under their influence, or who had a personal interest in the condoning 
of the wrong’.664 In addition to that, it depends on whether or not the wrong was a 
fraud.665 In its final report, the CLRSG confirmed its proposal and consequently 
the Government followed the CLRSG opinion and made some reforms to the 
ratification of directors’ breach of duty.  
However, the Government’s changes to ratification had a narrow scope and 
were limited to the process by which ratification is to be attained, and there is still 
no clarity on the concept of fraud.666 Under the Companies Act 2006, wrongdoers’ 
votes must now be ignored on any ratification.667  
                                                
661 ibid para 4.135; also Christopher Riley [n 643] 600 
662 ibid para 4.136   
663 Christopher Riley [n 643] 587 
664  CLRSG, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure 
(London: DTI, November 2000) para 5.85 
665 ibid, also Christopher Riley [n 643]  
666 Riley ibid 601  
667 Companies Act 2006 Section 239(3)  
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In Franbar the court confirmed that the Companies Act 2006 does not alter the 
common law position that certain wrongs are unratifiable.668  The court held that 
the 'connected person' in sections 239(3) and 239(4) impose extra requirements for 
effective ratification which arise from the existing equitable rules but which 
impose more severe demands.  
Moreover, 'wrongdoer control' is still applicable to ratification in cases where 
the connected persons requirement in section in 239(4) has not been satisfied.669 
The court opinion relates to the situations where section 239(4) has not been 
satisfied but actual wrongdoer control exists. In this scenario, the wrongdoers 
should not then be able to ratify their wrongdoing by using the ambiguity in the 
statutory derivative claim provisions.670  
Overall, the court in Franber tended towards the voting-based approach to 
ratification. It confirmed that some of the acts complained of might be incapable of 
ratification, which initially suggests that it was adopting the transaction-based 
approach. The judge’s view on what established an unratifiable wrong reflected the 
common law position and all the ambiguities around it. 671 
One of the main critiques of ratification under the Act is on vote counting and 
identification of connected persons. The argument is that such a process might be 
                                                
668 Franbar [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] BCC 885 894    
669 Franbar [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch), [2008] BCC 885 [44]-[45]  
670 Tang [n 642] 198 
671 Andrew Keay and Joan Loughrey, ‘An assessment of the present state of statutory derivative 
proceedings’ in Joan Loughrey (ed), Directors' duties and shareholder litigation in the wake of the 
financial crisis (Edward Elgar 2012) 205 
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easy in the context of small, private companies; however, in terms of large public 
companies which tend to vote by proxy this issue is complicated.672 
The issue is whether the courts have the ability to find that the shareholders who 
voted to ratify the directors’ breach of duty were truly independent of the 
wrongdoers. One simple disadvantage of this could be the length and complexity 
of the leave application.673 The other problem arises from the fact that the Act 
makes ratification a significant battleground in derivative claims. By providing 
ratification as a bar to this remedy, it fails to clarify the issue of unratifiable 
wrongs. This position was not adopted in other jurisdictions.  
The problem with ratification in the context of the derivative claim is not 
limited to the actual ratification, which has already occurred before the initiation of 
the derivative claim. Under section 263(3)(c), the Act requires the court in its 
discretion to consider whether the act or omission that has raised the derivative 
claim would be likely to be ratified or authorised by shareholders in future. 
The argument is that such considerations would only add to the complexity of 
the derivative procedure and would also cause confusion for the courts, because in 
practice it would be unpredictable whether the breach of duty would be ratified or 
not, unless the court can sustain the procedure until the company shareholders 
decide on whether or not to ratify the alleged wrong. Such a lengthy procedure 
could be unfair to the derivative claim’s applicant.  
                                                
672 ibid 199 
673 ibid 207 
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Considering the uncertainties on the issue of ratification, the question is why 
should ratification remain as a significant battleground in the context of derivative 
claims in the UK? Hence, the proposal of this thesis is that instead of playing a role 
as a substantial requirement, ratification should be taken into account by the court 
as a subsidiary consideration and only with regards to the wrongs, which have 
already been ratified. Such approach has already been adopted in New Zealand. In 
the United States, also, the shareholder ratification is not a bar in the way of 
shareholders bringing derivative suits. Both countries do not consider ratification 
as a requirement for the derivative claim.  
 A similar approach applies in other jurisdictions in which ratification is not part 
of the derivative claim requirements or plays a less important role than in the 
UK.674 One of this thesis’ proposals which will be discussed in the next chapter is 
to extend the standing to bring a derivative claim to the employees’ representatives 
in the company. The argument is that in the case of an employee’s derivative 
claim, the ratification of the directors’ breach of duty by shareholders should not 
be a significant bar in the way of any employee’s derivative claim. 
Considering that the interests of shareholders are not always in line with the 
interests of employees in the company, such requirement would otherwise be 
unfair to the rights of employees.  
  
                                                
674 Andrew Keay, ‘Assessing and rethinking the statutory scheme for derivative actions under the 
Companies Act 2006’ (2012) 16(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 39-68 
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6.3 Problems of derivative litigation costs in the United Kingdom: Lessons from 
New Zealand and the United States 
 
The cost of derivative litigation in the United Kingdom is one of the practical barriers 
to the commencement of derivative proceedings. The derivative claim is a claim on 
behalf of the company and the claimant lacks any direct personal benefit in the claim. 
Hence, in terms of shareholders as the applicants, they might only own a small number 
of shares in a company. Therefore, they would have little incentive to initiate a 
derivative claim because the benefit of any recovery goes to shareholders according to 
the size of their shareholding, not their efforts in bringing the claim. If the applicant 
loses the litigation, under the English ‘losing party’ rule, they should pay not only the 
costs of the litigation for themselves but for the winning party as well. The problem of 
the derivative litigation costs applies to the employees’ derivative claim as well. As with 
shareholders, employees would not gain any personal benefit from the derivative claim 
outcome and initiating a derivative claim could entail  so much risk for employees. 
Awareness of the problems of funding such expensive litigation could discourage 
claimants from pursuing meritorious claims, which could protect the company from the 
wrongdoers harm.  
This research views this as a problematic approach because a functional derivative 
claim is a crucial mechanism for disciplining directors in a company. The protection 
that derivative claims potentially provide for a company is unique and other 
mechanisms ensuring accountability of directors cannot effectively fill the role of the 
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derivative claim in all circumstances. The reason is that those other mechanisms of 
accountability for directors have been essentially designed to protect the shareholders’ 
interests in the company in the first instance, but the derivative claim protects the 
company itself as a separate legal entity from its shareholders. The protection of the 
company is important for the protection of all the stakeholders whose interests are tied 
to the long-term functioning and financial stability of the company. Hence, any harm to 
the company could put their interests in jeopardy. The risk of bearing the litigation costs 
for applicants’ meritorious derivative claims should be reduced and in this regards the 
financial structure of derivative claims in the United States and New Zealand which I 
discussed in previous chapters, could be inspiring for the UK. In both of these other 
jurisdictions, the statutory presumption is in favour of the company covering the costs 
for the derivative claim. Therefore, by drawing on inspiring aspects of financial 
structure in these jurisdictions, this research suggests a new solution for English law. 
Before discussing the thesis’ proposed solution, I review the current problems with the 
derivative litigation costs in more detail.  
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6.3.1 Costs as the hurdle to shareholder derivative litigation in the UK  
6.3.1.1 Indemnity cost order 
 
In the UK the indemnity cost order, which is covered by the Civil Procedure Rule 
(CPR) 19.9, provides that a court is authorised to grant an indemnity order to the 
claimant in respect of costs incurred in the proceeding as it thinks appropriate.675 
The indemnity cost order which has been established under the well-known decision 
of the Court of Appeal in Wallersteiner v Moir,676 addresses the obstacle of funding in a 
derivative claim by recognising that the applicant should be reimbursed for the costs 
incurred during the procedure. The justification is that the company that is receiving the 
benefit of the derivative claim ought to bear the risk of losing the case; hence, the 
derivative litigation procedures should be simple and inexpensive for the claimant.677 
Although the establishment of the indemnity cost order was a positive step in 
mitigating the risk of litigation for the derivative claim applicant, there are some 
difficulties and flaws in its operation. The CPR 19.9 does not lay down any specific 
procedure that the party or court must follow. This could cause uncertainty for the court 
regarding under which circumstances it should issue the costs order for the applicants. 
The application for an indemnity has been integrated into the application for leave on 
                                                
675 Rule 19.9E provides that ‘the court may order the company, body corporate or trade union for the 
benefit of which a derivative claim is brought to indemnify the claimant against liability for costs incurred 
in the permission application or in the derivative claim or both’. 
676 Wallersteiner v Moir (No2) [1975] 1 All ER 849 
677 ibid 859 
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the first stage.678 This issue could cause uncertainty for the court, because the court does 
not substantially investigate the alleged claim at this stage.679 It is only at the second 
stage of the derivative claim procedure that the court enters into full hearing, based on 
the factors set out in section 263(2), (3) and (4), and is able to evaluate the merit of the 
claim. Moreover, consideration of the applicant’s indemnity cost request at the first 
stage could be disadvantageous for the claimant as well, as it could be difficult for him 
to prove their eligibility for the indemnity order to a suspicious court with very little 
evidence at this stage before the claim has been heard on its merits.680  This could 
increase the length and cost of the litigation for the claimant, instead of compensating 
him for the costs681 and it is against the notion of the indemnity cost order, which was 
intended to turn the derivative claim into a ‘simple and inexpensive’ procedure.682 
The flaws in implementing the indemnity cost order have resulted in uncertainties 
and inconsistencies for the courts. The argument is: if the derivative claim is a claim on 
behalf of the company, why is the burden of the costs not imposed on the company itself 
in the first instance? Why do not the courts follow the approach laid out in Wallersteiner 
v Moir in granting the indemnity cost order? The main concern is that the current 
approach fails to overcome the discouragement of applicants to initiate a meritorious 
derivative claim, as they are not reassured that they will be reimbursed for the costs of 
the claim even if they have strong evidence for wrongdoers’ misconduct. Hence, 
                                                
678 CPR r 19.9(7) also Companies Act 2006, s 261(2) 
679 Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Application (Oxford 
University Press 2007) 
680 ibid; also Smith v Croft [1986] 1 WLR 580 
681 Consultation paper Para 14.1; see also the judicial case management under CPR r 1.4(1). 
682 Arad Reisberg [n 679] 
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disappointed shareholders prefer to sell their shares and leave the harmed company 
rather than challenging the company’s wrongdoers through potentially expensive 
litigation.  
In private companies, the situation may be worse as there is no market for minority 
shareholders to sell their shares, or there may be restrictions on transferring their shares. 
For example, under the company’s Article of Association, they might only be able to 
sell their shares, often at a reduced price, to controlling shareholders themselves. 
Therefore, in situations where controlling shareholders harm the company with 
opportunistic behaviour, the most plausible option for minority shareholders is to sell 
their shares to controlling shareholders and exit the company.  
However, selling the shares is not a rational solution for dealing with the wrongdoers’ 
opportunistic behaviour in the company. Selling the shares (assuming a buyer can be 
found) is not the best possible option for shareholders. Even if selling the shares 
personally benefits shareholders in terms of preventing further harm to their interest, it 
would not bring any benefit to the damaged company. It will not bring any financial 
recovery for the harm done to the company; it will not punish directors for misconduct, 
or will not prevent future harm. If every single shareholder decided to sell their shares in 
such a situation, then theoretically there would be no remedy for the company and this 
would create greater incentive for wrongdoers to continue their wrongful actions 
without concern about the consequences. Preserving the company’s well-being is 
important not only for the sake of shareholders but also for the interests of other 
stakeholder groups such as employees and society in general.  
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Derivative claims are brought to compensate the company for harm inflicted by a 
company wrongdoer whom the board of directors has failed to sue. While a costs hurdle 
confronts the derivative claim applicant who seeks to vindicate the company’s rights 
through the derivative claim, the defendant director is in a stronger position. This is 
because the defendant director has access to substantial corporate funds for their 
defence. Moreover, directors and officers are normally protected through directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance.683 Therefore, in order to achieve a balance between the 
directors’ power and the company’s protection, the problem of derivative litigation costs 
should be solved.  
  
                                                
683 Directors and officers’ liability insurance, or management liability insurance, is insurance cover 
that offers financial protection to directors, partners or officers of a company. It is designed to cover the 
cost of claims against those who have responsibility in running the company.  
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6.3.1.2 Conditional and contingency fee agreements  
 
In addition to the indemnity cost order, there are other sources of financial aid 
available for shareholder litigation in the UK in the form of conditional and contingency 
fee agreements. The conditional fee agreement (CFA) is an agreement between a client 
and their lawyer, which allows the lawyer to take a claim based on the understanding 
that if the litigation is lost, he will not be entitled to charge his client any fee. However, 
if the litigation is won, the lawyer will receive the full fee plus an enhancement 
calculated as a percentage uplift on the fee (of up to 100% of the lawyer’s normal bill) to 
recompense for the risk of not being paid.684  
Another type of agreement is the contingency fee agreement, which is known as a 
damages-based agreement (DBA) in the UK. The damages-based agreement is the same 
as the US contingency fee agreements. It is an agreement in which a claimant and their 
lawyer agree that the claimant will be responsible for the attorney’s fees only if a given 
lawsuit is decided in the claimant’s favour, either by settlement or a court decision. 
Otherwise, like the conditional fee agreement, the lawyer will not be entitled to any 
remuneration. However, the difference is that under the contingency fee agreements the 
lawyer’s reward is usually set as a percentage of the damages awarded to the company. 
The difference between the English damages based agreement and the American 
contingency fee agreement is that the American contingency fee agreement is supported 
                                                
684 See the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1998 (SI 1998/1860); also see generally “Access to 
Justice with Conditional Fees”, a Lord Chancellor's Department Consultation Paper (March 1998).  
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by both the Common Fund and Corporate Benefit doctrines. None of these doctrines 
exist in the English legal system. Despite the availability of the damages-based 
agreements, these agreements have not been used in any shareholder derivative 
litigation in the UK.  
 
6.3.1.3 Reasons for the inefficiency of conditional and contingency fee agreements in 
reducing the costs of the derivative claim 
 
The main problem with both conditional and contingency fee agreements in the UK 
is that they only offer a partial solution to the problem of derivative litigation costs. 
Even with these agreements, the English losing party rule still remains as a hurdle in the 
way of derivative claims. Therefore, although the losing claimant may not be obliged to 
pay the lawyer fees under these kinds of agreements, he will still remain liable for the 
opposite party’s costs.  
One solution to this problem is the use of insurance policies that cover the client’s 
potential liability for the other side’s litigation costs. However, ‘after-the-event’ 
insurance is generally only available for cases with prospects of success greater than 65 
per cent and premiums tend to be about 20 to 30 per cent of the amount of cover 
required. Thus, the insurance premium is very expensive and relying on it would still 
pose a great risk for shareholders in litigation like the derivative claim. The reason is 
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that courts are traditionally reluctant to challenge directors’ conduct in the company,685 
hence a successful outcome can in no way be guaranteed in a derivative claim.   
 Another important problem with conditional and damages-based agreements is that 
these agreements are practically unworkable in the UK. These agreements can only be 
advantageous when lawyers have a critical mass of derivative claim cases, which enable 
them to diversify the risk of losing some derivative claim cases and winning others 
under contingency fee agreements. Otherwise, making use of these types of agreements 
would be a risky task for British lawyers. However, as I explained in previous chapters, 
the UK corporate governance system is not generally litigation-based. It has mainly 
been based on institutional shareholders’ power, which through ex ante mechanisms686 
monitor and control directors’ conduct and hold them accountable to their fiduciary 
duties. Therefore, litigation mechanisms including derivative claims have never been 
frequent in the UK to make the damages-based agreements favourable to British 
lawyers. As such, while the damages-based agreements and conditional agreements 
have failed to address the problem of derivative claim costs in the UK, this research 
proposes other solutions for solving the problem of costs.  
 
  
                                                
685 For example, the courts’ adherence to the Majority Rule or the Business Judgment Rule. 
686 Ex ante is a phrase meaning ‘before the event’ and ex ante mechanisms of protection refers to a 
series of actions that protect the company through the monitoring of the board’s conduct, such as the 
corporate governance ‘comply-or-explain’ principle, market for corporate control and non-executive 
directors. 
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6.4 The thesis proposal: A blended approach to the derivative litigation costs 
 
If the derivative claim is intended to have a practical role in the English legal system, 
then the current hurdle of litigation costs should be removed. The current approach has 
created an environment which discourages legitimate derivative claim applicants from 
initiating a claim on behalf of the company, even in situations in which they have strong 
evidence of company directors’ misconduct. Based on the arguments outlined, this paper 
proposes a blended approach to derivative costs in the UK, inspired by the United States 
and New Zealand approaches.  
To improve the deterrence function of the derivative claim in the UK, the American 
corporate benefit doctrine could be inspiring in terms of considering the non-monetary 
but substantial benefits that could arise from a derivative claim. Therefore, it is 
suggested here that in granting the costs order, the court considers not only the possible 
financial recovery but the likelihood of non-financial but advantageous recovery as 
well. As was discussed in chapters one and six, these non-financial advantages could 
happen in the form of changes to the management of the company, or a court injunction 
which terminates a detrimental transaction, or any other corporate governance reforms 
in the company either by a judicial order or through a settlement. Since the corporate 
benefit doctrine does not exist in the UK, the non-pecuniary consideration of the 
derivative claim could be added to the provisions, which define the criteria for granting 
the derivative claim leave. Also, as I will mention, it could be considered as a 
subsection under a cost provision which requires the court to consider the possibility of 
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both the monetary relief and non-financial advantages of the derivative claim in issuing 
the cost order.  
The second proposal is inspired by the approach taken in New Zealand. Instead of the 
current indemnity costs order approach, upon granting permission to continue a 
derivative claim in which the claimant has already established a prima facie case, the 
court should order the company to meet the whole or part of the reasonable costs of the 
derivative claim. The exceptions would be cases in which the plaintiff is willing to pay 
the costs of the litigation or when the court considers it unreasonable for the company to 
pay the costs. One example of a situation in which it is unreasonable for the company to 
pay would be when, in the later stages of the proceeding, the court is presented with 
evidence that calls the merit of the derivative claim into question. In such 
circumstances, the court would have the option of recalling the costs order and 
instructing the applicants to compensate the company for the costs.  
The reason for this proposal is that in derivative litigation, the real claimant is the 
company and all benefits go back to it. Therefore, it is not fair that the claimant, who 
has already obtained leave to continue a derivative claim and has already satisfied the 
court that their claim has sufficient merit for leave to be granted, should bear the costs 
personally and the other shareholders and stakeholders in the company receive the 
benefit without any cost to themselves.  
The proposal remains similar to the current indemnity costs order in that the courts 
would still have discretion to decide when it is unreasonable for the company to pay the 
costs, thus preventing the abuse of the derivative claim procedure. However, it is 
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different in terms of that it puts more a mandatory burden on the company to pay for the 
costs of legitimate litigation on its behalf. This means that in meritorious derivative 
litigation in which the claimant has proved a prima facie claim, the costs of the 
litigation would shift from the claimant to the company unless the court considers it 
otherwise. Instead of putting the burden of proof on the claimant to reason why the 
company should bear the costs of their meritorious claim, it would be for the company 
to show reasons why it is not legitimate for it to pay the costs of a claim, which has been 
initiated on its behalf. Such a statutory order would be more reassuring for applicants in 
a potentially advantageous derivative claim, as these applicants would take less 
financial risk in initiating a claim on behalf of the company. The experience in New 
Zealand shows that the availability of other mechanisms of accountability for directors 
may limit the role of the derivative claim to some extent. Moreover, because of the 
difficulties with leave requirements and the court scrutiny in the two-staged procedure, 
which is designed specifically to filter out vexatious claims, such an approach would not 
open the floodgates of litigation against the company. Also, in order to prevent the 
chance of abuse that might remain, the court would have the ability to recall the cost 
order at a later stage if the claim subsequently turns out to be unmeritorious and order 
the plaintiff to pay back the costs to the company. There is a low possibility that 
shareholders or other applicants would make time-consuming and risky litigation from 
which they would not even obtain any personal profit, without a proper cause of action 
and with the mere aim of harming the directors.  
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The both mentioned proposals for the derivative litigation cost could be covered 
under a statutory provision for the costs.  The suggested provision could provide as 
follows: “The court, on an application of shareholder or employees to whom leave has 
been granted to bring the derivative claim shall order that the whole or any reasonable 
costs of the proceedings be met by the company, unless the court considers it 
unreasonable for the company to bear the costs or the applicant is willing to pay the cost 
of the litigation himself”. Also, the consideration of the non-financial benefit of the 
derivative claim could come under a subsection, which provides that: “in addition to any 
financial relief which may arise from the derivative claim, the criteria for granting the 
cost order shall include the non-financial but beneficial outcome arising from the 
derivative claim”. 
6.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter discussed new proposals on the issue of ratification and derivative 
litigation costs. The argument is that the complexities and ambiguities in the 
current role of ratification has resulted in confusion in the derivative claim 
procedure and might prevent legitimate derivative claims.  
The reason is that in practice it would be unpredictable whether the breach of 
duty would be ratified or not, unless the court hold the procedure until the 
company shareholders decide whether to ratify the alleged wrong or not. However, 
such a lengthy procedure could be apparently unfair to the derivative claims 
applicant. Moreover, in the context of the employees’ derivative claim, which will 
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be discussed in the next chapter, dismissing an employee’s derivative claim on the 
ground that the shareholders would ratify that misconduct would be unfair to the 
employee applicant, because the interest of shareholders and employees is not 
always in line with each other and their claim should be considered on the grounds 
of their own interests only.  
As the solution, this thesis suggests that instead of playing a role as a substantial 
requirement for assessing a derivative claim, ratification should be taken into 
account by the court with regards to the shareholders’ derivative claim as a 
subsidiary consideration and under the court’s discretion. Such approach has 
already been adopted in New Zealand and the United States and some other 
common law jurisdictions. In terms of derivative litigation costs, this chapter 
revealed that, under the current situation, these costs are one of the biggest hurdles 
in the way of derivative claims in the UK. 
This chapter showed that the current financial support, in the form of the 
indemnity cost orders or the conditional or the damages-based agreement, is not 
effective in reducing the risk of the litigation for shareholders. Hence, this thesis 
proposes a blended approach inspired from both the United States and New 
Zealand. Under the suggested solution, in granting the cost order the court would 
consider both pecuniary and non-pecuniary outcomes in a derivative claim. 
In addition to that, upon granting permission to continue the claim, the court 
should order that the company must meet the whole or part of the reasonable costs 
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of a derivative claim unless the plaintiff is willing to pay the costs of the litigation 
himself, or the court considers the costs unreasonable. 
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Chapter 7: Employees’ derivative claim  
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter deals with the thesis proposal on expanding the standing for initiating 
the derivative claim to the employees. As was discussed in the first chapter, the reason 
that this thesis argues for the employees’ derivative claim is that among the different 
groups of stakeholders, employees are in a better position to be aware of the internal 
management of the company because th          hhghggg hghg gh                                                                                         
ey are working in the company and they could even have better access to the company’s 
documents. On the other hand, they are in a vulnerable position when the company gets 
harmed because they may lose their job and the ability to earn their livelihood. The 
apparent evidence for this assertion is the BHS scandal, which led to the loss of many 
employees’ jobs and significant harm to their entitlements with substantial pension 
deficits. Therefore, employees could have stronger motivation to protect the company 
from the wrongdoers harm. 
 Overall, the argument for the employees’ derivative claim has been based on three 
grounds. The first is that shareholders may only have short-term profit maximisation 
interests and they may only care about their own investing returns in the near future. 
Hence, they may be reluctant to be involved in corporate governance matters and costly 
monitoring of their investee companies, or they may not care if their companies earn 
profits by breaking the law or hurting the company in the long run.687 Even in some 
                                                
687  Lorraine Emma Talbot, ‘Why shareholders shouldn’t vote: a Marxist-progressive critique of 
shareholder empowerment’ (2013) 76(5) Modern Law Review 791-816; Lynn Stout, The Shareholder 
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private companies like the former BHS, there might be no shareholder outside the 
wrongdoers’ team to deter their harm to the company. Therefore, protection of the 
company as a separate legal entity should not be in the monopoly of shareholders only. 
Just like shareholders who have both personal rights as well as the right to make a claim 
on behalf of the company, employees should have similar rights to protect the company 
and consequently their interest in the company. The argument is that extending the 
derivative claim right to the employees would increase the overall protection of the 
company for the benefit of all the stakeholders. The employees have sufficient incentive 
to protect the company in the long run.  
Second, although the long-term debate on the corporate objective in the UK finally 
resulted in partial consideration of employees’ interest and promotion of business 
relationships with other stakeholders under section 172, still the current enlightened 
shareholder value principle has remained fundamentally loyal to the shareholder 
primacy theory and it is not effective in protecting the company as a whole in the long 
run. The most obvious reason for this inability, in addition to the section 172 
ambiguities, is the lack of enforcement power for employees to protect the company 
against the directors and controlling shareholders’ damages in situations that 
shareholders are absent or are not willing to do that. 
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Third, in light of tragedies like BHS, the UK Government has set out some reforms 
to strengthen employee engagement in the company. The Government’s specific plans 
for improving the protection of employees’ interests in the company have been set in the 
form of a specific provision requiring premium listed companies to adopt, on a 
“comply-or-explain” basis, one of three employee engagement mechanisms: a 
designated non-executive director; a formal employee advisory council; or a director 
from the workforce. However, although the Government’s approach toward 
strengthening the employees’ protection is well-intentioned, this thesis argues that these 
measures will likely have little impact in practice. In fact, the proposed reforms merely 
offer tokenism rather than a much-needed call to action. Therefore, the thesis argues that 
in order to enhance the overall protection of the company and to safeguard the 
employees and other stakeholders’ interest in the company, in addition to the proposed 
reforms, the standing for bringing derivative claims should be broadened to the 
employee’s representative. The argument is that tragedies like BHS might have been 
prevented if the company employees had had the right to bring a derivative claim. While 
there were no other mechanisms from outside to stop the harm to the company, the 
derivative claim’s deterrence function could have enabled the employees to sue the BHS 
wrongdoers on behalf of the company for their negligence and mismanagement, and 
might have prevented them from further misappropriation of the company’s assets. In 
fact, the employees’ derivative claim right would be a threat to potential wrongdoers 
like Mr. Green, who in turn might be more cautious about the consequences of their 
misconduct, and it would prevent them from easily enriching themselves on the back of 
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the company with no concern for anyone else. This chapter reviews employees’ interest 
consideration in the UK. Also, it explores the proposed corporate governance reforms 
intended to strengthen the employees’ voice and discusses why these proposals are not 
insufficient. The chapter also explains how employees’ derivative claims could help 
prevent tragedies like BHS and discusses the implementation of an employees’ 
derivative claim in the UK. 
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7.2 Attempts to diverge the UK corporate law from its shareholder-centric 
orientation 
Although the predominant ‘shareholder primacy’ basis of the UK’s company law 
framework seems to be clear and recognised, in fact such normative cohesiveness 
covers up a longer history of substantial uncertainty with regard to the corporate 
objective in the UK.688 In fact, until the enactment of the Companies Act 2006, UK 
corporate law had taken an uncertain approach towards the issue of for whose benefit 
the company should be run. This debate had taken over 40 years in the UK and as was 
discussed in the first chapter, resulted in establishment of the enlightened shareholder 
value principle under the Companies Act 2006 with still strong loyalty to the 
shareholder primacy principle. Although the UK corporate governance has neo-liberal 
political orientation, during the post-war period, some democratic public policy actions 
were carried out to directly incorporate employees into the UK’s corporate legal 
framework. 689  During these years, at one stage UK company law became close to 
adopting employees’ board representation like some of the other European 
jurisdictions. 690  Such an attempt failed mainly because of the opposition of labour 
unions in the UK who were reluctant to be engaged in management of the company.691 
Overall, the attempts to diverge the UK company law from shareholder primacy value 
could be traced in three important periods: (1) from the Bullock report in 1977 to 
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section 309 of the Companies Act 1985; (2) from section 309 of the Companies Act 
1985 to the enlightened shareholder value principle under section 172(1) of the 
Companies Act 2006; and finally (3) from section 172 Companies Act 2006 to corporate 
governance proposed reforms in 2017. However, in none of these considerations have 
employees been given the right to directly sue the ones who damage the company on 
behalf of the company and to protect the company and their reflective interests in the 
company through the derivative claim. Therefore, this thesis argues that none of these 
attempts were successful in increasing the protection of the company for the benefit of 
the company itself and for the overall interest of all the stakeholders. The scandals like 
BHS are evidence of this issue. 
7.2.1 The employees’ representative proposal under The Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry on Industrial Democracy 
After the Labour Government came into power in 1974 and in light of the looming 
introduction of industrial democracy in the UK, the Government published the 1977 
Bullock Report on Industrial Democracy which became famous as the “Bullock Report” 
after it was chaired by Lord Alan Bullock.692 The report suggested that the board of 
large companies be comprised of shareholders and employee representatives similar to 
the large companies in Germany.693 The proposal would have required the same level of 
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shareholder and employee representatives on the boards of all companies with more 
than 2,000 shareholders, subject to a minimum of four directors on each side.694 
The rationale behind the report was that the growth of large companies had amplified 
the distance between the locations where decisions affecting workers were made, and 
where they were felt, leaving directors responsible to shareholders only, in practice.695 
Moreover, social changes such as better education had led to a greater desire and ability 
of workers to control their working environment, and a greater power of unions and 
legislative changes. 696  Nonetheless, the proposal encountered much opposition. For 
instance, Sir Otto Kahn-Freund put emphasis on the natural conflict between the 
respective interests of shareholders and employees. Kahn-Freund argued that it simply 
was not possible to express the interests of the company in such a way as to allow this 
concept to encapsulate the particular interests of employees in those instances (e.g. 
proposed plant closures or mass layoffs) when the latter constituency is most in need of 
the protection of company law.697 Thus, although he was not completely against the 
notion of employee representatives on the board, he was cautious in highlighting the 
need of such mechanisms being seen as an extension of the independent rights of trade 
unions to protect employees’ interests through adversarial industrial action, as opposed 
to a way of integrating the specific interests of a company’s workforce into the general 
interest of company as a whole.698  
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The Bullock Report visibly recognised the long foundation of shareholder primacy in 
the UK, noticing that ‘[t]he ultimate control of the company is seen in law as residing 
with its owners or shareholders,’ and that the board’s duty to act in ‘the best interests of 
the company’ had been ‘narrowly interpreted by the Courts to mean the best interests of 
the shareholders’. 699  The Bullock Report was therefore unsuccessful in shifting 
shareholders from their key position in UK corporate law, facing resistance to the 
proposal from City institutions, employers, and the Thatcher Government alike.700 
The Bullock Report’s failure was also attributed to the concerns that the objective of 
corporate decision-making would be unclear if it is diverged from its strict shareholder-
centric framework.701Trade unions themselves barely supported the Bullock Report’s 
proposals. Many were scared that employee board representation might tend to damage 
efforts to secure gains through collective bargaining.702 They also feared being drawn 
into management responsibilities and losing their independence from capital.703 In any 
event, due to the opposition against it, the Bullock Report could not gain approval and 
later Margaret T5atcher’s neo-liberal Conservative Government, known for its hostility 
to organised labour, further caused the dismissal of the industrial relations reform 
movement in the UK.  
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7.2.2 Section 309 of the Companies Act 1985: no derivative claim right for the 
employees 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government introduced section 46 of the 
Companies Act 1982 shortly after coming to power in 1979. The section stated ‘the 
matters to which the directors of a company are to have regard in the performance of 
their functions shall include the interests of the company’s employees in general as well 
as the interests of its members.704 This provision seemed to be an alternative to the 
Bullock Report in considering the interests of employees by requiring directors to ‘have 
regard’ for the employees’ interests, but in practice the provision proved to be of little 
consequence, not least due to the fact that employees could not force directors to 
comply with their fiduciary duties.705 Section 309 of the Companies Act 1985, the 
immediate successor of section 46 of the Companies Act 1980, inherited exactly the 
same features. Neither of the provisions had empowered employees with the derivative 
claim right on behalf of the company. Section 309 provided that the matters to which 
the directors of a company are to have regard in the performance of their functions 
include the interests of the company’s employees in general, as well as the interests of 
its shareholders.706 Therefore, directors were only required to consider or have regards 
to the interests of employees in the context of their duty to the company, which was for 
the interests of its members. There was also no guidance provided to directors as to how 
they interpreted their responsibility under this provision and how they should strike a 
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balance between employees’ interests and those of the shareholders.707 However, in 
instances such as Re Saul D. Harrison & Sons Ltd 708  the courts refused to order 
directors to wind up a loss-making company whose premises were seized for the 
extension of a subway line. According to the High Court, in light of their duty to 
employees, directors were ‘entitled to take into account if they were of the opinion that 
there was a reasonable prospect that the company's business could be saved’. While the 
decision also involved a majority-minority conflict, the decision is sometimes cited as 
an example where section 309 was used as a defence for directors. 709  In Dawson 
International v Coats Patons,710 the court held that directors had a fiduciary duty to the 
company ‘to have regard to the interests of members and employees’711 in the course of 
their duty to make a good faith recommendation to shareholders about a takeover bid. 
Also in Re Welfab Engineers Ltd712 even if the court did not clearly refer to section 309, 
it used the provision to dismiss the liquidator’s claim against the directors of an 
insolvent company after they had entered into a doubtful transaction to temporarily save 
the employees’ jobs, citing ‘widespread unemployment and industrial devastation’ in 
the region. Nevertheless, despite its occasional implication in the case law, section 309 
never functionally worked for the interests of employees in the context of company law. 
In fact, the ability of shareholders to ratify breaches of directors’ duties demonstrated 
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that employee interests continued to be alien to the edifice of company law. Also, in the 
absence of a direct derivative right for employees, section 309 was a toothless 
mechanism against the directors’ breach of duty. Hence, scholars continued to confirm 
that the dominant approach was still shareholder primacy.713 
7.2.3 Enlightened shareholder value principle: consideration of stakeholders’ 
interests for the benefit of shareholders  
It was explained in chapter one that the issue of company objection came to the 
attention of the UK Government again in 1998 when Tony Blair’s Labour Government 
initiated the “Company Law Review”.714 The efforts of the Company Law Review 
Steering Group in defining the corporate objective resulted in establishment of the 
enlightened shareholder value principle, which has been based on the ambition of 
promoting the success of the company for the benefit of members as a whole. In 
achieving such a goal, however, a director must have regards to factors such as the 
interests of the company's employees and the need to foster the company's business 
relationships with suppliers, customers and others. As was argued in chapter one, 
section 172 has two main problems. First, under the section, directors have been given 
the discretion to consider a wide range of issues without a clarification of how they 
should consider the factors mentioned in that section. Second, the section fails to 
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empower the employees with the right to make a claim on behalf of the company in 
situations that the directors are in breach of their fiduciary duties toward the company.  
The deficiencies of section 172 have become evident to the UK government, which 
has responded with a proposed package of reform. However, under the proposed 
reforms, shareholders are still the only company law’s executive arms for holding 
directors accountable toward the company. This thesis argues that the lack of a 
derivative claim right for the employees is one of the main shortcomings of the 
proposed corporate governance reforms. Without a right to make a claim on behalf of 
the company, employees would be powerless in increasing the protection of the 
company and protecting their reflective interests. In the next section, I discuss why the 
proposed reforms are not sufficient and why employees still need a derivative claim 
right as a complementary mechanism. 
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7.3 The Government’s new package of reforms: Would it enhance the protection of 
the company as a whole? 
In light of tragedies like BHS, the UK Government has proposed a package of 
corporate governance reforms. The House of Commons report named the BHS scandal 
as “the unacceptable face of capitalism,”715 and the UK Prime Minister Theresa May 
has promised to stamp out irresponsible corporate behaviour through the new 
corporate governance framework. The proposed plans have three key components: 
fixing executive pay; strengthening the employee, customer, supplier and wider 
stakeholder engagement in the company; and extending the corporate governance code 
to large privately-held businesses. For strengthening the employees and other 
stakeholders’ voice, the Government’s intention is to: introduce secondary legislation 
and require all companies of significant size (private as well as public) to explain how 
their directors comply with the requirements of section 172 to have regard to employee 
and other stakeholders’ interests. Also, on a “comply-or-explain” basis, the Financial 
Reporting Council (FCR) requires premium-listed companies to adopt one of three 
employee engagement mechanisms: a designated non-executive director; a formal 
employee advisory council; or a director from the workforce. Furthermore, the 
government intends to invite the GC100 group of the largest listed companies to 
complete and publish new guidance on the practical interpretation of directors’ duties 
in section 172 of the Companies Act. 
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The Government’s assumption is that these proposals will drive change in how big 
companies engage with their key stakeholders by putting higher expectations on 
companies especially on leading, premium listed companies. My argument is that to 
enhance the protection of the company, more mandatory mechanisms than the ones 
envisioned by the Government are  needed, such as the derivative claim for employees. 
I review the current proposals to justify my argument. 
7.3.1 Fixing the executive pay 
The first part of the Government Corporate Governance proposals deals with the 
issue of executive pay and highlights the concerns over very high levels of executive 
remuneration at UK quoted companies. The Government argument is that the executive 
pay is a key factor in public dissatisfaction with large businesses, and a source of 
frustration to UK investors. FTSE100 CEO total pay has increased from an average of 
around £1m in 1998 to over £4m today, fuelling a widespread perception that 
boardroom remuneration is increasingly disconnected from the pay of ordinary working 
people. It is also questionable whether long-term company performance has consistently 
matched this rapid growth in pay. 716  However, in order to fix the problem the 
Government has mainly focused on the shareholder interests. In response to the 
shareholders’ concerns on the executive remuneration the Government has invited the 
Financial Reporting Council to: (1) revise the UK Corporate Governance Code and 
make it specific about the steps that premium listed companies should take when they 
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encounter significant shareholder opposition to executive pay policies and awards; (2) 
give remuneration committees a broader responsibility for overseeing pay and 
incentives across their company and require them to engage with the wider workforce to 
explain how executive remuneration aligns with wider company pay policy (using pay 
ratios to help explain the approach where appropriate); and (3) extend the recommended 
minimum vesting and post-vesting holding period for executive share awards from 3 to 
5 years to encourage companies to focus on longer-term outcomes in setting pay.717 In 
addition to that, the Government has plan to introduce secondary legislation to require 
quoted companies to: (1) report annually the ratio of CEO pay to the average pay of 
their UK workforce, along with a narrative explaining changes to that ratio from year to 
year and setting the ratio in the context of pay and conditions across the wider 
workforce; and (2) provide a clearer explanation on remuneration policies of a range of 
potential outcomes from complex, share-based incentive schemes.  Furthermore, the 
Government invites the Investment Association to implement a proposal it made in its 
response to the green paper to maintain a public register of listed companies 
encountering shareholder opposition to pay awards of 20% or more, along with a record 
of what these companies say they are doing to address shareholder concerns. Lastly, in 
addition to these proposals, the Government will take forward its manifesto 
commitment to commission an examination of the use of share buybacks to ensure that 
they cannot be used artificially to hit performance targets and inflate executive pay. The 
review will also consider concerns that share buybacks may be crowding out the 
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allocation of surplus capital to productive investment. The Government will announce 
more details shortly.718 
In the view of this thesis, the Government proposal for executive pay may result in a 
modest fall in levels of remuneration to some extent and the requirement concerning pay 
ratio reporting may generate adverse publicity for some companies. However, it is 
unlikely that the proposed reforms make a radical change in the context of directors’ 
pay and prevent any misuse. There are some reasons for that. First, that the proposed 
reforms target only large quoted companies in the UK. Other large companies, which 
are not quoted, especially large private companies are beyond the scope of the 
Government proposals and will be exempt. The other main problem, however, is that 
the Government concerns about the shareholders’ interests only and trusts that 
shareholders would consider the overall interest of the company and even broader 
interests of society to their own interests. Therefore, only shareholders would have the 
right to get the report on the executives’ pay. However, as it has already been discussed 
in this thesis, the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance cannot address 
the problems with poor management of the company nor it is able to curb the directors 
and controlling shareholders’ opportunistic behaviour or remunerations which exceed 
the company profits. Shareholders usually do not have long-term commitment to the 
company. They are mainly interested in short-term returns. Even institutional 
shareholders, who are expected to have a longer commitment to their investees’ 
companies and play an important role as the companies’ stewards, may not share the 
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general public’s concerns about high pay as long as the so-called directors guarantee 
their profit maximisations. Hence, relying on shareholders only may not be enough for 
improving the corporate governance. As the evidence for this argument, the House of 
Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee launched its own 
inquiry into corporate governance, and published a report in April 2017. The report was 
specifically concerned that companies appear to be under pressure to focus on the short-
term profit maximisation for the shareholders rather than the long-term protection of the 
company, and that current share ownership patterns have resulted in shareholders not 
being in a position to exercise their supervisory function properly.719   
 
7.3.2 The non-executive director  
Under the new corporate governance reforms, one way of engaging the employees in 
the management of the company is through assigning an existing non-executive director 
who represents the interests of employees and other stakeholders in the company.720 
However, it is neither clear at this stage how the designated non-executive director is 
supposed to increase the protection of employees and other stakeholders at the board 
level, nor weather the designated non-executive director will act for different 
stakeholder groups or only for the employees in the company.  
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Some respondents to the Government Green paper have suggested that there should 
be more than one non-executive director acting as a point of liaison for different 
stakeholders.721 Other respondents have suggested that non-executive director(s) should 
be able to meet management, the workforce and unions to discuss matters of concern; 
should have access to employee engagement survey results and other statistics; should 
be able to consult with key suppliers; and should be able to review customer feedback, 
including complaints. Regardless of the extent to which the Government would apply 
the proposed recommendations in defining the role of the non-executive directors for 
employees, it is unlikely that this option would be effective. In fact, it is difficult to 
analyse the possible impacts of designating a non-executive director to protect the 
interests of stakeholders without knowing how the mechanism will be implemented. 
Respondents to the Green Paper have raised the concern that, if the non-executive 
director is expected to promote rather than channel the interests of particular groups, the 
role could potentially conflict with the joint duties of directors and compromise their 
independence. There are also concerns that designated non-executive directors could 
find themselves isolated on the board, unable to provide an effective challenge.722 
Another concern is the difficulty of reconciling diverging stakeholder interests. This 
thesis adds some more general concerns about the role of non-executive directors and 
their efficiency in protection of the company as a whole. These concerns have already 
been discussed in chapter three.723 The fact is that although the non-executive directors 
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have broad duties to monitor the executive directors’ conduct, there is lack of clarity on 
how they should perform their duties and what fiduciary duties they have toward the 
company.724 In addition, they may not always completely understand the complexities 
of the businesses they direct. 725  Moreover, they may lack incentives to effectively 
perform the tasks that have been assigned to them,726 unless they are provided with 
strong financial incentives that likely align their interests with those of shareholders 
only. Further, they may be under the influence of the executive directors who have 
proposed them.727 Based on these reasons, the non-executive directors might not protect 
the company and the interests of other stakeholders in the company in all circumstances.  
7.3.3 Formal employee advisory council 
The second option under the Government reform for engaging the employees in the 
corporate governance of the company is through a formal employees’ advisory council. 
As for the previous option, it is not clear how this body is expected to strengthen the 
employees’ voice. Also, it is not clear how the council members would be chosen and 
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what kind of task they would have. If works councils in Germany and other Continental 
European jurisdictions serve as the model, would employees elect the council members 
themselves, or would the task be given to the directors or shareholders? 
What impact would the council have on the board’s decisions? Would the panel have 
enough power to challenge the board? Would they participate in decisions about 
company strategy and its execution? Would they similarly to the work councils in 
Germany have an impressive set of information, consultation and co-decision rights? 728 
Still there is no clear answer to these questions. The respondents to the Green Paper 
have suggested, among other things, that the panel should be able to issue an annual 
public statement (potentially as part of the annual report) and commission independent 
investigations, in order to maintain its independent voice. The panel should ensure that 
the board and management are clear about key risks and amplify perspectives that may 
be absent or weak at board level. Moreover, the panel could have a formal consultative 
role with the remuneration committee in reviewing executive pay policies and 
performance. While it is unclear whether the Government will implement any of these 
suggestions, it is evident that the employee advisory council as an optional mechanism 
would not have a sufficient mandatory nature to oblige directors to consider the 
employees’ interests in their decision-making, nor would it have strong power to 
prevent the directors’ opportunistic behaviour. 
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7.3.4 Appointment of an employees’ representative to boards 
The third proposed employee’s engagement mechanism is appointing a director from 
the workforce, which was actually one of the UK Prime Minister’s campaign pledges. 
However, she eventually stepped back from her initial promise by substituting 
mandatory employees’ representative on board with an optional workforce 
representation for public listed companies. 
As a general concept, providing employees with the right to have a representative on 
the board could provide some advantages both to the company and to the employees 
themselves. The economic rationale for employee representation is that employees may 
be more motivated to invest in the company-specific skills if they are less exposed to 
threats of opportunistic wage negotiations or termination of pension plans.729 Also, the 
employees’ representative could introduce different perspectives on the operation of the 
company. The employees’ representative could potentially raise concern on the board 
decisions, which is likely to harm the stability of the company in the long run. On the 
other hand, however, there are some potential problems. The first important point is that 
an employees’ representative in the UK as a voluntary option based on the “comply-
and-explain” principle might not be effective in protection of the company. Listed 
companies might not see this as an opportunity to engage with employees. Even if 
companies choose this option, some factors might undercut its potential benefits. It is 
not clear how the proposed employee’s director would be elected. Company employees 
                                                
729 Martin Gelter and Genevieve Helleringer, ‘Constituency Directors and Corporate Fiduciary Duties’ 
in Andrew Gold and Paul Miller (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law (Oxford University 
Press 2016) 302-320; Eger [n 13] 384-385; see also Martin Gelter, ‘The Pension System and the Rise of 
Shareholder Primacy’ (2013) 43 Seton Hall Law Review 909, 937-941 
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might either hold an official election, or they might only be permitted to nominate a 
candidate for subsequent appointment by directors or election by shareholders.730 In the 
latter case (which is currently practiced in the few British companies having employee 
representatives)731 the powers of employees would remain notional. The purpose of 
employees’ representatives is not merely to serve as figureheads, but to preserve the 
stability of the company and protect the employees’ interest in the company. The 
employees’ representative who has been selected by the board and voted into office by 
shareholders will likely not be able to achieve the mentioned goals. Moreover, the 
Government has not clarified the prospective role of employees’ directors. If the 
purpose is to represent the interests of employees and to contribute their concerns to 
board deliberations, this role could be potentially in conflict with general duties of 
directors. The UK Companies Act 2006 clearly indicates that the company is the only 
beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties.732 Therefore, all the fiduciary duties described 
in sections 171 to 177 of the Companies Act 2006, including the duty to avoid conflict 
of interest733 must be discharged in a similar way by employee directors and others.734 
It is far from clear how the proposed employees’ representative will be positioned to 
promote the interests of employees and protect the company without creating the 
conflict of interest. Also, information sharing between the employees’ director and the 
group he is representing is a two-edged sword. Employees’ directors may struggle in 
                                                
730 Edo Groenewald, ‘Corporate Governance in the Netherlands: From the Verdam Report of 1964 to 
the Tabaksblat Code of 2003’ (2005) 5 European Business Organization Law Review 291, 299  
731 This is currently the practical approach in the First Group PLC which is apparently one of the few 
UK public companies who has an employee representative on the board; http://www.firstgroupplc.com. 
732 Companies Act 2006 s. 170 
733 Companies Act 2006 s 175 
734 Gelter and Helleringer [n 729] 309 
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keeping their duty of confidentiality on the one hand, while reducing the asymmetry of 
information between employees and the board by providing the employees with reliable 
information, on the other. The UK Government needs to clarify the mentioned 
ambiguities on the role of the employees’ representative. Even if her duty would be to 
provide perspective rather than representing particular interests, the scope of her role 
should be clear. The other serious concern is that a single employees’ representative will 
be isolated on the board and will not have an impactful voice there. For the Government 
proposal to work in practice, a critical mass of two or three directors would have to be 
appointed. Considering the traditional board structure of UK companies, few firms will 
likely choose this option. 
7.3.5 Mandatory report on compliance with section 172 
The Government’s fourth option is strengthening the reporting requirements on how 
directors comply with the requirements of section 172 to have regard to the employees’ 
interests. Again, the details of the proposal could hardly be less clear. Under the current 
plan, companies will be required to explain how they have identified and sought the 
views of key stakeholders, why the mechanisms adopted were appropriate, and how 
they influenced boardroom decision-making. In addition to the annual report, the 
government may require disclosures on the company website.735 The new reporting 
requirement is expected to encourage directors to give more thought to how they engage 
with employees and other stakeholders.736 However, the requirement does not provide 
                                                
735  Department for Business, Energy & industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance Reform, The 
Government response to the green paper consultation, para 2.36 
736 ibid para 2.39 
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any guidance on how directors can ensure effective engagement.737 Nonetheless, it is 
not clear how the new reporting requirement will be different from the contents of 
section 414C of Strategic Report and Directors’ Report Regulations 2013. Section 414C 
of the Companies Act 2006 requires directors to report to members of the company on 
how they have performed their duty under section 172.738 The problem with the current 
and the proposed report is that directors are required to report their compliance to the 
company shareholders only. Unless directors are required to report to the employees or 
employees’ representatives or other stakeholders’ representative directly, the 
consideration of employee or other stakeholders’ interests will not be a priority, because 
shareholders will likely only consider the information relevant to the extent that it serves 
shareholder interests. As mentioned above, directors may sacrifice long-term stability of 
a company in order to enhance short-term profit maximisation. 739  This could be 
damaging for the long-term development of the company, and might ultimately harm 
society as a whole.740 One reason is that in such situations, institutional shareholders 
would be indifferent to other stakeholder interest or corporate social responsibility.741 
As a result, strengthening the directors’ report on compliance with section 172 may not 
be an adequate solution to control corporate misconduct in all circumstances. The 
                                                
737 ibid 
738 Companies Act 2006 section 414C(4)(b) 
739 Iris H-V Chiu, ‘Operationalizing a stakeholder conception in company law’ (2016) 10(4) Law and 
Financial Markets Review 173-192; Caitlyn Helms, Mark Fox and Robert Kenagy, ‘Corporate Short-
Termism: Causes and Remedies’ (2012) 23 International and Comparative Company Law Review 45 
740 Chiu ibid 
741Chiu ibid; also Emeka Duruigbo, ‘Tackling Shareholder Short-Termism and Managerial Myopia’ 
(2011–12) 100 Kentucky Law Journal 531; David Millon, ‘Shareholder Social Responsibility’ (2012) 36 
Seattle University Law Review 911; Marc Moore and Edward Walker-Arnott, ‘A Fresh Look at Stock 
Market Short Termism’ (2014) 41 Journal of Law and Society 416; BIS, The Kay Review of UK Equity 
Markets and Long-Term Decision Making (Final Report, 23 July 2012), http://www. 
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question is why the Government if it feels that stakeholders’ interests are being ignored, 
would not turn the directors’ duty under section 172 into a pluralist duty, in which 
stakeholders’ interests rank equally with shareholders’ interests? In that case they would 
have equality with the shareholder right to sue directors on behalf of the company.  
While the Government has announced that it has no plans to amend the wording of 
section 172, it has considered publishing a new guidance on the practical boardroom 
interpretation of directors’ duties, for which it has invited the GC100 group of largest 
listed companies to prepare and publish a draft. Considering the ambiguous wording of 
section 172, such guidance on the performance of directors’ duties is a step in the right 
direction. However, without knowing any details at this point, it is impossible to predict 
effects. 
7.3.6 Strengthening the corporate governance framework in the UK’s largest 
privately held companies 
In addition to the proposed reforms for increasing the employees and other 
stakeholders’ voice, the Government aims to enhance the protection of large private 
companies by providing a set of corporate governance principles. Nevertheless, 
adopting these principles will be voluntary, given that companies will be permitted to 
retain industry-level codes and guidance. At least, in order to increase transparency in 
private companies, large private companies with over 2,000 employees will be required 
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to disclose their corporate governance arrangements in their Directors’ Report and on 
their websites.742 
Critics argue that these measures will not impose any meaningful obligations on 
wrongdoing controlling shareholders and directors to refrain from detrimental 
opportunistic behaviour. Even if large private companies in the UK adopted the 
corporate governance principles and reporting requirements, they would not serve to 
shield companies from harm in all circumstances. For instance, in cases such as BHS, 
there would be no shareholders outside the wrongdoers’ team to discipline directors. 
7.4 The Government’s proposed mechanisms are not sufficient  
The UK Government has claimed that the proposed reforms “will improve corporate 
governance and give workers and the other stakeholders stronger power to engage in the 
management of the company”.743 The UK Prime Minister has also pledged to introduce 
tough new laws for pension schemes to prevent a repeat of the BHS pension scandal. 
She has promised the Pensions Regulator will have the power to block business 
takeovers that could be used to raid pension funds.744 As we have seen, the Government 
reforms, although are promising in rhetoric, will be unlikely to have a practical impact. 
All of this reveals the key problem: in proposing these reforms, the Government still 
assumes that shareholders are the only important group of stakeholders. Only 
shareholders will receive a report on executive pay, and only shareholders will have a 
                                                
742  Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance Reform, The 
Government response to the green paper consultation, Action 11 p 42 
743 ibid Introduction from the Prime Minister  
744 Josephine Cumbo, ‘UK Pension Scheme Protections not expected before 2020’ (October 19 2017) 
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binding vote on it. Even in terms of strengthening the employees and other 
stakeholders’ voice, shareholders would still have more rights themselves than those 
groups. Directors will still report exclusively to shareholders on how they discharge 
their duty to consider employee and other stakeholders’ interests. Also, it is very 
plausible that shareholders will play a greater role in forming the proposed advisory 
council and choosing the employees’ director than the employees. As previously 
discussed, shareholders may not always have a long-term orientation, and they may not 
object to extraordinary rewards for executives as long as they receive substantial short-
term returns on their investments. They may not care when directors harm the company 
assets with opportunistic behaviour putting employees’ jobs in jeopardy. 
There is no chance that the Government’s proposals for large private companies will 
prevent scandals comparable to BHS, which was a family-run business in which 
controlling shareholders and directors stripped the employees’ pension fund. There are 
many other private companies where there are no control mechanisms outside of the 
board of directors. Due to the lack of scrutiny by markets and regulators, the 
wrongdoers’ abuses remain unchecked, and the transparency provided by the proposed 
corporate governance code would likely not affect internal management. 
Employees, however, are the arm and brawn of the company, and the Government 
has clearly identified the need for strengthening their protection. Nevertheless, the 
Government has failed to adequately adopt practical solutions that preserve company 
stability in the long term for the sake of the employees and other stakeholders’ interest. 
Therefore, in addition to the current proposals, which are theoretically constructive, the 
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right to initiate a derivative claim, which is currently restricted to shareholders, should 
be broadened to employees. The employees’ derivative claim right would increase the 
accountability of directors and controlling shareholders toward the company. The need 
for broadening the derivative claim right to other stakeholders, including the employees, 
has also been mentioned by respondents to the Government Green Paper. 745  The 
argument is that empowering the employees with the derivative claim right would 
benefit other stakeholders as well because they could benefit from the stability of the 
company in the long run.  
The thesis argues that instead of only empowering the pension regulator to prevent 
scandals such as BHS in the future, it would be better if such an enforcement right were 
granted to employees themselves. Employees have stronger incentives than the pension 
regulator to protect their own interests in the company either in the form of protecting 
their pension schemes or protecting the company from any other negligent or 
opportunistic behaviour, which could harm the company and damage their interests. 
 
7.5 Establishing an employees’ derivative claim 
 
How can a derivative claim be a useful mechanism in cases like BHS? As we 
previously discussed, protecting the interests of employees very much depends on the 
stability of the company in the first instance. The derivative claim is the only direct 
protection available to the company, as a separate legal entity, to maintain its 
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sustainability. If a violation of the law harms the company and puts the employees’ 
interests in danger, but benefits shareholders in the short run, shareholders will not 
necessarily have incentives to bring a suit; or even in cases like BHS, there might not be 
a minority shareholder to protect the company. Consequently, broadening the derivative 
right to employees in such situations would benefit the company as a whole in general.  
The BHS tragedy might have been prevented, and the company could have been 
saved, if the company’s employees had been equipped with the right to initiate a claim 
on behalf of the company against Sir Philipp Green and all those other company 
wrongdoers for their negligence, mismanagement, and for the misappropriation of the 
company’s assets through dividends and a variety of intragroup transactions. Under the 
current statutory provisions, the derivative claim could be initiated against a 
wrongdoing director or another person, or both 746 but only by shareholders.  
Nevertheless, in cases like BHS – which was a private company – there is no 
shareholder from outside the wrongdoers’ team to act as a watchdog and control and 
stop the wrongdoers’ misconduct. If BHS employees had been equipped with the right 
to initiate a claim on behalf of the company, they could have challenged the directors or 
controlling shareholders’ opportunistic behaviour such as excessive dividends, 
extraction of cash from the company or depleting of the pension funds. Through a 
derivative claim the employees could bring compensation to the company and prevent 
further harm to it. The deterrence role would increase the likelihood of a derivative 
lawsuit by the employees and could have a deterrent effect in preventing losses to the 
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company. The employees would be able to prevent the misappropriation of the company 
assets or stop a self-dealing transaction, which harms the company through a court 
order. The employees derivative claim right would be a threat to managers or majority 
shareholders like Sir Green, who under the current situation feel free to do whatever 
they want with the company’s assets while disregarding the interests of others. Although 
employees do not formally have the right to investigate the company’s documents or get 
direct information on the board’s conduct, they are still in a better position to obtain 
information about the directors’ wrongful conduct in the company and challenge them 
by initiating a derivative claim.  
7.6 The proposal is not in conflict with other employee rights 
It needs to be clear that the thesis proposal is neither a substitute for other proposed 
reforms, such as the right to have a representative on the board, nor does It claim that 
having the derivative right only, would provide ironclad protection for the company 
either through employees or shareholders in all circumstances. Like any other 
mechanism, the derivative claim has its limitations. However, the thesis argues that the 
derivative claim right could work as a complement to other mechanisms.  
The argument is that just like shareholders who have both personal rights as well as 
the right to make a claim on behalf of the company, employees who are often more 
deeply invested in a company with their human capital, and are dependent on the 
company for their livelihoods and their pension benefits, should have similar rights to 
protect their reflective interests. As Paul Davies argues, employee governance rights 
which operate only at sub-board or only at board level (including the advisory panel and 
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having a representative on the board) are unlikely to provide sufficient support for a 
fully effective cooperation arrangement, but each is arguably a necessary ingredient in a 
complete structure.747 Employees’ governance rights such as having a representative on 
the board and a work council can have beneficial effects, provided that the role and 
function of these mechanisms have been defined clearly. The employees’ derivative 
claim right could be the building block to complete this edifice. It is less likely that 
mechanisms providing representation for workers work effectively in preventing harm 
to the company without an enforcement mechanism to support them. What would be the 
advantage of employees being aware of directors’ opportunistic behaviour that harms 
the company when they would not have the enforcement power to stop them? 
One might possibly argue that employees could use other platforms such as media 
discussions or whistleblowing to bring wrongful conduct to the attention of the public. 
However, while either of these mechanisms could be helpful, they both fall short of 
holding directors accountable for breaching their fiduciary duties compared to legal 
action. Many companies, especially private companies, are not large or sufficiently 
well-known to invoke the media attention or become the subject of financial analysts. 
The derivative claim could theoretically play an outsize role in protecting smaller 
publicly traded or private companies against the exploitation by majority shareholders. 
Another argument could be that employees should be given stock in the company, or 
buy it in order to have a greater governance role. This would permit them to sue 
wrongdoing directors in their capacity as the shareholder. Again, this solution does not 
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apply to all companies. Whether employees hold shares depends on the company’s 
capital structure, public trading status, and remuneration policies. It might not apply to 
all the companies. For instance, as a large privately held firm, BHS is an example where 
employees could not have availed themselves of a shareholder derivative claim. 
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7.7 Extending the derivative claim right to the employees’ representative 
Based on the arguments given, statutory provisions under the Companies Act 2006 
should be broadened to include employees as the claimant for the derivative claim. In 
this regard, in addition to the shareholders, the proposed derivative claim would be 
initiated by, a registered trade union that represents employees of the company, or 
another representative of employees of the company. 
The proposal resembles section 165(2)(c) of the South African Companies Act 
2008,748 which clearly permits a registered trade union that represents employees of the 
company or another representative of employees of the company to initiate a derivative 
action.  
In the view of this thesis, limiting the derivative claim right to the employees’ 
representative would reduce the amount of litigation and undercut concerns about 
abusive lawsuits. 
 One argument could be that the employees’ representative, especially a trade union, 
might pursue its own agenda rather than serve the employees’ interests. The situation is 
similar as in collective bargaining, where the union representative could take advantage 
of the situation when dealing with the company’s directors. However, the situation 
discussed here differs crucially in that a derivative claim is brought on behalf of the 
company and only the company would receive any possible benefit or remedy that 
arises from the derivative claim.  Considering the factors such as the role of the court, 
the derivative claim’s tough procedural requirements and the costs of the litigation, it is 
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unlikely that the derivative claim would create many opportunities for misuse. It seems 
doubtful that employees or their representative would take the risk of initiating a time-
consuming and costly litigation, which would not even benefit them personally, with the 
aim of abusing the directors. If we are too concerned about the risk of an employees’ 
representative abusing the situation of a claim on behalf of the company, then we could 
find employees’ representatives on the board, which has already been proposed by the 
UK Government, equally troubling. In the end, it is a larger question as to what extent 
unions are accountable to their constituents, and to what extent the relationship between 
unions and workers entails an agency problem. If such a concern would affect all union 
activities, unions that are properly accountable to workers should be largely immune 
from this criticism. 
Another objection might be that the proposed reform would cause an excessive 
amount of litigation against company directors and would reduce directors’ business 
risk-taking, and consequently affect the profit growth because broadening liability risks 
would make directors more risk-averse. Other jurisdictions have already expanded the 
derivative claim right to other corporate stakeholders, including corporate employees, 
without such an effect. The experience in these jurisdictions reveals that because of the 
derivative claim’s procedural requirements expanding the derivative claim right to other 
stakeholders would not open the floodgates to litigation against the company. 
For instance, the Canada Business Corporations Act 1985 section 238 provides that 
in addition to the members, some specific types of creditors, and directors, the 
derivative action can also be initiated by “any other person who, in the discretion of a 
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court, is a proper person to make an application”. Singapore has also taken the same 
approach to Canada.749 As was mentioned above, more in line with the thesis argument, 
section 165(2) of the South African Companies Act 2008 provides that in addition to the 
members of the company, a registered trade union that represents employees of the 
company, or another representative of employees of the company can also initiate the 
derivative action.750  In Lewis Group Limited v Woollam and Others751 The High Court 
of South Africa held that:” One of the most obviously reformative aspects of s165 of the 
2008 Companies Act is that standing to bring derivative actions is afforded more widely 
than it appears to have been under the common law. Standing is afforded under s 165 
also to directors, employee representatives and any other person who might obtain the 
court’s leave to proceed derivatively”. The court further reasoned that:” Whilst the 
majority of shareholders might be prepared to condone loss occasioned to a company 
due to the negligent conduct of its directors, employees faced with resultant redundancy 
or wage cuts might have a different view and be able to persuade a court that objectively 
it would be in the company’s best interests to seek redress against the negligent 
directors.” 752.  
This thesis agrees with the court ruling that the derivative right for employees would 
pose a greater deterrent to wrongdoers in the company. This is true especially in private 
                                                
749 Singaporean Companies Act section 216A(1)(c); also see Andrew Keay, ‘Assessing and rethinking the 
statutory scheme for derivative actions under the Companies Act 2006’ (2016) 16(1) Journal of Corporate 
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director delinquent or be put on probation; see Maleka Femida Cassim, The New Derivative Action Under 
the Companies Act : Guidelines for Judicial Discretion, (Juta Company Ltd, 2016) 
751 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam and Others (9900/2016) [2016] ZAWCHC 130 
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companies whose directors may otherwise feel sufficiently secure to interfere as they 
please with the company’s assets, or to run the company in a way that benefits them 
personally without having to consider any consequences of their conduct for others. The 
derivative right to employees would make directors and managers more cautious in their 
conduct. Even if they had shareholders supporting them or ignoring harm being done to 
the company, employees would be theoretically in the position to prevent harmful 
actions. Hence, the benefit of broadening the derivative claim provisions to include 
employees would outweigh its possible disadvantages. 
As was explained above, the risk of abusing the litigation is not high. The derivative 
claim is a lawsuit on behalf of the company predicated on shareholders and employees’ 
ability to show that the company’s interest is harmed or is in jeopardy. Therefore, due to 
the claim’s limited grounds, which only apply when the company has sustained harm, 
the two-staged judicial procedure for the admission of derivative suits, and the difficulty 
of surmounting the leave requirements, mean that the risk of abusive claims cannot be 
high.  
7.8 The structure of the current statutory provision should change 
Based on the above arguments, this thesis proposes that the scope of the derivative 
claim’s applicants under section 260 of the Companies Act 2006 should be broadened to 
the employees’ representative. The current statutory derivative claim scheme has been 
established on the shareholder primacy principle. Under the statutory provisions, only 
shareholders have the right to initiate the claim. Consequently, the procedural 
requirements have been based on the shareholder derivative right only. To implement 
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this employees derivative claim proposal, the wording of the current provisions as well 
as some of the procedural requirements should be amended. In the first step the scope of 
the derivative claim applicants under section 260 of the Companies Act 2006 should be 
changed and the section should provide that the statutory derivative claim would be 
initiated by a member of the company, a registered trade union that represents 
employees of the company, or another representative of employees of the company. In 
addition to that, the current derivative claim procedural requirements should be 
reformed and these requirements should be defined by considering both shareholders 
and employees as the applicants. For instance, the current role of the shareholder 
ratification in the context of the derivative claim under section 263(3)(c) should be 
changed. I have already discussed this issue in chapter six. My argument is that the 
ratification of directors’ conduct by shareholders should not prevent employees to bring 
a claim on behalf of the company. The interest of shareholders and employees is not 
always in line with each other and the employees’ derivative claim should be considered 
on the grounds of their own interests only. Furthermore this research’s proposal for the 
derivative claim costs applies to the employees as the applicants as well and they should 
have the equal right as shareholders to apply for an indemnity costs order.  
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7.9 Conclusion 
In light of the BHS scandal and some other companies’ failure in protecting the 
employees’ interests, the UK Government has set out some plans to strengthen the 
employees and other stakeholders’ voice. 
The Government’s specific plans for improving employee protection in the company 
have been set in the form of a mandatory report on how directors comply with the 
section 172 requirements in considering the employees interest, adopting either: a 
designated non-executive director; a formal employees advisory council; or a director 
from the workforce on a “comply-or-explain” basis. Moreover, the Government requires 
the GC 100 group of the largest listed companies to prepare guidance on the practical 
interpretation of the directors’ duty under section 172 of the Companies Act 2006. In 
addition, the Government has unveiled some other corporate governance reforms such 
as standardizing the executive pay and establishing a voluntary set of corporate 
governance code for large private companies. The Government proposed reforms, 
provided that the role and function of these mechanisms will be defined clearly, may 
have beneficial effects. 
However, thesis’ argument is that these proposed reforms would be insufficient to 
enhance the company’s protection. A derivative claim right for employees would help to 
further protect their reflective interest in the company and preserve the company from 
the wrongdoers’ harm. In the current situation, only shareholders have the right to bring 
a claim on behalf of the company when directors fail to comply with their fiduciary 
duties. Nevertheless, they may not care when directors harm the company assets with 
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their opportunistic behaviours and put the employees’ jobs in jeopardy as long as they 
are benefiting from short-term developments in the company. Employees often have 
better incentives than shareholders to protect the company in the long run. Therefore, 
empowering them with the derivative claim right would enhance the protection of the 
company and would benefit the other stakeholders and even in a greater scale society as 
well.  
In this regard, the paper proposed the broadening of the derivative claim provisions 
to a registered trade union that represents employees of the company, or another 
representative of employees of the company. Providing a derivative right to employees 
at least in theory would pose a threat to wrongdoers, especially in private companies 
where there is no external control on directors and controlling shareholders. If directors 
and other wrongdoers are aware that their misconduct can be challenged by a larger 
group of applicants, they will be more strongly deterred from acting without care and 
disloyally, and they would be less likely to run the company in a way conducive to their 
personal benefit, while harming the company itself and its other stakeholders. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
8.1 Summary of the research objective and arguments 
 
After much consideration and many years of consultation, the statutory 
derivative claim was finally established in the UK under the Companies Act 2006. 
The enactment was the result of the difficulties with common law derivative 
action. The English Law Commission, which at the time was in charge of 
reforming the derivative actions, described the law governing derivative action as 
obscure and outmoded. The aim of the reforms was to set a more modern, flexible 
and accessible criteria for derivative actions.  
In the view of this thesis, however, there are some major critiques to the 
statutory derivative claim structure in the UK. Despite the reforms to the common 
law derivative actions, the approach to the derivative claim is still overly restricted. 
The shortcomings of the statutory derivative claim were reviewed in chapter two. 
It was revealed that the problem with derivative claims costs along with the 
ambiguities in the derivative claim procedure requirements, discouraged applicants 
to initiate a meritorious claim on behalf of the company. In addition to that, the 
scope of the derivative claim applicants is limited to shareholders and the statutory 
derivative claim provisions are likely to have been established to protect the 
interest of the shareholders rather than the company as separate legal personality. 
Nevertheless, this thesis argued that the company is a separate legal personality, 
which should be protected for the interest of all the stakeholders in the long run. 
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Therefore, the role of the derivative claim as the only mechanism of protection for 
the company itself should be reconsidered. In chapter three, the thesis reviewed the 
different mechanisms of accountability for directors in both private and public 
companies and argued that the other mechanisms of accountability for directors 
protect the company to the extent that shareholders care. However, shareholders 
might not care about the protection of the company as a whole as long as their 
personal rights are preserved or they can receive profits for their investment in the 
short term. Therefore, although the combination of these mechanisms could 
provide an environment in which the derivative claim is less needed, they might 
not protect the company in all circumstances. To enhance the protection of the 
company, the derivative claim should be available as a complementary mechanism 
for the situations that it is needed.  
The thesis also argued that the efficiency of the derivative claim stands from not 
the high number of the derivative claim cases but the quality of the law that rules 
the derivative claim procedure. The derivative claim is an exceptional remedy and 
which is not supposed to be frequently used by shareholders or employees, 
otherwise it could result in the abuse of the mechanism. The evidence for this 
situation is the United States. It was discussed in chapter four that although the 
derivative suits are frequently in use in the United States, they are not resulting in 
benefit to the company in all circumstances. Therefore, the thesis argued that the 
derivative claim could be an affordable and accessible mechanism under the law 
without the necessity to be implemented too much. To support this argument, 
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chapter five explored the derivative action in New Zealand and although the 
statutory derivative action has a set of smother procedural requirements in 
comparison to the UK, derivative claims are still not frequently used in this 
country. One apparent reason is that under the law the mechanisms of 
accountability are also sufficiently available to protect the company.  
8.2 The thesis proposals 
In order to improve the quality of the statutory derivative claim in the UK, this 
research proposed some reforms. The main proposal of this research is that the 
scope of the derivative claim should be broadened to employees. The thesis 
discussed the limitations of the shareholder primacy theory and the shortcomings 
of reliance on shareholders to protect the company. It was argued that in addition 
to shareholders, employees should have the right to make the derivative claim. 
Among the different stakeholder groups, employees are in a better position to 
protect the company through the derivative claim. They invest in the company with 
their skill and their economic fortune is tied to the company’s well-being. 
Therefore, they have strong incentive to protect the company from the 
wrongdoers’ harm. The thesis also discussed the UK Government proposed ways 
of engaging employees in the management of the company in chapter seven. The 
thesis reviewed these proposals to illustrate why they are not sufficient in 
increasing the protection of the company as a whole in the long term, and why the 
employees’ derivative claim is still needed as a complementary mechanism to 
these proposals. Based on the arguments, the thesis proposed the extension of the 
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derivative claim right to the employees’ representative in the company and 
subsequently suggested some reforms to the structure of the statutory derivative 
claim. The proposal for extending the derivative claim right to the employees’ 
representative has been inspired by section 165(2) South African Companies Act 
2008. 
The other research proposals were a set of reforms to the derivative claim 
procedure requirements. With regards to the role of ratification in the context of 
the derivative claim, this thesis argues that the current approach has added to the 
complexities and ambiguities of the statutory derivative claim. In chapter six, the 
research reviewed the current problems with the role of shareholder ratification 
and suggests that instead of playing a role as a substantial requirement to 
derivative claims, the directors’ conduct which has been ratified by shareholders 
should be taken into account by the court only in the context of the shareholders’ 
derivative claim. It was argued that the employees’ derivative claim should be 
considered on separate grounds because the interest of employees and shareholders 
are not always in line.  
In terms of reform to derivative litigation costs, inspired from the derivative 
claim financial structure in New Zealand, the thesis proposes that upon granting 
permission to continue the claim, the court orders that the whole or part of the 
reasonable costs of a derivative claim must be met by the company unless the 
plaintiff is willing to pay the costs of the litigation himself, or the court considers 
the costs to be unreasonable. Moreover, the research suggests that similar to the 
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corporate benefit doctrine in the United States, in granting the cost order the court 
considers the likelihood of any non-financial but advantageous recovery as well. 
The consideration of non-pecuniary benefit of the derivative claim includes any 
probable court order that would stop the directors to continue a detrimental 
transaction which harms the company. It could also happen in the form of any 
corporate governance reform in the management of the company, for example the 
nullification of a wrongdoing director. The non-monetary outcome of the 
derivative claim could give minority shareholders or the employees the power that 
they do not have in ordinary situations.   
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8.3 Final remarks 
 
If derivative claims are supposed to have a practical role in the English legal 
system, and if all the efforts in reforming the mechanisms are to be effective, then 
some further reforms are needed. The reforms suggested in this thesis would 
ensure that the derivative claim could play a more practical role in protecting the 
company in situations in which the other mechanisms of accountability fail to 
monitor or detect the directors’ misconduct. On the other hand, it guarantees that 
the proposals would not open a floodgate of unmeritorious litigation against the 
company.  
Overall, in the view of this research, the risk of abuse of the derivative claim is 
over-estimated. Because the derivative claim is a claim on behalf of the company 
and all the probable benefit goes back to the company, it is unlikely that the 
shareholder or employee applicant would make a time-consuming and risky 
litigation from which they would not in any event obtain any personal profit, 
without a proper cause of action and only with the aim of abusing the directors.  
Additionally, there would still be sufficient safeguards in the derivative claim’s 
procedure and under the court’s scrutiny to prevent any probable vexatious claim. 
Lastly, directors are usually protected by liability insurance for their business 
decisions. The company takes out the insurance to cover the costs of any probable 
litigation against them. It would be unfair if shareholders and employees who are 
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exposed to the opportunistic behaviour of company directors did not have a fairly 
accessible and affordable remedy to compensate the harm to them. 
 
8.4 Beyond this thesis: future direction  
Although this research attempts to improve the function of the statutory derivative 
claim in the UK, it cannot explore all aspects in this area. In fact, I hope that the 
theoretical inquiry developed in this thesis provides new insight for the future study of 
derivative claims in the UK.  
One of the further avenues of research relevant to the subject of this thesis is the 
question of whether derivative claims could be extended to the creditors in a company.  
Creditors are an important group of stakeholders in a company and which could have 
their interests harmed by directors’ opportunistic behaviour and wrongful conduct. Like 
the employees, the creditors could have strong incentive to save the company from the 
wrongdoers’ harm. Although section 172(3) of the Companies Act 2006 requires 
directors to consider the interest of creditors in situations where the company is close to 
insolvency, the Act fails to empower the creditors with a statutory right to pursue a 
derivative claim in situations where directors harm the company.  
Another problem is that it is not clear when the company is “close to insolvency’’ 
and when directors must consider the interests of creditors under section 172 (3). 
Reviewing the case law reveals that the judicial view is that where a company is 
insolvent, directors must consider the interests of creditors. However, the courts have 
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also failed to be consistent and precise in defining when the duty of directors toward the 
creditors arises.  
Creditors are said to able to protect themselves by the terms of the contracts that they 
make with the company. They are said to have fixed claims in an insolvent company 
and therefore they take the least risk among different stakeholders in a company. 
However, despite the mentioned rights, still the contractual protections are not sufficient 
to protect creditors in all circumstances. One apparent reason is that no contract is 
complete enough to encompass all the proper safeguards against the probable harm to 
the interest of creditors in the future. Therefore, the argument could be that like 
employees and shareholders, creditors should also be empowered with a statutory right 
for the derivative claim. Granting the derivative claim right would empower them to 
bring a claim on behalf of the company in situations that the harm to the company 
affects their reflective interests in the company.  
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